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In recent years, the amount of information that has to be processed by car drivers has
increased: there is more traffic on the roads than ever, information systems have been
introduced both outside (variable message signs) and inside the car (route guidance system,
telephone, fax, television). A reasonable question is whether this increase in information
raises the risk of traffic accidents. Drivers can only process a limited amount of information
at the time, and they may be distracted by irrelevant information.
Much research on the effects on traffic safety of the introduction of in-car information
systems has been conducted within the workload framework. Within that framework,
processing of information from information systems is considered a task additional to the
main task of driving a car. Performing a subsidiary task is assumed to increase the mental
task demands on the driver and research has thus focussed on the effects of secondary task
performance on mental workload during driving. Drivers have performed various secondary
tasks while driving, including various working memory tasks, mental arithmetic tasks, and
driving with complex information systems, such as visually complex route guidance
systems. Driver mental workload has been measured using measures of driving behaviour
(e.g., speed, variations in lateral position) and measures of mental effort, both
psychophysiological measures (e.g., heart rate and its variability) and self-report measures,
such as short questionnaires and rating scales (see de Waard, 1996, for an overview of
research on mental workload and car drivers).
The main results showed that in-car systems can indeed increase mental effort invested.
However, they also showed that drivers often change their behaviour when dealing with
high task demands. For example, when driving with visually complex route guidance
systems, drivers increased their distance to the car that was driving immediately in front
(Noy, 1989) or reduced their driving speed (Pohlman & Traenkle, 1994). These behavioural
adaptations decrease the actual task demands, as drivers give themselves more time to react
to traffic situations. De Waard (1996) noted that goal setting is an important factor in
driving and that strategies to deal with high task demands play a large role, “leaving a part
of the regulation of task demands in the drivers’ hands”. Strategy choice thus partly
determines the outcome of workload measures and the actual level of task demands. Choice
of strategy consequently has effects on the level of traffic safety. However, the strategies
drivers use in dealing with high task demands have not been under direct investigation and
at present, effects of high task demands on driver strategies are not entirely clear. The




To understand drivers’ strategies in dealing with high task demands, it is necessary to
realise that task behaviour is not random, but aimed at attaining certain task goals. The way
a subtask is performed, if it is performed, depends on the value attributed to the associated
task goal. During high task demands, not all subtasks can be performed due to time pressure
and perceptual, cognitive and motor limitations; therefore subgoals have to be traded off
against each other. Drivers’ strategies in dealing with high task demands therefore need to
be understood in terms of setting and prioritising of the task goals that the subtasks aim to
satisfy.
Driving a car fulfils the goal of reaching a planned destination. However, during driving,
many different goals and subgoals are operating at the same time. Some tasks are
performed to attain subgoals of the driving task, such as overtaking, merging into the traffic
stream, or negotiating an intersection, but other tasks serve goals external to the driving
task, for example, tuning the radio, peeling an orange, answering the car telephone. In order
to understand how drivers deal with high task demands, it is necessary to understand the
relative value of these subgoals. For example, from a workload perspective, processing
information from in-car route guidance systems is a task additional to the driving task, just
as processing information from a collision warning system or a traffic information systems:
all these tasks are assumed to increase the task demands on the driver. However, in terms of
goal priorities, some types of “additional” information are highly relevant for the task goals
in driving: processing route guidance information serves a major goal in driving, that of
arriving at the destination, and it can be assumed that it receives more priority than
processing weather information, for example.
At present, however, it is also unknown whether drivers prioritise their subgoals in a
consistent manner. Also, not much is known about how drivers set and evaluate the values
of the various subgoals. Indeed, an important concern in driving behaviour research has
been that drivers are distracted by irrelevant information rather than remaining focused on
the driving task. This indicates that drivers may not always assign high priority to the main
driving task.
Main research question
The main research question that this thesis therefore tries to answer is how drivers during
high task demand situations assign priority to the various (sub)goals, and hence to the
various (sub)tasks. More specifically, do drivers adapt their behaviour in high task
demands, do tasks that are irrelevant to the driving task receive less attention than relevant
tasks, how do drivers choose between goals when they are equally relevant for the main
goal in driving? These are important questions: car driving is a time-critical and safety-
critical task, and the assignment of priorities to subtasks may be of vital importance, both
for the driver and for other traffic participants.
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How do drivers set their goals, choose between conflicting goals, deal with emergency
situations, remember the goals they have set, and prioritise the goals? These questions refer
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to what I will call goal management in this thesis. These questions have not been studied in
car drivers but have been studied in other complex dynamic tasks such as air-traffic control
and industrial process operation. Relevant theories and experimental results of these studies
will be discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
The next chapter (Chapter 2) will start with providing some theoretical background on
developments in traffic psychology to explain why these questions are of theoretical
importance as well. This will be followed by a short description of the driving task as a
hierarchical task with concurrent activities at different levels. It will be noted that at present
it is not established how drivers choose among goals during driving.
Performance in other complex dynamic tasks will be discussed in Chapter 3 as far as it is
relevant for the present research questions. This chapter will describe the demands placed
on operators in such tasks, and discuss how operators deal with these demands. It will also
discuss psychological and cognitive factors in performing and learning complex tasks. It
will be argued that complete automaticity does not exist. Even behaviour that runs of
autonomously is goal-dependent, is not entirely data-driven, and can be interrupted at will.
Also, environmental information is very important in expert task behaviour. Most
importantly, it appears that in routine task behaviour not simple specific stimulus-response
chains run off, but rather general strategies of dealing with the environment.
Chapter 4 will deal with goal management. The chapter will start with a discussion on goal
properties. Some researchers believe that goals have motivational qualities: they create a
“goal tension” to achieve the goal, which increases as long as the goal has not been
achieved. Others believe that goals or intentions are declarative information that needs
rehearsal to prevent decay in memory. How goals are traded off against each other is also
discussed in this chapter, the main conclusion being that operators try to protect their main
task goal when dealing with high task demands.
As the main goal in driving is to arrive safely at the destination, it can be expected that car
drivers focus on this goal despite information overload and that they resist distraction.
Chapter 5 will discuss the literature on workload and car driving to find whether there is
evidence for this assumption. At the end of Chapter 5, the research questions, formulated
only tentatively above, will be formulated more precisely, and the experiments, which will
be discussed in the three chapter that follow, will be introduced. This thesis will end with a
discussion on the main experimental results and will indicate the theoretical and practical





This chapter will provide some theoretical and practical background on the importance of
goals in research on car driving. Car driving is assumed to be a hierarchical task, but the
mechanisms of control between and within the behavioural levels are still unclear. Section
2.2 will discuss the implications of the assumption that car driving is a hierarchical task and
will also show how car driving is a complex dynamic task. The next chapter will pick up on




Ranney (1994) reviewed driving behaviour models, and followed the distinction between
taxonomic and functional models previously made by Michon (1985). Taxonomic models
describe relations between variables without indicating the processes that underlie these
relations. For example, a large body of literature deals with individual differences in
accident involvement. Psychological variables, such as cognitive style, selective attention
or useful field of vision, are used to predict accident involvement. The relation between
these variables and driving behaviour is at best indirect, and this line of research has failed
to find reliable predictors of accident involvement, both for methodological and theoretical
reasons (Ranney, 1994).
Functional models, which include motivational models and information processing models,
do involve dynamic relations between components. In motivational models, risk plays a
central role. These models assume that driving is a self-paced task and that drivers select
the amount of risk they are willing to accept in a given situation. The most important
proponent of these models has been the risk homeostasis theory of Wilde (1982, 1988),
which assumes that drivers aim at a target level of subjective risk. An implication of this
theory is that drivers will compensate for safety-enhancing improvements by driving faster
or less cautiously to re-establish the level of subjective risk. Main criticisms included a
confusion between aggregated and individual levels of analysis, lack of internal
mechanisms that account for the higher-order cognitive functions with which the models
deal (risk, beliefs), and exclusion of cognitive mechanisms (Michon, 1985).
Michon (1985) proposed a hierarchical control model of car driving, where car driving is
seen as occurring at three different levels. At the strategic level, trip decisions are made
regarding route to drive, and general goals are set, such as “minimise time” or “avoid traffic
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jams”. Actual manoeuvring takes place at the tactical level: overtaking, negotiating
intersections; at the operational level, immediate vehicle control occurs, such as change of
gear, braking, steering. Each level is associated with a time scale: at the strategic level,
decisions take minutes, driving manoeuvres are measured in seconds, whereas operational
control actions take less than one second.
A hierarchical model assumes top-down control, so that decisions made at superordinate
levels control behaviour at lower-level levels, but Michon allows for bottom-up control as
well. Momentary traffic conditions can lead to an adjustment of tactical preferences.
Drivers may for example decide to overtake more often when traffic is extremely slow, or
drive more cautiously on slippery roads. Rather than being a single task, car driving
involves different subtasks, performed at different levels of control. Control mechanisms
are assumed to allocate attention between the levels of control. However, it is not known
how attention is allocated to the different subtasks, and Ranney therefore proposed that
future research should focus on these attention control mechanisms.
He suggested to combine the hierarchical control model with concepts derived from work
in automaticity. On the basis of extensive practice, specific situations will automatically
trigger the associated actions. Automatic task behaviour proceeds without conscious
awareness, is fast and effortless; controlled processing does involve effort and problem
solving, and is generally slow. Following suggestions from both motivational models and
information processing theory, Ranney assumes that novel or unexpected situations will
disrupt automatic behaviour and that controlled processing is required to deal with such
situations. He agrees with Summala (1988) that novel or hazardous events evoke
uncertainty and hypothesises that it is uncertainty that might trigger the shift from
automatic to controlled processing: When the driver is uncertain about the present situation
or about which actions to take, control is shifted from automatic to controlled processing in
order to decide on future actions. Summala’s later model of hierarchical control in accident
risk and driver behaviour (1997) also assumes that uncertainty (and overload) may be the
trigger for controlled processing.
However, it is doubtful whether this approach really provides a satisfactory framework.
First, it is questionable that uncertainty triggers the shift to controlled processing. There is a
more straight-forward explanation: novel events simply cannot be dealt with in an
automatic fashion. They cannot be matched against existing behavioural schemata, because
these schemata have not been learned. Only when such schemata have been learned, can
they be applied in similar situations. Therefore, not uncertainty but lack of behavioural
schemata results in controlled processing.
Second, the concept of automaticity is misleading. Automaticity refers to reliable and
consistent behaviour, insensitive to interference. However, on closer inspection not even
gear shifting, a frequently cited example of automatic behaviour, is automatic in this sense
(Groeger & Clegg, 1997). The link between environmental cues and associated responses is
also not as direct as proposed: it is goal-dependent. Consider the car driver who has learned
to associate a red traffic light with a braking response. When this driver is walking,
however, seeing a red traffic light will not automatically lead to a braking response.
Without the driving-a-car goal active, the response will not initiated (Bargh, 1992). Even
“automatic” behaviour is goal-dependent, and under cognitive control. Car driving thus
does not proceed automatically in the sense that it is entirely stimulus-driven, reliable, and
consistent (see also Chapter 3).
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At present, therefore, it is not established how drivers allocate their attention among the
tasks at the different levels of control (Ranney, 1994), or among tasks at the same level.
Traffic psychologists are however concerned about potentially negative safety effects of
secondary tasks and in-car systems on driving behaviour (Verweij, 1993; Alm & Nilsson,
1995). For example, Dingus, Hulse, Mollenhauer, Fleischman McGehee & Manakkal.
(1997) and Pohlman & Traenkle (1994) showed that the number of unplanned lane
deviations increases when drivers use complex visual route guidance systems. Also, use of
mobile phones has been associated with an increase in accident risk (Violenti & Marshall,
1996). Determining how attention is allocated in multitask performance is therefore an
important issue, not just from a theoretic but also from a practical viewpoint.

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Michon (1985) and others thus assume that car driving is a hierarchical task with
concurrent activity at different behavioural level. This section will discuss some
characteristics of a hierarchical task while the next section (2.2.2) will describe the driving
task as a multi-task activity.
2.2.1 Car driving as a hierarchical task
Tasks are undertaken to fulfil a certain task goal. The main task goal is achieved by creating
subgoals, which are satisfied first by performing the appropriate actions. The main task
goals in driving are to arrive at the destination and to avoid collisions. In order to visit a
friend in the country (the main goal), a subgoal is created to drive there (Subgoal1 created
and pushed on the goal stack). A new subgoal may be created to determine the route to
drive (Subgoal2 created), of which “finding the road map” is a subordinate subgoal
(Subgoal3 created). When the road map is on the table (Subgoal3 achieved and removed
from the goal stack), the route is determined (Subgoal2 achieved), and the drive may start
(Subgoal1 achieved). When the destination is reached without accidents, the main task
goals are achieved. In many hierarchical tasks, the task structure includes subgoals that
have their own hierarchical structure as well: they include other subgoals. For example, the
subgoal of overtaking includes subgoals such as check for oncoming traffic, adjust speed.
A hierarchical model supposes that lower-order levels are controlled by higher-order goals.
The main goal in driving is to arrive at the planned destination, which implies that a
decision at the strategic level is needed to select the route to drive. This higher-level goal
sets subgoals and behaviour at the tactical level (such as to turn left before the bridge)
which in turn set the subgoals and actions at the operational level (change into second
gear). This implies that a certain action will only be performed when it fulfils a certain
(sub)goal. For example, only when the subgoal of overtaking is active, will the associated
behaviours (checking rear-view mirror, speed up, move into left lane) be performed. This is
an important property of hierarchical tasks, a point that will be taken up again in the
discussion of effects of high task demands on driving behaviour (Section 5.2).
Decisions at higher levels thus establish the criteria that must be met at the lower levels.
Higher-level goals set the constraints for lower-order behaviour but they do not dictate
behaviour in a deterministic way. The higher-level goals only specify a general plan or
strategy rather than specific behaviour; the actual actions depend largely on actual
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circumstances: they obviously have to be in tune with the actual task environment (Vera &
Simon, 1993). This bottom-up control is an important aspect in all task behaviour, and will
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
Not only the actual actions but also the task goals themselves can be dependent on the task
conditions: higher-order goals may occasionally be adapted to fit the outcome of certain
manoeuvres or the prevailing circumstances. There is evidence to suggest that task goals
are not only adapted but triggered by environmental cues (see Chapter 4).
2.2.2 Car driving as a multi-task activity
Car driving is a multi-task activity. It involves performing many subtasks simultaneously,
both at an operational level and at a tactical level. Aasman (1995) differentiated a number
of driving subtasks. Speed control involves selecting the correct speed and acceleration
rate. Lane keeping, curve negotiating and collision avoidance, and motor control in
handling the car (shifting gear, etcetera) are two other tasks at the operational level. Visual
orientation involves looking in the right direction at the right time. This is a vital but
difficult subtask that serves to get an accurate and actualised overview of the traffic
environment: Novice drivers make many errors in this specific subtask, indicating that
much experience is needed to become proficient in this subtask. Examples of other driver
subtasks, not mentioned by Aasman, are route finding, overtaking, and distance keeping.
Additionally, drivers often perform subtasks that are not associated directly with the driving
task itself, such as talking to a passenger or over the mobile phone, operating the radio set,
eating, smoking, monitoring children, and more.
Aasman considered co-ordination of the subtasks (multitasking) a subtask in itself: doing
the right thing at the right time. Subtasks not only need to be integrated within the driving
task but should also be interleaved with the task environment. Aasman gave the example of
approaching an intersection, where many different subtasks need to be carried out in a very
short time. This involves integration and co-ordination of many discrete visual and motor
actions, but also sampling and interpretation of the environment and other traffic
participants’ behaviour, while actions should be adapted to and in tune with the
environment. Not surprisingly, novices approach intersections at a relatively slow speed.
2.2.3 Dynamic goal management
Car driving is a task performed in a dynamic environment, and critical situations can
develop fast and unexpectedly. Drivers need to be ready to respond to such emergencies but
at the same time should not be distracted from the main task by such interruptions: for
example, after dealing with a child suddenly crossing the road, the driver still needs to
remember the route. Thus, drivers’ goal stacks are not static, but subgoals are created
dynamically as a response to external events. Management of such a dynamic goal stack,
protecting high-priority (sub)goals and keeping behaviour in tune with the environment,




In summary, car driving thus appears a task where higher-level goals set lower-order
subgoals and hence, lower-level task behaviour. The general strategies are adapted to the
actual circumstances encountered, so the actual actions are in tune with the task
environment. The car driving task itself involves performing many different subtasks
simultaneously, and co-ordination of these tasks can be considered a subtask in and by
itself. In order to keep behaviour adaptive to the environment, visual orientation is
important to keep a mental overview of present and potential future situations. To
understand how drivers can perform such a complex task, it is necessary to study how
expertise in general develops. This will be discussed in the next chapter. How people







Car driving is an example of a complex dynamic task, and this chapter will discuss the
complexities that face the operator in such tasks. First, the next section (3.1) will give a
normative task analysis: what do operators need to do. Section 3.2 will discuss some
psychological aspects in performing complex tasks, and possible cognitive processes
involved will be outlined. Although car driving is a complex task for the novice driver,
most drivers can converse, tune the radio and perform other activities while driving. As
experience grows, task behaviour becomes more automated, reducing the demands on
drivers’ working memory. In order to understand driving behaviour, it is thus necessary to
know how behaviour in complex tasks becomes more efficient with experience. Sections
3.3 and 3.4 will therefore discuss how automaticity develops, and how explicit problem






Complex dynamic tasks, such as air-traffic control, industrial process operation, and
medical emergency handling, are characterised by a number of features (Bainbridge, 1997).
First, these tasks are difficult to perform: they are complex and need co-ordination,
organisation and planning of subtasks. Furthermore, they are performed in dynamic
environments where circumstances can change immediately and without warning.
Operators therefore need flexibility to adapt their behaviour to new information and
situations. At the same time, they need to keep their behaviour goal-directed and resist
distraction. They also need a good mental overview of the task situation to be able make
reliable predictions about the future.
Organisation and planning
Complex dynamic tasks often involve performing several subtasks, or involve controlling
several different variables (Bainbridge, 1997). Because of this multitasking, and because
one subtask may not be finished before another is started, subtasks have to be interleaved.
This makes it necessary that subtasks are organised and planned. Subtasks and variables
can be dependent on each other: There can be a strict order in which subtasks have to be
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performed; subtasks can be hierarchically organised. When subtask hierarchies are large, or
the number of subtasks is large, this implies heavy use of working memory.
It may not be possible to perform all subtasks simultaneously. Operators therefore have to
switch between the different (sub)tasks on the basis of their priority. Usually, not all
subtasks are equally important for achieving the main task goal, and it is often possible to
postpone or even give up a subtask. High-priority situations taxes working memory heavily,
as operators have to remember which subtask they were performing before the emergency
occurred. After dealing with the emergency, they furthermore have to determine whether it
is still opportune to finish it.
Dynamic environment
The tasks or variables that have to be controlled are not static, but may change even if the
operator does not take any action. To prevent errors, operators have to take anticipatory
actions: rather than waiting for an emergency situation to develop, operators have to
prevent it from occurring. Actions therefore not only have to be correct and of the right
size, but they also have to be timed correctly.
Still, events can happen that are unexpected. This can happen either because elements in the
environment itself are unpredictable, or because the task itself is so complex that it is not
possible to anticipate all the possible situations beforehand. In these cases, operators need
to assess the new situation or the new information on its relevance for the presently active
task goal, and decide on further actions. When the situation is unfamiliar, the operator has
to work out a strategy to deal with the new situation. This type of problem solving is
mentally demanding, and often requires much background knowledge and expertise.
Search for information
Information is needed to maintain situation awareness, that is, a mental overview of the task
situation, to be able to assess the situation, decide on appropriate actions, and assess the
effects of previous actions. However, not all information may be available, or information
may be ambiguous. Operators may have to make inferences about the state of the system
and the environment. When information is not directly available, active search for
information is needed. An important aspect of expert behaviour is knowing where and
when to find information. This search for information is directed by the knowledge
operators have of the present situation, the knowledge they have of similar situations
(experience), and most importantly by the current task goal (Bainbridge, 1997; Neisser,
1976).
Crucial in task performance is performing the right actions at the right moment. Operators
in complex tasks therefore need considerable competence, that is, “knowledge, abilities and
cognition to generate appropriate behaviour given conditions in the task environment”
(Smith & Hancock, 1995). Equally important for skillful performance is having a correct,
updated mental overview of the momentary task situation; this is sometimes called situation
awareness (although situation awareness has various definitions). The next two sections







Situation awareness is considered crucial in decision making in complex dynamic tasks
(Endsley, 1995). Situation awareness does not merely involve knowledge of the present
situation. It is defined as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their
status in the near future in light of the operator’s pertinent goals” (Endsley, 1995). Correct
comprehension of data and valid predictions of future states require considerable task
competence; some authors equate situation awareness with the competence to know the
cues and demands in the task environment that enable actions which are appropriate to the
present task goal (Smith & Hancock, 1995).
3.2.1 Situation awareness
Situation awareness thus involves the perception, selection and comprehension of
information, the selection of actions, and the projection of that information into the future.
Adams, Tenney & Pew (1995) use the perceptual cycle of Neisser (1976) to explain how
operators attain situation awareness. The main idea is that task performance, and cognition
in general, does not proceed in isolation from the environment. Neisser (1976) proposed the
“perceptual cycle” to describe this interdependence of perception, knowledge, and action. A
person may take some action to achieve a certain goal, which brings about changes in the
environment. Perception of these changes informs the operator about the effectiveness of
the actions performed. This information modifies the operator’s knowledge, and thus forms
the basis of learning. This knowledge (represented as schemata) directs the next actions to
be taken and the sampling of information. In this way, information in the environment
congruent with the present schema will be perceived more quickly and more accurately
because the person anticipates on that information. There is indeed empirical evidence that
the search for and the selection of information present in the environment is dependent of
the presently active goal (Vicente & Wang, 1998; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996).
Neisser included both an inner and an outer circle in his perceptual cycle. The inner circle
includes knowledge that is currently active, information that is immediately available in the
environment, and the actions presently taken. The outer circle includes the knowledge of
the person that the person does have but that is presently not active, information that is not
readily observable, and the actions to obtain information that is not present.
Adams, Tenney & Pew (1995) proposed to divide the immediately active schemata into two
parts: explicit and implicit focus. Adams, Tenney & Pew related explicit focus to working
memory, which contains a limited number of interrelated tokens of (or pointers to)
knowledge structures in long-term memory. They assumed that the contents of explicit
focus are regulated like a “push-down stack”. Maintenance of this information depends on
how recently it has been activated, and on its relevance for the current goal and current
circumstances: the information that has been most recently activated and that is most
relevant for the present goal is held on top of the stack. Implicit focus is the “full-blown
representation of the underlying schema” that is only partially active in the explicit focus; it
is can be equated with knowledge in long-term memory that is associated with the contents
of working memory (or implicit focus). Because this information is already partially active,
it is accessible more quickly than other information in long-term memory.
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Schemata thus play a central role in obtaining situation awareness. Schemata can be seen as
abstracted representations of complex situations, which apply over a range of comparable
situations, and capture the functional significance of elements in the environment. They
link elements in the environment (data) into coherent patterns (information). Endsley
(1995) suggests that schemata are prototypical examples of situations, against which the
current situation is compared. When the task situation matches a schema, actions can be
selected which are appropriate in the given circumstances. Schemata thus direct
information search and the actions taken. In this way, they form the declarative basis for
task competence. The procedural basis for task competence is discussed in the next section,
which will also discuss how task competence is acquired.
3.2.2 Task competence
As experience in complex tasks grows, perceptual cues will trigger the appropriate actions
faster. At the cognitive level there are two main reasons for this: declarative and procedural
learning. Declarative learning involves the formation and refinement of declarative
structures, which at the psychological level may represent the schemata. More declarative
structures will develop, covering a wider range of environmental configurations.
Furthermore, these structures will become more differentiated and increasingly more in
tune with the environment. The presence of these declarative structures diminishes the need
for effortful problem solving in classifying and understanding the state of the environment.
Procedural learning involves the formation of new production rules and adaptation of
existing ones. These rules relate the present goal and the state of the environment to actions.
As the declarative structures become more differentiated, the production rules will also
become more adapted to the demands of the environment. As a result, the appropriate
production is matched faster to the prevailing circumstances and the current goal, and
actions will therefore become selected faster. How this goes about is discussed next.
3.2.3 ACT-R
Within the cognitive architecture ACT-R (Anderson, 1993; Anderson & Lebière, 1998), a
distinction is made between declarative knowledge, consisting of chunks, and procedural
knowledge, consisting of production rules. Declarative knowledge is factual knowledge that
people can report or describe (“what is the capital of England?”), while procedural
knowledge only becomes manifest in performance and cannot be reported directly (“how
do you walk up the stairs?”). Although it is sometimes convenient to use the term working
memory as consisting of the chunks that have the highest activation, a separate structure
representing working memory is not part of the ACT-R architecture.
Retrieval time of chunks depends on their activation so that highly active chunks are
retrieved faster. Chunks gain activation with use, and lose it over time. The level of
activation of a chunk is thus partly dependent on how long ago a chunk was used
previously. A major source of activation is perception: perceived objects receive immediate
activation. Chunks in the focus of attention, not necessarily perceptual objects, receive
activation as well. Chunks are associated with other chunks and they receive activation
from these associated chunks. Goals are also declarative structures, and therefore, chunks
associated with the present goal will also gain activation. In the present simulation model of
ACT-R, it is assumed that, in contrast to other chunks, the activation of goals does not
decrease as a function of time as long as they are on the goal stack, but this assumption has
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recently been challenged (e.g., Altmann & Trafton, 1999a, 1999b); this will be discussed
more thoroughly in the next chapter on goals in Section 4.1.
Production rules form the basis of action, and have a condition (IF) and an action (THEN)
part. The IF past describes the circumstances under which the rule will apply. The THEN part
specifies the actions to be taken in those circumstances. The conditions can have different
levels of abstraction, but always specify certain goal conditions that must be met for the
rule to apply. Because production rules are goal-dependent, the same stimuli can activate
different responses, depending on the present goal. More than one production rule may
match to the state of the environment. A production rule is then selected on the basis of its
expected gain. Expected gain of a production depends, among other things, on expected
success in achieving the goal using this production rule (which partly depends on previous
success), and the expected costs in terms of effort and time of using this production rule.
This implies a preference for production rules which were previously successful and which
have low effort and time costs.
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The basis for a skill are production rules (Anderson, 1993). They allow the fast and stable
task performance that is characteristic of expert task behaviour. Procedural knowledge
develops as a result of solving problems in dealing with the environment. Usually, a novice
to a task will receive some sort of instructions about how to perform the task. A new driver
will, for example, receive instructions about how to change gear from a driving instructor.
These instructions specify the sequence of the actions to be performed. The new driver will
turn these instructions into declarative rules, which specify (the order of) the actions in a
declarative way; for example, first release the accelerator, then press the clutch pedal, then
move the gear stick, etcetera. To change gear, a production rule first has to find and retrieve
the appropriate instructions. The result of this production rule is a declarative rule, for
example to release the accelerator first. A second production rule is needed to interpret the
declarative rule and execute the action. Retrieval and interpretation of declarative rules
requires attention and working memory capacity.
The use of the initial declarative rules will produce failures and successes in achieving the
goal. Examples of solutions, so-called instances, are stored in declarative memory. When a
new task situation is encountered, these may be retrieved directly by a production rule from
declarative memory and the action part of the production rule can be applied directly.
Therefore, using instances in action selection involves low effort and time costs. Because
instances may be matched only partially to the condition part of a production rule, the
instance can also be used in situations which are not identical but only similar to the
original situation. Application of the instance in a similar situation will again provide
feedback about its success, and this will increase the number of useful examples in task
performance. Instances may be generalised and hence cover more situations, which also
improves the efficiency in task performance.
Another important mechanism in skill acquisition is the compilation of declarative rules
into production rules (Taatgen, 1999). The two production rules that were initially needed
to retrieve the declarative rule and execute the found instructions are combined into one
production rule. The new production rule no longer needs to retrieve the instructions but
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directly maps the conditions to the actions. This proceduralisation of declarative rules
considerably reduces the amount of attention and working memory capacity needed
because the declarative rule does not have to be kept active. Although a production rule
does not provide new knowledge compared to a declarative rule, use of production rules is
much faster than use of declarative rules. There is no time needed for retrieval and
interpretation of instructions. Also, use of production rules results in less errors in
performance because no retrieval errors can occur.
As learning continues, production rules will become more and more specialised based on
feedback received about the effectiveness of the associated actions. More subtle relations
between elements in the environment will be recognised and followed by more appropriate
responses. Declarative and procedural knowledge develop in interaction with each other,
and with the task environment. For declarative structures to be successful, they should fit
the functional dependencies in the environment. Whether declarative knowledge is correct
is revealed by the outcome of the actions taken based on declarative knowledge. The
success of procedural knowledge depends on the correct interpretation of environmental
cues and production rules will usually give better performance if the selected declarative
structure is the correct one. Thus, task behaviour will become increasingly more in tune
with the demands and constraints of the task environment. Because building of expertise
explicitly proceeds in interaction with the task environment, task performance will become
optimally adapted to the specifics of the task environment. Expertise is thus highly specific,
both to the task, and to the task environment in which it developed.
An important feature of production rules is that they are goal-dependent: a production rule
will only fire when it matches to the appropriate goal. Although production rules become
more readily selected as a function of practice, production rules will only fire when the
appropriate goal is active. For example, a red traffic light will only automatically activate
the actions of braking when the goal of driving is active; when one is walking, the braking
response by the foot will not take place when one meets a red traffic light (Bargh, 1992).
There is evidence that even implicit learning (i.e., learning without being aware of what is
learned) is goal-dependent (Wright & Whittlesea, 1998).
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At a psychological level, it thus appears that as experience grows within a given task
domain, responses will be selected faster and with less effort. Task performance is said to
have become automatic (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). It is claimed that automatic
behaviour is initiated without the conscious intention to do so, performed without
awareness of the actions and of the stimuli that elicited the actions, and performed without
paying attention to the task. Automatic task performance is also assumed to be highly stable
and not variable. The automotive theory of Bargh (Bargh, 1997; Bargh & Barndollar, 1996;
Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994) takes this position a little further. Not only the responses are
triggered automatically by cues from the environment. It is argued that also the goals
themselves become automatically activated by these cues when these stimuli have been
consistently paired to that goal Bargh (1997) argues that goals and behavioural responses
correspond to mental representations, and that therefore the same principles of
automatisation should apply to them as apply to other mental representations. If a person
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persistently has the same goal within a specific situation, then the goal representation will
become active automatically when situational features present in the environment activate
the internal representation of the situation (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994).
The automotive theory further assumes that when the goal is activated, its associated
strategies or plans to attain the goal are also activated. Furthermore, cues from the
environment may also become associated with the goal-directed actions that were
repeatedly successful in satisfying that goal in the past. Thus, cues from the environment
trigger the goal and its associated actions automatically, without intention to perform the
actions, or awareness of the triggering stimuli. As a point of interest, Bargh also assumes
that not only “chronic” goals can activate the actions, but temporary goals can also trigger
associated actions automatically, that is, without the deliberate intention to do so: control of
actions is said to be delegated to the environment. (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994).
It is however highly probable that even routine behaviour is not so automatic that it
proceeds without intention to perform the actions, or without awareness or attention. For
example, careful observation shows that even gear changing, which is supposed to be a key
example of such a routine action sequence, is highly variable (Groeger & Clegg, 1997).
Changing up is more variable than changing down, and time to complete various
subroutines in changing gear are affected by performing a secondary task. This indicates
that performing the same sequence of actions millions of times is not in itself sufficient to
produce “automatic”, low-variability performance, and that performance of routine actions




As expertise grows, environmental cues increasingly govern task behaviour and at a
phenomenological level, it appears that action control becomes delegated to the
environment (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994). For example, making a turn in driving needs
controlled decisions at first about when to start turning the steering wheel, how far to turn
it, when to let it go. Eventually, the decision to turn the wheel is taken automatically. It then
appears as if curves in the road automatically direct the steering actions of the driver.
Within the ecological approach of psychology, this is called an “affordance” of the road
(e.g., see Suchman, 1993), by which is meant that properties of objects are simply “picked
up” from the environment: they are perceived directly and do not need further processing.
Although the ecological approach assumes that direct understanding of properties is innate,
it is more likely the result of extensive practice and experience within a certain task
domain.
With sufficient experience in a given domain, the relevant information is thus represented
at a highly abstract functional level, so that one does not need to know about the details.
Moreover, because production rules are not available for introspection, the details of the
actions cannot be known directly, although they can be inferred or deduced from
declarative knowledge.
Bargh & Barndollar (1996) and Vera & Simon (1993) noted that behaviour that runs of
autonomously is not a static behavioural response, but an automated “strategy” for dealing
with the environment to reach the intended goal, that is, a general plan concerning future
behaviour. Before a task is performed (for example, driving home, or climbing through a
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difficult passage in mountaineering), a general strategy or plan may set out (route to climb,
use of which limbs at the different locations) but actual circumstances determine the actual
actions performed (when a route turns out to be to difficult, the route has to be adjusted).
Not the specific actions or fixed sequences of actions are activated by cues from the
environment, but strategies, which determine each successive action as a function of current
information about the situation. Thus, the mental system interacts with the environment:
both the general strategies and information in the environment guides actual behaviour.
In summary then, for experienced drivers, driving runs off rather autonomously under
abstract goals such as “driving home”. Many actions of drivers are guided by circumstances
and events occurring in the road environment, and it may appear as if control of action is in






The main research questions that this thesis tries to answer refer to goal management in car
drivers. How do drivers deal with increases in task demands: will they become
overwhelmed by the information, or will they remain focussed on the main task? As we
saw in the previous chapter, task behaviour is essentially goal-directed. Goal-directed
behaviour presupposes concentration on task-relevant (or goal-relevant) information, and
ignorance of irrelevant information. But, as noted previously, in driving and other complex
tasks, more than one goal may be active at the same time. Goal management, that is,
setting, selecting and choosing between goals, therefore plays an important role in complex
dynamic tasks. Because not much is known about goal management by car drivers, this
chapter will discuss the general literature on goal management by operators in other
complex tasks (Section 4.2).
However, because goals play such a central role in this thesis, the next section (Section 4.1)
will first discuss some properties of goals. Successful goal-directed behaviour starts with
formulating a goal, and ends with achieving it. It requires that pending subgoals are
remembered, and achieved subgoals forgotten, among other things. Some authors believe
that intentions to achieve a goal motivate behaviour and create a feeling of tension that only
subsides when the goal is achieved. However, other researchers disagree and think that
goals and intentions have declarative properties: they are simply chunks of information that
may lead to the desired outcome in terms of actions performed, but may also be forgotten




Goals exist at different levels of behaviour. A distinction can be made between general
goals, task goals, and subgoals. General goals are long-term goals, which refer to higher-
order, abstract wishes about positive outcomes that should be promoted or about negative
outcomes that should be prevented. Examples are being a nice person, or being informed
about world affairs. It is this type of goals that social psychologists mostly, though not
exclusively, refer to when they use the term “goal” (Gollwitzer and Bargh, 1996; Higgins &
Kruglanski, 1996). These general goals determine the contents of the task goals. Task goals
are set to fulfil a higher-order goal by performing a certain task or take certain actions; for
example, take the train to Amsterdam, to visit a friend; or read a newspaper, to become
informed. Subgoals are short-term goals that are set in order to achieve the task goal (check
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the train timetable, go to the railway station, buy a train ticket). Task goals can be
considered plans about how to achieve the general goal, while subgoals specify the actions
that have to be taken to achieve the task goal (one possible action specified in a subgoal is
to set even lower-order subgoals, specifying how the higher-order subgoal can be
achieved).
Activated goals or strategies follow the principle of applicability: only in the presence of
environmental information for which a strategy or goal is applicable, is it applied. Once a
goal or intention has been formulated, one has to wait for an opportune moment before it
can be acted on (Bargh, 1997). Strategies or plans need the specific circumstances in the
environment before they can be applied to attain the goal: for example, only when one is
actually climbing can a general climbing strategy be applied (see also Vera & Simon,
1993).
Goals have to be distinguished from intentions. Goals are mere wishes to achieve a certain
end state, while intentions, also called goal intentions (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994), include
a commitment to the execution of actions that bring about the goal state. A number of
phases can be discerned in the process of goal fulfilment (Lewin, 1926). It starts with the
formulation of a goal that one wants to achieve. Next, one has to make this a binding goal
to which one commits oneself. This marks the end of deliberating over wishes and desires
and sets priorities: this binding goal is given priority over other goals (Bargh & Gollwitzer,
1994). The person makes general plans about how to achieve the goal, that is, forms a task
goal. The last phase is that of turning this intention into actual behaviour when the
opportunity presents itself where one can perform the intended behaviour (Gollwitzer &
Moskowitz, 1996).
This implies that intended activities may not be performed, for example because the
appropriate situation does not present itself, other activities seem more important, or it may
difficult to get started. One way to help getting started is formulating so-called
“implementation intentions” (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994), which not only specify the
intention, but also the situation under which one intends to perform the planned actions
(“when situation x presents itself, I will do activity y”). Deliberately linking specific
behaviour to a specific situation or specific time indeed helps people getting started
(Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997).
4.1.1 Goals as motivational entities
Some authors believe that intentions to achieve a certain goal lead to a state of tension, a
subjectively felt need to attain the goal, which only subdues when the goal has been
successfully realised, either by performing the intended actions or performing substitute
actions that equally result in goal achievement (Lewin, 1926). This tension is quite evident
in a person who knows that he or she intended to do something, sometimes without
remembering what it is he or she has to do. The value of the goal determines the strength of
this tension and therefore how likely it is that the associated behaviour will be executed: for
a person who wants to achieve professionally, a mailbox will more strongly activate the
action to post a letter when that letter is a job application letter than when it is a personal
letter to a friend (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996). This tension has motivational qualities:
it increases over time, it is relieved as soon as the goal has been achieved, and it results in
task persistence in the face of interruptions or obstacles (see also Bargh, 1997).
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There is evidence that suggests that the activation of the intention indeed increases over
time. When intentions are time-based, that is, when a certain activity has to be performed at
a specified time, activation of an intention has been shown to increase over time. Goschke
& Kuhl (1993) found evidence that the activity of such time-based intended activities
persists in memory, and increases when the time arrives that the intended activities are to be
performed. They also found that details of intended activities are recognised faster and
recalled better than non-intended activities. This was also true when participants were
meanwhile engaged in other activities so as to prevent active rehearsal of the intended
activities. Interestingly, in ACT-R (Anderson, 1993), goals are the only declarative units
that do not need activation or active maintenance, that is, rehearsal, to stay available.
As a result of the tension to achieve a goal, people should want to finish the task after they
have been interrupted before the goal has been satisfied. Evidence for task persistence
comes from research on task interruptions (Lewin, 1926) and time delays between the
setting and execution of intentions. Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai & Barndollar
(unpublished, cited in Bargh, 1997, p. 39) showed that participants primed for achievement
by a word-search puzzle continued on a (different) task after they were told to stop.
Participants in another experiment were likewise primed for achievement. They showed
better performance on a performance task than participants in the neutral priming condition.
This difference was increased when there was a 5-minute delay between the priming task
and the other task. Intentions thus follow the principle of applicability. As long as the goal
has not been achieved, it creates a goal tension which increases until the opportunity has
presented itself where the goal can be achieved.
Evidence for the motivational character for intentions also comes from research on recall of
uncompleted tasks. According to Lewin’s theory (1926), the tension to achieve the goal
remains until the goal is achieved. This implies that as long as a task has not been finished,
it would remain in memory, that is, uncompleted tasks should be remembered better than
tasks that were accomplished. Zeigarnik (1927) showed that participants who were
interrupted before they had finished a large number of tasks indeed remembered more
names of interrupted than completed tasks. Many researchers have since then tried to
replicate these findings. Van Bergen (1968) gave an extensive literature review on these
studies and found that exact replications did not show this so-called Zeigarnik effect. Of
modified versions of the original study, at best only half of these studies showed the effect.
Van Bergen’s interpretation of the Zeigarnik effect, which she believes is a non-existing
effect, is that if the effect is observed, it is due to the particular laboratory context and the
implicit social relation between participants and researchers, not to the motivational
qualities of intentions themselves. She further notes that participants, if asked to do so, may
in fact be able to recall the name of an unfinished task or describe it, but are often unable to
say whether they had in fact finished a particular task or not. This also argues against the
concept of “goal tension”.
4.1.2 Goals as declarative information
Delayed intentions, intended activities that cannot be performed immediately, are the
subject of research on prospective memory. The successful execution of delayed intentions
is assumed to hinge on at least two skills: remembering at the right moment or in the right
situation that one has to do something, called memory of intent; and remembering what one
has to do, memory of content (Brandimonte, Einstein & McDaniel, 1996). In contrast to the
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previous results on the motivational qualities of intentions, research on prospective memory
shows that remembering and executing intentions is not perfect. It furthermore shows that
realisation of delayed intentions needs active maintenance of the intentions. Lewin (1926)
mentioned the example of a person who knows that he or she intended to do something but
forgot what the activity was and interprets this as a positive result of tension towards goal
fulfilment. Researchers on prospective memory would, however, actually interpret this as
loss of memory for content.
Although Goschke & Kuhl (1993) found that intentions do not need active rehearsal for
better recognition and recall, there is evidence to the contrary that goal intentions are not
executed without fault. McDaniel, Robinson-Riegle & Einstein (1998) showed that
intentions are executed less often during a divided attention task. When another task was
performed (a pleasantness rating task) at the time when the action should be performed, the
intended action was executed less often than in the single task conditions.
Byrne & Bovair (1997) also showed that working memory load at the time of retrieval of
the intended action determines the occurrence of a specific error in retrieval of goals, a
post-completion error. A post-completion error refers to forgetting to perform a last action
when the main goal has already been achieved, for example forgetting to retrieve the
original from the photocopier when the copies have been made. In an experimental study,
Byrne & Bovair found that the frequency of such errors increased when working memory
load was increased by using a more complex task, a task with more time pressure, and in
participants with lower working memory capacity. Interestingly, when Lewin discussed
forgetting of intentions, he already described an experiment (performed by Birenbaum)
which dealt with a post-completion error. Participants were asked to solve problems on
separate sheets of paper and to put their autograph under each solution. Many forgot to do
so, which Lewin explained by the fact that the autograph was not “embedded” within the
same “action sphere” as the problems and that therefore, the intention was not very
“lively”.
Altmann & Trafton (1999a) showed that when rehearsal of subgoals was prevented in a
complex task with a hierarchical goal structure, reaction times and errors increased, also
indicating that active maintenance is needed for retrieval of goals later. Furthermore,
pending goals, i.e., goals that are not yet fulfilled, intrude more often than goals that have
already been achieved, suggesting that achieved goals are omitted from the rehearsal loop,
while pending goals remain active.
These results show that active maintenance of goals and intentions is indeed needed in
successfully realising delayed intentions. Altmann & Trafton (1999b) performed two
computer simulations in ACT-R of the experimental data on the Tower of Hanoi task. The
first simulation was based on the normal ACT-R architecture, where (sub)goals remain on
the goal stack until they are fulfilled, with no additional processing needed to maintain their
activation, that is, with perfect memory for goals. The second simulation used the same
ACT-R architecture, but goals were treated as normal declarative units, which decay over
time, and need active maintenance (rehearsal) to remain active. Both simulations showed
good agreement with the experimental results on reaction times. With respect to the number
of errors and the type of errors made, however, the second approach, where goals need
rehearsal to remain active, was in better agreement with the data than the “classic”
approach. Their computer simulation of another task (the Red Tape task) with goals that
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need rehearsal was also in good agreement with both the reaction time and error data
(Altmann & Trafton, 1999a).
McDaniel, Robinson-Riegle & Einstein (1998) suggested two possible causes for the failure
to respond to a prospective cue (the cue that should elicit the desired action) under divided
attention conditions. The first is that the additional or cover task is so demanding that
participants do not notice the cue to which they should respond. The second possible cause
is that the realisation of delayed intentions requires working memory. West & Craik (1999)
studied the loss of intentions in elderly people and they suggest that the slowing of
responses to prospective cues in the elderly participants result from temporary “lapses of
intentions”. They found that elderly participants do notice the cue and know that they
should respond to the cue, but that they temporarily do not recall which actions they should
perform as a response. West & Craik suggest that maintenance of an integrated
representation of the task context in working memory (also called task set; Hockey, 1986)
is temporarily lost in these participants.
Guynn, McDaniel & Einstein (1998) show that reminders only help in successfully
realising one’s intentions when they specify both the target stimulus (the prospective cue)
and the intended activity. Mäntylä (1996) also presents evidence that planning facilitates
prospective remembering because it increases the level of activation of the associated
chunks and the number of potential cues for activating the action. Gollwitzer &
Brandstätter (1997) also show the importance of the specification of the situation where the
intention is to be carried out. When that situation is specified in more detail, the intended
action is performed more readily than when the situation is not specified. They suggest that
goals that are more difficult to achieve profit most from the formation of these so-called
implementation intentions.
4.1.3 Summary
The literature on goal maintenance and realisation of intended actions seems therefore
contradictory. Some authors claim that the formulation of intentions lead to an increase in
tension and the motivation to achieve the goal as soon as circumstances allow. Furthermore,
it is claimed that memory of one’s intentions is therefore better than memory for other
declarative information. It has however been suggested that intentions might be better
remembered simply as a result of more elaborate processing at encoding of intentions than
of other declarative information (Crowder, 1996). This hypothesis would partly explain
why intentions are remembered better while they are at the same time subject to decay, as
other declarative information.
There seems to be sufficient evidence to state that intentions or subgoals in working
memory need to be rehearsed for the intended actions to be performed at the appropriate
situation. Prospective memory, remembering to perform one’s intentions at the appropriate
time or place, is vulnerable to interruptions and obstructions. Especially in situations where
working memory demands at time of retrieval are high, for example when performing other
tasks, successful implementation of intended activities is hampered. This suggests that
intended activities are indeed represented as declarative structures. They are subject to
decay and they have to compete with other chunks of information for activation.
Interestingly, this is quite clearly acknowledged by Lewin himself, who also discussed
forgetting of intentions. However, he did not want to discuss the specific case where they
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are forgotten as a result of high task demands at the time when the intentions have to be
actualised, precisely because to him it was so obvious that high task demands could
obstruct this (Lewin, 1926, p. 343).
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The present thesis is concerned with the possibly detrimental effects on driver behaviour of
information overload. In car driving, more goals may be active simultaneously, and drivers
need to respond to emergencies and deal with other interruptions. Although the driving task
has lost much of its complexity for the experienced driver, information overload may still
present difficulties. These cognitive demands on the driver may still constrain task
performance because of the capacity limitations in working memory. The next section on
multiple task performance will first outline that the goal stack or task queue in complex
dynamic tasks is not static, but prioritised and dynamic. The second section will be devoted
to how operators in general deal with high task demands, particularly with complex tasks,
and whether they remain focussed on the task, resisting distraction.
4.2.1 Multiple task performance
Once the task goal has been set, the operator will want to achieve the task goal and will
perform the actions to reach the goal state. Therefore, most of the operator’s behaviour is
aimed at satisfying this main goal. However, formulation of the goal is only the first step
towards goal attainment. In general, it may be difficult to get started, to perform the right
action at the right time, to deal with difficulties, to compensate for failures in task
performance, to ward off distractions, and to negotiate conflicts between goals (Gollwitzer
and Moskowitz, 1996).
In complex dynamic tasks, operators are usually performing several subtasks at the same
time (Bainbridge, 1997), and these need to be planned and co-ordinated. Circumstances are
constantly changing, independent of the operator. Furthermore, memory for goals and
intentions is vulnerable to interruptions and needs rehearsal to avoid forgetting. Quite
likely, some goals may already be forgotten before they are turned into intentions. There is
usually time pressure under which actions may have to be selected and performed. There may
be a strict order in which the subtasks have to performed, or they are hierarchically organised.
At the same time, operators have to keep their behaviour goal-directed but be flexible as well
in responding to important changes in the environment. This implies a dynamic management
of goals.
In cognitive science it is often assumed that the maintenance of the task queue proceeds on
a last-in-first-out (LIFO) basis (e.g., ACT-R). Attainment of the main task goal (driving
home) is subdivided into achieving a number of subgoals (start engine, turn key). These are
pushed unto a goal stack, where the last subgoal (turn key) is served first (leading to a chain
of activities: turn key in order to start engine in order to drive home). It can be seriously
questioned whether this approach would increase our understanding of multiple task
performance. It is conceivable that multitask performance uses separate goal stacks
(Anderson, 1993), but this would not explain or predict how choices are made regarding the
order in which the subgoals from different stacks would be served. More importantly, even
tasks known for their hierarchical goal structure are probably not solved with the use of
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such a LIFO goal stack (Altmann & Trafton, 1999b). Most likely, the order in which goals
are served depends on their relevance: (sub)goals are prioritised (Adams, Tenney & Pew,
1995). Furthermore, in complex dynamic tasks, the goal stack is not a static entity, but
changes continuously to adapt to changes in the environment; the enviroment may also set
new goals (see also Section 3.4).
There are two main sources of information for operators to remember what they still want
to do: working memory, where pending goals and intentions are stored, and the
environment. Information in working memory is vulnerable: activation of information in
working memory decays as a function of time. The most important method to prevent decay
is rehearsal. Because working memory is also involved in problem solving, and maintaining
of other information, there may not always be time to rehearse the goals or other important
information in complex dynamic tasks, even though goals that have been accomplished are
removed from the rehearsal loop (Altmann & Trafton, 1999a).
However, the state of environment also provides powerful cues regarding progress on the
task goals and intended actions. Checking the environment for the results of actions is often
sufficient to reconstruct the intermediate steps in and the progress towards goal fulfilment
(seeing the kettle on the gas suffices to check on the progress towards making tea).
Furthermore, the environment provides prospective cues: stimuli that are associated with
intended actions. When implementation intentions (see Section 4.1.2) have been formulated
specifying the situation where an intended action is to be executed, the situation might
trigger the activity; Gollwitzer & Brandstätter (1997) even assume that this proceeds
automatically. It may be questioned whether complete automaticity exists in complex tasks,
but it is safe to say that especially for experienced operators, it is likely that certain
environmental stimuli will have become associated with certain actions and certain goals.
This relative behavioural automaticity obviously reduces the need to remember goals in a
declarative manner in working memory.
4.2.2 Mental task demands
The main question of this thesis concerns the effects of high task demands on driver
behaviour. Important questions refer to information overload of drivers, and distraction
from the driving task as a result of high mental task demands. Because traffic behaviour
research has mainly focussed on the effects on mental workload of drivers instead of on
behavioural strategies, this section will discuss how operators in general deal with high task
demands. Results from traffic behaviour research will be discussed more fully in the next
chapter, which is entirely devoted to car driving.
In computer science, the complexity of a problem is determined by the time that the most
efficient algorithm would need to solve it (Taatgen, 1999): the longer the algorithm takes to
solve the problem, the more complex the problem. Because problems in computer science
are solved by perfect problem solvers, complexity is a property of the task, not of the
problem solver. However, this formal definition is too restricted. Humans can solve
(subsets of) even the most complex problems because they have learned how to solve
certain instances of complex problems (Taatgen, 1999). At the same time, humans cannot
always solve problems that are not very complex. Apart from difficulties such as lack of
appropriate knowledge, expertise, time, or information, an important difficulty for humans
in solving not-so-very-complex problems lies in remembering the intermediate results,
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remembering the (sub)goals, and combining information with each other: the limiting factor
is working memory. As the total activation of chunks is assumed fixed, there is a limit to
the number of chunks that can be retrieved from working memory successfully. For
example, Anderson, Reder & Lebière (1996) showed that decay in working memory, i.e.,
loss of activation, can account for decrements in dual task performance as task complexity
increased. Rehearsal is an example of a strategy to preserve the activation of chunks
(Taatgen, 1999). Task complexity is thus largely based on the limitations of working
memory.
As experience grows, more efficient methods can be used. This reduces the cognitive
demands of the task. In view of the inter-individual and intra-individual differences in
strategies of task performance, and because the ultimate expert who shows perfectly
efficient task performance does not exist (Taatgen, 1999), it is impossible to make a general
task analysis of the complexity of a task that would apply to all people performing the task.
It is therefore impossible to determine the mental demands of a task independently of the
individual’s working strategy (see also Meijman & O’Hanlon, 1984). However, in general,
people tend to use a working strategy that does not tax working memory too heavily, in
order to protect the main task goal.
4.2.3 General strategies of dealing with task demands
High task demands thus may threaten effective task performance because the limitations in
working memory may make it impossible to process all information. However, most tasks
can be done in a number of different ways, and operators do not always use the same
working strategy (Bainbridge, 1978; Welford, 1978). Operators have been shown to use at
least three ways of dealing with high task demands (Bainbridge, 1974; Hockey, 1993, 1997;
Hockey, Wastell & Sauer, 1998): investment of more effort; behavioural adaptation or
change of working strategy; and neglect of subsidiary information. These strategies will be
discussed in more detail.
Invest more effort
The first way to deal with an increase in task demands is to invest more effort into the task.
G. Mulder (1986) distinguished between compensatory and computational effort.
Compensatory effort was supposed to be associated with compensating for a
psychophysiological state (due for example to fatigue or drug use) that was not optimal for
performing the task, and computational effort with controlled information processing (as
opposed to automatic information processing). I have previously used the terms state-
related effort and task-related effort to describe these types of effort (Cnossen, 1994). There
is empirical evidence (Wiethof, 1997) that these types of effort can be differentiated. Task-
and state-related effort are not opposite dimensions of task demands; for example,
performing a complex task while being fatigued or in noisy conditions involves both types
of effort. It is possible to invest both state-related effort and task-related effort at the same
time. Use of working memory is associated with task-related or cognitive effort.
Hockey (1997) describes a model of compensatory control which involves one type of
effort, but at two different levels. In his conceptualisation, operators have an “effort
budget”, based on anticipated resource needs of the task, level of skill, and so on. When
effort is still within the effort budget, effort is regulated automatically. At this so-called
lower level, representing the automatic control of well-learned skills, effort is invested
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whenever minor mismatches occur between target output criteria and actual performance.
Effort at the lower level is equivalent to the computational effort associated with task
demands, and this type of effort is invested without further costs. This is called the active
coping style. When the perceived level of difficulty is too great to be met by small
adjustments to the effort budget, operators either adjust their performance target downward
(passive coping style) or increase the effort budget (strain coping style). However, at this
higher level of the effort budget, effort investment is associated with costs: fatigue, anxiety,
and secretion of stress hormones (catecholamines and cortisol). Whereas effort at the lower
level is determined primarily by the task demands, effort at the higher level is more
motivational in nature.
Change working strategy
Another way to deal with high task demands is to change the working strategy. There are
usually more ways to do a complex dynamic task (Bainbridge, 1974) and not all working
methods involve equal amounts of effort. Operators can therefore perform the task with a
working method that is less demanding, involving less calculations or other manipulations of
information, or involving fewer storage processes of information. For example, they may
write things down, instead of trying to remember them. Operators may also decrease the
aspired level of performance for which they strive: they may be content with less accurate task
performance, or they may reduced the required level of speed with which the task is
performed. A well-known example of operators changing their working method to reduce the
demands on their working memory is the case of air-traffic controllers. They started using less
demanding strategies to assign flight routes to pilots as the number of aircraft increased
(Sperandio, 1971, 1978). Rather than treating each aircraft individually and assigning it
with custom-made routes, operators assigned standard routes to the aircraft. In this way, the
time to land an aircraft increased, but the demands on the controller’s working memory
decreased. Therefore, an adequate level of safety was preserved, despite the higher number
of aircraft under control.
Pay less attention to subsidiary activities
The third way to deal with high task demands is to pay less attention to subsidiary activities
or to non-essential information. Operators have even been shown to skip a subtask if that
subtask is not essential for the main task (Hockey, Wastell & Sauer, 1998). As mentioned
earlier, not all subtasks are equally important in achieving the main task goal and some can
therefore be skipped without hampering the fulfilment of the main task goal. One of the
best-documented form of decreases in secondary task performing during high task demands
is attentional narrowing, or increased selectivity (specific instances of this are called tunnel
vision). Under an increase in task demands, it has been found that peripheral information is
processed less by operators, as they concentrate on information presented centrally, which
they considered to be less important (Welford, 1978).
Summary
Although the level of task performance may decrease by adopting less demanding working
strategies, or by paying less attention to non-essential subtasks or information, it is
important to note that this happens only in what participants consider less important parts of
the task. Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that operators will not always strive for
perfect task performance, but will be content with performance considered adequate. In this
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respect it is noteworthy that achieving the main task goal was the very reason why the task
was initiated in the first place, and even in high task demands, operators will try to protect
the main task goal. All of the above-mentioned strategies of dealing with high task demands
serve to protect the main task goal. Rather than becoming overwhelmed by the demands
that the task presents them, operators try to keep their behaviour goal-directed. When there
is more information than can be processed, or more actions than can be performed, choices
have to be made. It appears that people performing tasks will choose performing those
actions that are necessary to achieve the main task goal and neglect less relevant ones. In





The previous chapter discussed some strategies of operators in dealing with high task
demands in complex dynamic tasks. It indicated that operators try to preserve their primary
task goal when task demands are high. In car driving, the main goal is to arrive at the
planned destination while avoiding accidents. Mental task demands for car drivers mainly
come from performing tasks such as map reading, tuning the car stereo, making telephone
calls, processing information from an in-car route guidance system or from variable
messages signs along the road. In light of the increase in in-car information systems
introduced into cars, and the continuing increase in traffic volumes, the main question of
this thesis is whether drivers can deal with such a high information load. This chapter will
be dedicated to traffic behaviour research and examine whether behavioural adaptation to
high task demands has also been observed in car drivers.
Although car driving is considered a complex dynamic task, an important difference
between driving and tasks such as industrial process operation, flying an aeroplane, or air-
traffic control is the nature of task environment. Operators in other complex tasks often
need to infer the state of the process or the state of the environment from indirect
information sources (e.g., displays) and, perhaps more important for mental task demands,
have to remember this information. For the car driver, more information is visually
available in the environment. Cognitive demands are thus lower for car drivers than for
operators in other complex dynamic tasks. However, expertise is needed for optimal use of
environmental information. The next section (5.1) will therefore not only focus on the role
of the environmental cues in driving, but also discuss driving expertise. Goal management
in car drivers is discussed in Section 5.2. Having set the stage for the next three chapters in
which three experiments will be discussed, this chapter will end (Section 5.3) with a
formulation of specific research questions that those experiments try to answer.
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In comparison with other complex dynamic tasks such as air-traffic control or flying an
aeroplane, car driving is more environmentally cued. In most other complex tasks,
information about the environment and the task is often not (visually) present and needs to
be inferred. An air-pilot cannot directly observe the position of the flaps in the wing, the
state of the landing gear, or a fire in an engine; rather, this information needs to be inferred
from displays. In contrast, most of the information necessary for driving task is available in
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the environment. Obtaining situation awareness, i.e., knowing the present state of the
environment and the task, is therefore less difficult for car drivers. Although information
may not always be visible to car drivers (for example, the position of following cars on the
road cannot be observed when the driver looks ahead), information is usually readily
obtainable: changing visual focus suffices to obtain a direct up-to-date overview. Expertise
is, however, needed to guide visual search: experienced drivers know where and when to
expect information, and where to search for it.
5.1.1 Expertise
Expertise depends on the ability to recognise the general category of a specific situation,
and on performing the appropriate actions in the appropriate situations. Experts will
develop general schemata which enable the classification of the situation. This determines
the general strategy to deal with the environment. The specific actions are determined by
this strategy, but tuned and moulded by information from the environment so that the
resulting behaviour is maximally adapted to the actual circumstances.
5.1.2 Schemata
Although traffic situations vary greatly in their specific details, car drivers often encounter
the same traffic situations: negotiating intersections with minor or major roads, entering and
exiting the motorway, driving a motorway, etcetera. Consistent exposure to similar traffic
situations will result in the development of specific schemata. These schemata guide the
perception and selection of (goal-)relevant information from the environment, the
interpretation of behaviour of other traffic, the selection of actions and prediction of future
traffic situations. As a result of practice, environmental cues will increasingly trigger
associated behaviour, or rather, activate the subgoals to deal with the specific traffic
situations. As experience grows, so does the number of schemata, which become more
differentiated as well. As a result, car driving becomes increasingly more environmentally
cued.
For novice drivers, it is not always obvious where information is, where it can be expected,
and when to search for it. It requires considerable experience to develop information
searching and noticing patterns. Novices look closer to the vehicle, and in contrast to
experienced drivers do not look farther forward when their driving speed increases
(Mourant & Rockwell, 1972; Neboit, 1983). Experienced drivers focus more on the horizon
than novice drivers (Carter & Laya, 1998), and can use peripheral vision in lane keeping
more than less experienced drivers (Summala, Lamble & Laakso, 1998).
Experienced drivers use schemata or reference situations more than novice drivers (Saad,
1996). Experienced drivers compare the actual situation against such reference or prototype
situations, and base their decisions on a representation of the typical behaviour adopted in
such situations. Deviations from this typical behaviour by other drivers leads to increased
monitoring and adaptation of driving behaviour (e.g., increase headway). Only experienced
drivers report the environmental cues on which they base these judgements, suggesting that
novice drivers do not use that information or are not aware of these cues. This difference
between novice and more experienced drivers is also evident in the type of errors made in
visual search. Novice drivers mainly look in the wrong direction because they lack
knowledge concerning which situations might become dangerous. Experienced drivers’
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search patterns are based on expectations and they typically overlook dangerous situations
when they occur in unusual locations. That visual search is dominated by expectations is
also shown by Theeuwes (1996). Objects at unusual locations are detected later, even when
they are highly salient.
The development of these schemata depends on consistent associations between
environmental cues and future situations. In the Netherlands, physical appearance of
motorways is rather consistent, while other roads outside of built-up areas have less
consistent lay-out. This indeed impedes the development of prototypical representations:
Dutch drivers have developed a prototypical representation of a “motorway”, but not of
other roads (Theeuwes, 1998).
5.1.3 Expertise is specific and dependent on the environment
In Chapter 3, expert task behaviour was said to be goal-dependent and highly specific.
There is indeed strong evidence that the development of expertise is highly specific. For
example, Duncan, Williams, Nimmo-Smith & Brown (1993) showed that in experienced
drivers, individual driving subtasks, e.g., mirror checking, overtaking, merging, were only
marginally correlated with each other, indicating that each subtask develops independently
from the others. Moreover, within-subtask performance was variable as well: there was no
tendency to generally be a “reliable mirror checker” for example. This probably indicates
that performance of specific tasks relies to a large extent on the specific environmental
details encountered. Groeger & Clegg (1997) also showed that timing in gear shifting is
very variable. Berthelon, Mestre & Taramino (1996) performed a study in which drivers
had to assess the arrival time of a crossing vehicle at the intersection. When abstract images
were used (moving dots), driving experience had no effect on decision time, but with
realistic images (driving simulator), more experienced drivers were faster and more
accurate in their decisions. They appeared to have gained an increased ability to select
quickly the relevant cues and/or to analyse complex visual scenes. This also hints at skill
specificity.
More generally, these studies indicate that in the development of a specific skill, task-
specific cues become associated with task-specific actions. It appears that the specificity of
expertise lies in the variability of the environment, not in the schemata themselves. As
experience grows, the schemata become more differentiated to be more in tune with the
environment.
Anticipation plays an important role in driving. Anticipation allows faster reactions to
traffic situations and adaptation of behaviour to prevent potentially dangerous situations.
Rather than reacting to dangerous situations as they occur, drivers thus prevent them from
occurring. For example, drivers increase their time headway when the car in front signals to
turn at the next intersection (Van Der Hulst, Meijman & Rothengatter, 1999). Drivers also
increase their time headway when they anticipate that the lead car will slow down to give
way to a car from the right (Van Der Hulst, Rothengatter & Meijman, 1998). When driving
in fog, they also increase their time headway. In this way, car drivers increased the time
available to react to potential hazards, which obviously reduces task demands.
Anticipatory actions are based on schemata. For example, the decision to overtake is not
based on the momentary state but on the expected development of that situation (Saad,
1996). The expected development is part of the driver’s representation of normal behaviour
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in reference situations. The cues from the environment and such a schema enable the
anticipation of future situations. In more experienced drivers, the number of schemata will
be higher, and be more detailed and differentiated, allowing more anticipation in
experienced drivers.
5.1.4 Summary
Thus, car driving appears be less complex than other complex dynamic tasks. Most
information is readily observable in the environment, and mental schemata can be easily
checked against environmental information. This reduces the demands on working memory
and enables the driver to perform other tasks during driving. However, drivers thus rely
heavily on visual information. Therefore, the introduction of visual in-car information
systems (of which route guidance systems are an important example) has stimulated
research on the effects of performing visual tasks while driving. The next section will





Car driving is a task where different goals operate at different levels of behaviour. Despite
some differences with other complex tasks, car driving is clearly a complex and dynamic
task. It can be assumed that trading off between goals proceeds in the same manner as in
other complex tasks: preservation of the primary task goal is likely to be important in car
driving as well. This review will discuss experimental results from relevant driving
behaviour studies.
Car driving is a hierarchical task, and arriving safely at the planned destination is the main
goal in car driving. In order to achieve the main task, subtasks aimed at satisfying subgoals
have to be performed to achieve the main task goal. Thus, behaviour at the operational level
(speed control, lateral control, mirror checking) is under control of goals at the tactical and
strategic level. As an example, only when a driver is planning to overtake or change lane, is
it necessary to check the rear-view mirror (although driver may check the mirrors to
maintain a mental overview of other traffic). Driving behaviour is thus hierarchically
controlled. This top-down control does not rule out bottom-up control: most tactical and
operational goals in driving are mainly determined by the traffic environment, and only to a
lesser extent by general goals such as being in a hurry. Goals in driving are context-
dependent. For example, whether it is opportune to overtake depends on the traffic
environment: only when there is a slow car in front is overtaking opportune. Many goals in
driving are therefore created dynamically as a response to external events.
Drivers perform several subtasks during driving. Many subtasks are a direct part of the
driving task (e.g., speed control, steering, visual search, distance keeping), but others are
not (tuning the radio, picking up the car telephone). On the basis of results in other complex
dynamic tasks, it can be expected that drivers will neglect the subsidiary tasks (radio and
telephone handling) when task demands increase.
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5.2.1 Manipulation of task demands
Task demands have been increased by a number of manipulations. Visual route guidance
systems use displays to indicate the route to drive. Usually, the digitised maps indicate the
current position of the driver and the route to drive, but some systems use simple arrows.
The RG systems that were tested often included auditory support. Although checking a RG
system is a task additional to driving, the information it presents is highly relevant for
drivers. The main goal of arriving at the destination implies knowledge of the route to
drive. Drivers are thus faced with a goal conflict: to arrive at the destination they need to
check the system, but to perform the driving task safely, they need to look at the traffic
environment. To study demands of a more cognitive nature, various working memory tasks
have also been used, which are usually presented auditorily. The next two sections (5.2.2.
and 5.2.3) will discuss evidence on changing of working method and giving up subsidiary
activities by drivers under high task demands.
5.2.2 Change of working strategy
Speed reductions
The most important way of reducing task demands is by reducing driving speed. Many
studies found that drivers reduce their driving speed when task demands increase. Lower
driving speeds allow more time for information processing and are thus highly effective in
reducing the demands on the driver. For example, when drivers had to operate the car
stereo, time to complete a route increased, implying that driving speed was lower (Jordan &
Johnson, 1993). Other studies, using direct speed measures, also found that car drivers
reduced their driving speed when task demands increased. Srinivasan and Jovanis (1997)
studied a number of route guidance (RG) systems and also found that in high task demand
situations, drivers reduced their driving speed.
In a study by Dingus et al. (1997), a relation was found between level of demands and
driving speed. Participants were required to drive with different RG information systems:
visual displays, traditional paper maps, or messages by voice. The authors noted the long
duration of glances at the displays of the visual RG systems, indicating high visual
demands; in general, long glances are taken as evidence that the information presented is
difficult to process (Fairclough, Ashby & Parkes, 1993). Interestingly, systems with the
highest visual demands were associated with lowest driving speeds.
When drivers drive with a route guidance system, speed reductions are particularly found
near intersections. Pohlman and Traenkle (1994) studied the effects of different RG systems
on driving performance. The high visual demands of the electronic and paper maps resulted
in deteriorated lateral control and in speed reductions, which were especially found near
intersections. The fact that speed reductions are particularly found near intersections is not
surprising. Route decisions are made near intersections and it can be assumed that the RG
system will be consulted near intersections most heavily. The visual load of the RG systems
will therefore be most prominent near intersections. Furthermore, it is at intersections that
drivers interact with other traffic most, and attentional demands will therefore be highest
there. Drivers apparently try to resolve the goal conflict by reducing driving speed allowing
more time for both tasks.
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Other adaptations
Noy (1989) found that car drivers increased their distance headway to the front car when
driving with an in-car visual system. Interestingly, this effect was especially found when
drivers were actually looking at the system, suggesting that drivers are aware of the
negative effects that looking at the display have on driving performance.
Hancock, Simmons, Hashemi, Howarth & Ranney (1999) studied driver distraction by
having drivers react to a digit presented on a phone display screen by pressing a key on the
phone pad to indicate whether the digit was part of a memory set. The stimulus was
presented as the driver approached a signalled intersection where drivers had to come to a
stop if the traffic light turned red. With the distracter task, drivers started to brake later after
the change of the traffic light. However, they compensated for the later detection by
braking more intensely.
5.2.3 Neglect of less important tasks
Mirror checking
Checking the rear-view mirrors helps building up a mental overview of the traffic situation,
but it is only a critical subtask when the goal is to change lane. Mirror checking can thus be
considered a task of a relative low priority in most traffic situations. It can be expected that
under high task demands drivers reduce checking their mirrors, or decide not to overtake. A
number of studies support this. A number of studies examined rear-view mirror checking in
drivers under high task demands. Landsdown (1997) used two different visual displays: one
presented congestion information, the other route guidance (RG) symbols. Fairclough,
Ashby & Parkes (1993) used two different visual RG systems: one in which an electronic
map showed the route to drive, and one in which written text instructions were presented on
a screen. Brookhuis, De Vries & De Waard (1991) presented participants with a mental
arithmetic task over the car telephone in differing traffic densities.
All studies showed that car drivers indeed check their rear-view mirror less frequently when
task demands increased. This adaptation to the task demands did not hamper traffic safety,
as priority of mirror checking was probably not very high in these studies. Fairclough’s
study was performed in relatively low traffic intensity, where a mental overview is easily
obtained. In the study by Brookhuis, De Vries & De Waard, participants in the highest
traffic condition were instructed to follow a lead car as accurately as possible, ruling out the
possibility of overtaking it and strongly reducing the necessity to check the mirrors. When
traffic intensity increased, participants checked their mirror less often. The mental
arithmetic task reduced mirror checking in the conditions with lower traffic conditions, but
not in the highest traffic conditions. Most probably, mirror checking was already of low
priority because participants were following a car as accurately as possible. Landsdown’s
study also strongly suggests that the reduction in frequency of mirror checking is dependent
on the priority of the other task that increases task demands. Frequency of mirror checking
decreased in the RG condition but not in the congestion warning condition. Apparently,
participants regarded the route guidance information more important, which is not
surprising, considering that route finding is an important subgoal in driving.
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Other adaptations
It has also been found that drivers focus more on traffic-relevant objects when task
demands increase. For example, De Waard (1991) compared the time that car drivers
looked at traffic-relevant and traffic-irrelevant objects for different road sections. He found
that on a combined entrance/exit section of a motorway, drivers spend more time looking at
traffic-relevant objects (for example, other cars) compared with driving on a straight section
of the road. Wierwille, Hulse, Fischer & Dingus (1991) showed that as traffic intensity
increased, drivers looked less at the visual display on the dashboard and more at the traffic
environment. Gugerty (1997) studied memory for positions of other cars. He found that as
the number of cars on the road increased, the number of cars recalled decreased. However,
drivers focussed more on potentially hazardous cars.
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5.3.1 Main question: goal management
The main question of this thesis refers to goal management and task strategies in car
drivers. Drivers are increasingly required to deal with high information load: traffic density
increases, and so do the number of in-car devices and the amount of information along the
road. Traffic behaviour researchers have expressed concern about the potential information
overload and distraction of drivers, which may threaten traffic safety (e.g., Verweij, 1993).
From a traffic safety viewpoint, it is important to ask what drivers will do when they have
to deal with more information than they are able or are willing to process. Will their
priorities be with performing the driving task safely, or will they be distracted by additional
information and additional tasks? This is a question of how do drivers assign priorities to
subtasks, or stated differently, of how they deal with conflicts between different goals.
As was discussed in Chapter 2, driving is assumed to be a hierarchical task, with most
activities confined to the tactical and operational level. Goals at the tactical level determine
the goals at the operational level, and thus guide actual driving behaviour. Much of driving
behaviour is in response to the environment and it can be assumed that many goals at the
tactical (and strategic) level are triggered by the actual (and expected) state of the
environment. It is unclear, however, how this lower-level, bottom-up control interacts with
higher-level control. Ranney (1994) concluded in a review of traffic behaviour models that
it is presently not established how drivers allocate their attention among the tasks at the
different levels of control.
Most goal conflicts in driving behaviour thus take place at the same level, and it is not clear
how drivers deal with conflicts at the same level. The literature overview in the previous
chapter suggests that some tasks may be more central to the driving task than others. As
route finding is part of the main goal in driving (arriving at the destination), RG
information is probably more important to drivers than the news on the radio, for example.
It is therefore hypothesised that some tasks are more important than others, even if they are
at the same hierarchical level within the driving task. It can be assumed that important tasks
in driving are route finding, collision avoidance, lateral and longitudinal control.
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5.3.2 Overview of experiments
The main three strategies in dealing with high task demands appear to be investment of
more effort, neglect of subsidiary tasks, and change of working methods (see Chapter 4). In
order to investigate these strategies in drivers more fully, three experiments were designed
and performed in a driving simulator. How do drivers assign their priorities among different
subtasks: are some subtasks more important than others? Do drivers adapt their behaviour
to increases in task demands? These questions are addressed in the next chapter (Chapter 6)
and in Chapter 8. In the experiments discussed in Chapter 6, drivers performed various
demanding subtasks at the tactical level, whereas in the experiment in Chapter 8, drivers
had to weigh two conflicting subtasks at the strategic level.
Experiment 1: Conflict between goals at the same level
The first experiment, to be discussed in the next chapter (Chapter 6), dealt with the strategy
to neglect subsidiary tasks. It tested the hypothesis that tasks at the same hierarchical level
may have different priorities. More specifically, it tested whether route information is more
important than irrelevant traffic information. Two different tasks were performed in a 2 x 2
design: using a map for route finding and processing and remembering traffic information.
Task demands were furthermore varied by manipulating traffic density. It was assumed that
high traffic density is a factor increasing task demands that cannot be neglected by the
driver in the same way as traffic information or a map can. It was expected that driving in
high traffic density would either increase the investment of mental effort or result in
behavioural adaptation of the driver, for example by reducing speed. There were no
expectations on how this would interact with the performance of the other tasks
Experiment 2: Relation between driving speed and mental effort
As the previous section showed (Section 5.2.2), a rather consistent finding in the literature
is that drivers reduce their driving speed when task demands increase. This was interpreted
as an adaptive behavioural response: reducing speed would decrease the task demands,
which in turn would reduce the need for further effort investment. However, it has never
been shown directly that a reduction in driving speed does indeed reduce task demands.
This was therefore the main question in the second experiment, discussed in Chapter 7: do
drivers reduce their speed as an adaptive response to high task demands? The idea behind
the experiment was that if reducing speed is a way of decreasing mental task demands,
different driving speeds should be associated with different levels of mental effort. Drivers
were therefore requested to drive with different speeds. In one condition, drivers were
requested to drive as accurately as possible, complying with traffic rules, as if taking a
driving test. This was expected to result in a relatively low driving speed. In the other
conditions, speed was increased in two ways: in one condition, they were asked to drive as
fast as possible without hampering traffic safety. In the last condition, they had to follow a
lead car driving at high speed. All conditions were driven twice, once without and once
with an additional memory task. It was hypothesised that drivers would neglect this
subsidiary task when driving with high speeds.
Experiment 3: Conflict between main goals in driving
The question whether additional information can hamper traffic safety was addressed
directly in the last experiment, discussed in Chapter 8. The objective was twofold. The first
question concerned the trade-off between conflicting goals at the same level. The main goal
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in driving, to arrive safely at the destination, can be divided into two parts: arriving at the
destination, and preventing accidents. A conflict was induced between the two goals of
route finding and collision avoidance. How this goal conflict is solved by drivers is an
important question, also from a traffic safety viewpoint. Drivers were presented with
auditory route guidance messages just prior to an intersection. At the same time, a car from
the left does not observe the priority rules and fails to give way to the participant. It was
expected that handling of the emergency situation would interfere with trying to remember
the route messages. It was hypothesised that the dealing with the emergency would receive
more priority.
Apart from trying to answer the question of how this goal conflict is solved by car drivers,
this experiment also explored the properties of goals and intentions. From the literature on
goals and intentions (Chapter 4), it became clear that there is no consensus regarding the
nature of intentions. They are assumed to have motivational qualities, which render them
relatively resistant to obstructions, but they are also considered declarative structures
subject to decay, for which active maintenance is required to prevent loss of intentions. The
experiment therefore also included conditions in which the emergency with the car from
left occurred after the route guidance messages had been presented. In this way, it could be
tested whether the emergency interfered with the encoding of the messages, or with the
memory or execution of the previously formed intentions. It was expected that if intentions
are remembered as declarative units, an emergency occurring when they are actively





















When drivers perform additional tasks while driving, research shows conflicting results: primary
driving performance may deteriorate but adaptive changes such as reducing driving speed have also
been noted. We hypothesised that the nature of the secondary task may be important: drivers may give
more priority to tasks that serve goals of the driving task itself, for example route finding, than tasks
not directly relevant for driving, for example tuning the radio. The main objective of the present
driving simulator study was to test this hypothesis. Twenty subjects performed two different subsidiary
tasks while driving through two levels of traffic density: a working memory (WM) task and a map
reading (MAP) task. It was hypothesised that in high task demand situations, the WM task, irrelevant
for the driving task, would be neglected more than the MAP task. The results confirmed the
hypothesis: in MAP conditions, the WM task was indeed neglected, but map reading resulted in more
serving, indicating that the subjects looked at the map despite the high task demands. It is concluded
that drivers will be highly motivated to get route information, and RG systems should therefore
present their information in a readily understandable format.
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One of the key features of complex dynamic hierarchical tasks is that the people who
perform them have to adapt their behaviour to the dynamic environment. In complex
dynamic tasks, operators are usually performing several subtasks at the same time, which
all serve different task (sub)goals. Operators have to switch between these task (sub)goals,
taking the appropriate action at the appropriate time. This allocation of effort between task
goals is a key aspect of the effectiveness of task performance in complex dynamic tasks
(Bainbridge, 1997). The dynamic adaptation serves to keep task behaviour goal-directed
and coherent. The relevant task goal has to be preserved and protected against disturbance.
Effective task performance involves selecting relevant information while ignoring
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irrelevant information. Operators only select information relevant for achieving the current
task goal (Vicente and Wang, 1998).
The same task performance can be achieved by applying different working methods, and
each working method may require a different amount of “mental work” (Bainbridge, 1974;
Welford, 1978). When operators are confronted with increased task demands, they can
either invest more effort, or adjust the performance targets. In the latter case, operators may
decrease the desired level of accuracy or speed; use less demanding strategies; or ignore
subsidiary activities (Hockey, 1997). In general, operators will protect high-priority task
goals. For example, Sperandio (1978) reported that air-traffic controllers resorted to less
demanding strategies to assign flight routes to pilots as the number of aircraft increased.
Rather than working out which were the more efficient or comfortable routes, the
controllers resorted to assigning standard routes to the aircraft. In this way, an adequate
level of safety was preserved, despite the higher number of aircraft under control.
It can be assumed that the preservation of the primary task goal is also important in an
everyday skill such as car driving. Arriving at the planned destination is clearly a main task
goal in car driving, as is avoiding accidents. Potential disturbances are the demands of
secondary tasks, such as tuning the car stereo, making telephone calls, or talking with
passengers. It can be assumed that car drivers will attempt to protect the main task goal
from these disturbances.
A considerable amount of research has been carried out into the effects of secondary tasks
on driving performance. Some studies did find adaptive1 reactions of car drivers. For
example, Jordan & Johnson (1993) showed that the time to complete a route increased
when drivers had to operate the car stereo. This implies that driving speed was lower. Other
studies, using direct speed measures, found that car drivers reduced their driving speed
when secondary task demands increased (Pohlman & Traenkle, 1994; Srinivasan &
Jovanis, 1997; Dingus et al., 1997). Noy (1989) found that car drivers increased their
distance headway to the front car when looking at an in-car display.
On the other hand, many traffic studies report additional tasks to have negative effects on
driving performance. Traffic research shows that drivers can be so distracted by subsidiary
tasks that driving performance is affected. For example, Landsdown (1997) and Fairclough,
Ashby & Parkes. (1993) found that drivers reduced their mirror checking, when they were
driving with a visual route guidance (RG) system. The same effect was found when drivers
performed an auditory memory task (Brookhuis, De Vries & De Waard, 1991). Pohlman &
Traenkle (1994) found that drivers deviated from their lane more when they drove with a
complex visual RG system than when driving with a common paper map. Dingus et al.
(1997) also reported that drivers had more unplanned lane deviations when driving with
complex RG systems due to inappropriately long glances at the displays. It has also been
reported that drivers did not increase their headway to the car in front sufficiently to
accommodate for the increased reaction time due to performing a secondary task, even
though they did have the opportunity to do so (Alm and Nilsson, 1995). Also, when drivers
                                                          
1
 Note that in this paper, adaptation refers to behavioural changes aimed to protect the main task
goal in high task demand situations; it should be distinguished from the concept of ‘behavioural
adaptation’ (sometimes termed ‘risk compensation’), which refers to behavioural changes
specifically triggered by safety measures (such as airbags, antilock brakes, or collision avoidance
systems).
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performed a distracter task where they had to indicate on a touch screen whether a number
presented on a display matched the first number in a memory set, drivers used more time to
start braking and to come to a stop (Hancock et al., 1999).
The results seem contradictory. One reason for this discrepancy might lie in the nature of
the secondary tasks used in driving behaviour research: not all secondary tasks are
irrelevant for the driver. For example, although checking a RG system and performing a
memory task are both tasks additional to driving, RG information is highly relevant for
drivers, whereas a memory task presents information that is irrelevant for the driving task.
We hypothesised that tasks that serve the driving task directly will receive more priority of
drivers that tasks that are less important for the driving task. To understand which subtasks
of the driving task are more important for drivers than others, it should be acknowledged
that car driving is a hierarchical task, where arriving safely at the planned destination is the
main task goal (Michon, 1985). Behaviour at the operational level (speed control, lateral
control, mirror checking) is thus under control of task goals at the tactical and strategic
level. However, this top-down control does not rule out bottom-up control. Many tactical
and operational task goals in driving are determined by the traffic environment, and only to
a lesser extent by general task goals such as being in a hurry. For example, whether a driver
will overtake depends on the traffic environment: only when there is a slow car in front is
overtaking opportune. Many task goals in driving are therefore created dynamically as a
response to external events, and are thus context-dependent.
People performing complex dynamic tasks can use different strategies to achieve their task
goals. When faced with high task demands, operators may increase the amount of mental
effort invested to ensure the same level of performance. Alternatively, they may decide to
use less demanding strategies while still trying to achieve the main task goal, and in this
respect, skipping a less essential subtask may help to protect the main task goal. We assume
that tasks that serve goals high in the driving task hierarchy are considered more important
that lower-order goal, and that tasks not directly related to the driving task are neglected
more often in high-demand situations. There is indeed evidence that this is the case.
The most important way of reducing task demands for drivers is by reducing driving speed.
Many studies found that drivers reduce their driving speed when task demands increase.
Lower driving speeds allow more time for information processing and are thus highly
effective in reducing the demands on the driver. For example, Dingus et al. (1997) used
different RG information systems: visual displays, traditional paper maps, or messages by
voice. They found a relation between level of demands and driving speed. The authors
noted the long duration of glances at the displays of the visual RG systems, indicating high
visual demands; in general, long glances are taken as evidence that the information
presented is difficult to process (Fairclough, Ashby & Parkes, 1993). Interestingly, systems
with the highest visual demands were associated with lowest driving speeds. The speed
reduction with these systems can be thus be interpreted as an adaptive response by the
subjects to poor design of the system.
Other research shows that these speed reductions are indeed not random but are particularly
found in situations where the demands from the RG system are highest. Pohlman &
Traenkle (1994) studied the effects of different RG systems on driving performance.
According to the authors, the high visual demands of the electronic and paper maps resulted
in deteriorated lateral control and speed reductions without consideration of the traffic
regulations or other road users, especially near intersections. Obviously, it is at intersections
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that drivers interact with other traffic most, so attentional demands will be highest, and
perhaps more importantly, it is near intersections that route decisions have to be made: it is
where the RG system will be consulted most heavily. The visual load of the RG systems
will therefore be most prominent near intersections, and hence, speed reductions will be
largest. Burnett & Joyner (1997) also found that when driving on a motor way, visual
allocation to the RG system is highest when approaching an exit, which also resulted in
more compensatory steering wheel movements.
Another way of reducing task demands is increasing time headway to a car in front, which
allows more time to react to speed changes of the lead car. Fairclough & Graham (1999)
found that drivers who had not slept for a whole night had a longer time headway to a front
car than drivers who had slept for only 4 hours and drivers who had had a normal night
sleep to compensate for slower reactions. The authors interpreted this as an adaptive
strategy to counteract an increased risk of rear-end collision due to the impairment caused
by sleep deprivation. Van Der Hulst, Meijman & Rothengatter (2000) found that after
prolonged driving, drivers who reported an increase in fatigue increased their time
headway, whereas drivers who did not report more fatigue after prolonged driving, did not
increase time headway. This clearly suggests that experienced fatigue influences time
headway such that fatigued drivers may invest less effort while still preserving traffic
safety. The same authors also reported that in limited preview conditions (fog), drivers
increased their time headway to compensate for later detection of speed changes of the
front car (Van Der Hulst, Rothengatter & Meijman, 1998).
A related finding is that drivers after prolonged driving or sleep deprivation invest less
effort in their steering performance. Standard deviation of lateral position, a measure of
swerving, increases as a function of time on task (Brookhuis & De Waard, 1993; Van Der
Hulst, Meijman & Rothengatter, 2000) and as a result of sleep deprivation (Fairclough &
Graham, 1999). Psychophysiological results from Egelund (1982), Brookhuis & De Waard
(1993) and Fairclough & Graham (1999) indicate that prolonged driving results in less
effort invested, and this is reflected in steering performance. Interestingly, Fairclough &
Graham (1999) emphasised that partially sleep-deprived drivers only showed decrements in
non-safety-critical behaviours, not in safety-critical tasks. They only neglected their
steering until the situation became more critical, which was evidenced by the increased
frequency of near-lane-crossings compared with the other experimental groups. The authors
interpreted this minimum strategy as a compensatory response to the impairment due to
sleep deprivation. Drivers who were fully deprived of sleep were however unable to protect
fully safety-critical tasks, that is, they showed more lane crossings, and the number of lane
crossings increased with time on task.
Thus, drivers have been shown to neglect a non-critical subtask, when their psycho-
physiological state is non-optimal. Dropping a non-essential subtask is also a major strategy
when dealing with high task demands. Drivers perform several subtasks during driving
(e.g., McKnight & Adams (1970) described 45 major tasks and 1700 sub-tasks in driving).
Many subtasks are a direct part of the driving task (e.g., speed control, steering, visual
search, distance keeping), but others are not (tuning the radio, picking up the car
telephone). It can therefore be assumed that car safely drop certain subtasks when task
demands increase. Because of the hierarchical nature of the driving task, car drivers only
perform a certain type of behaviour if it serves a higher task goal. It thus depends on the
priority that is assigned to the higher task goal, whether a particular type of behaviour can
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be omitted if task demands increase. Furthermore, the same task goal can be highly relevant
in one context and inappropriate in another, and the driving context thus determines to a
large extent the priority of a certain task goal.
This is exemplified by studies on visual sampling behaviour under high task demands.
Checking the rear-view mirrors helps building up an overview of the traffic situation and is
important when slowing down, e.g., on approach to an intersection, but it is critical when
the task goal is to change lane. Giving up mirror checking under high task demands is
therefore only critical to traffic safety in certain situations. A number of authors have
studied rear-view mirror checking of drivers under high task demands: Landsdown (1997)
used visual displays with congestion information and route guidance (RG) symbols to
increase task demands; Brookhuis, De Vries & De Waard (1991) presented subjects with a
mental arithmetic task over the car telephone. These studies showed that car drivers
checked their rear-view mirror less frequently when task demands increased.
This can be considered an adaptive response of the drivers to the high task demands.
Apparently, in these studies, task demands increased to such an extent that drivers gave up
certain aspects of their behaviour. It is very likely that subjects chose to give up the subtask
of mirror checking, because in these studies it was not part of a high-priority task goal. In
Landsdown’s (1997) driving simulator study, the frequency of mirror checking only
decreased in the RG condition: in the congestion warning condition, there was no
difference compared with the control condition. Apparently, subjects’ priority was more
with the route guidance information than with mirror checking. This is not surprising,
considering that route finding is one of the most important subgoals in driving. Furthermore
traffic density was low (Landsdown, 1997, p.222), so the need to check the mirrors may not
have been great.
The study by Brookhuis, De Vries & De Waard (1991) was performed on the road. It
included three levels of traffic density, and subjects drove with and without an auditory
memory task in all traffic densities. In the condition of the highest traffic density, subjects
checked their rear-view mirror less frequently than in other traffic densities. In contrast to
the lowest traffic density situation, the frequency of rear-mirror checking in the other
density conditions was the same for both memory task conditions; performing the memory
task did not reduce mirror checking. This makes sense, since in high traffic density,
monitoring other traffic is a high-priority task. The authors’ explanation for this “minimum
strategy” of mirror checking was that drivers do not reduce mirror checking below a certain
level. However, subjects’ behaviour may have been even more strategic than this. To
impose a “heavy traffic” condition, the subjects were instructed to follow a lead car as
accurately as possible. The subjects’ main task was therefore to react to actions of the lead
car. This instruction obviously rules out the possibility of overtaking it. Therefore, the
necessity to check the mirrors was already low, irrespective of the memory condition.
Other studies on visual sampling behaviour confirm that car drivers’ visual behaviour is
context-dependent. De Waard (1991) compared the time that car drivers looked at traffic-
relevant and traffic-irrelevant objects for different road sections. He found that on a
combined entrance/exit section of a motorway, drivers spent more time looking at traffic-
relevant objects (for example, other cars) compared with driving on a straight section of the
road. Wierwille et al. (1991) showed that as traffic density increased, drivers looked less at
the visual display on the dashboard and more at the traffic environment and observed that
“drivers do adapt reliably and appropriately to both anticipated and unanticipated increases
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in driving task demand while navigating”. These studies show that in demanding situations,
car drivers will focus their visual attention on information relevant for the present task goal,
and neglect information that is irrelevant (see also Vicente & Wang, 1998).
Previous research thus support the view that drivers protect high-priority task goals,
possibly at the expense of low-priority goals in cases of high task demands. However, this
assumption has not been tested directly. The present study therefore examined directly
whether drivers give less priority to tasks external to the driving task than they do to tasks
that serve the driving task more directly. The experiment was performed in a driving
simulator, enabling the presentation of the same conditions to all subjects. As an external
task we used an auditory working memory (WM) task, which had no direct relevance for
the driving task of the subjects, and we assumed that subjects might neglect this task if task
demands increased. In half of the conditions, subjects received simple route guidance
messages; in the other half of the conditions, subjects had to use a schematic paper map of
the town for route finding. We assumed that map reading is directly relevant for the driving
task because it serves the main task goal in driving of arriving at the destination. We
therefore hypothesised that subjects would not neglect this task, even when task demands




Twenty male subjects from our institute’s subject pool participated in the study. All had
taken part in earlier experiments in the simulator. Mean age was 32.9 years (SD 7.3) and
mean annual kilometres driven was 19,000 (SD 12,000). They were paid a fixed amount for
their participation.
6.3.2 Experimental environment and conditions
The experiment was performed in a fixed-based driving simulator (described by Van
Wolffelaar & Van Winsum, 1995). The simulator car is a BMW 525 with original controls,
which are all linked to the driving simulator. The pedals and the steering wheel provide
resistance feedback as in a real car. The Silicon Graphics simulator has a 165 degree angle
of vision horizontally and a 45 degree angle of vision vertically. The simulator software
presents interactive sound of the engine depending on the number of revolutions of the
engine.
Subjects drove in an urban environment (with a speed limit of 50 km/h) with many
intersections, traffic signs, buildings, and traffic lights. There was other, artificially
intelligent, traffic driving in this town, which reacted in a naturalistic way to the actions of
other cars and to those of the participant. The scenario specification facility of the simulator
allowed the presentation of the same traffic situations at the same locations for all
participants. Almost all road sections were in built-up areas, which had the effect that
subjects could only see other cars approaching an intersection when the other cars were
about 30 meters from an intersection because of buildings along the road obstructing the
view.
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All participants completed two journeys, one in low and one in high traffic density. In
heavy traffic there were about twice as many cars at intersections and on the road. The
route for the two journeys was the same, except that they were driven in opposite
directions. The order of traffic conditions was balanced across subjects.
Each journey consisted of four consecutive rides, representing four conditions, in which
two factors were varied: type of route guidance (RG) and presence or absence of a working
memory task (WM). Participants were given two types of route guidance: they were either
given a map (MAP), or they received simple auditory route guidance messages (ARG). The
4 conditions in a ride were therefore: MAP with WM task, MAP without WM task, ARG
with WM task, and ARG without WM task. The order of these 4 conditions within a
journey was balanced across subjects, but for each subject, the order of the four conditions
in quiet and busy traffic was the same (e.g., if a subject started with ARG with WM task in
high traffic density, he would also start with ARG with WM task in low traffic density).
The total number of conditions therefore was 8 (see Table 6.1). Each condition lasted about
four minutes, depending on speed driven.
In the ARG conditions, route guidance messages were given by an electronic female voice
and were a simple “turn right” or “turn left”, presented 100 meters before an intersection.
When no message was presented, subjects had to drive straight on.
In the MAP conditions, participants were given a schematic paper map, which indicated the
route to drive. Road names or other landmarks were not indicated on the map as they were
also absent in the simulated environment due to processing limitations of the simulator
computer. All intersections and roads of the town were however clearly indicated on the
map. Therefore, although the paper map was not a real road map, it provided all the
necessary cues for navigating. We believe that this was not unrealistic, as people in real life
sometime have to navigate in an unfamiliar environment by means of schematic drawings
of the route to drive. After all, people in general may use environmental cues such as street
names, shops and other landmarks while navigating, but they do not always have such
information available. Also because both the simulated environment and the map were
short of distracting information, we believe that the overall navigation task of subjects was
probably not more demanding than on the real road.
Table 6.1 Overview of the 8 experimental conditions
MAP ARG
no WM WM no WM WM
quiet traffic MAP MAP/WM ARG ARG/WM
busy traffic MAP MAP/WM ARG ARG/WM
MAP: driving with a map; ARG: driving with auditory route guidance messages
WM: working memory task
The WM task consisted of a traffic broadcast containing six messages of incidences of
traffic congestion on existing Dutch motorways. The six messages indicated road number,
direction and length (e.g., A1, direction Amsterdam, 4 kms); the motorways chosen are
well-known for their traffic congestion. The traffic broadcast occurred at a specific point in
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a condition, about halfway through a condition, and was announced by a short statement
that traffic information would follow. The subjects’ task was to add up the lengths of all the
traffic queues mentioned and state this total length (ranging from 33 to 37 kms) at the end
of a condition. The traffic broadcast lasted about 30 seconds. Traffic information was
presented by the same female voice that gave route guidance. If an ARG message had to be
given during the traffic broadcast, the onset of a traffic message was delayed (e.g., A1, go
left, direction Amsterdam, 4 kms).
If subjects lost their way, they were instructed to stop and park the car, then they were put
back on the road where they had started in that condition. If subjects then lost their way
again, the next condition was started.
6.3.3 Procedure
Upon arrival, the participants were given general instructions about the experiment. To
allow heart rate measurement, ECG electrodes were fixed on the chests of the participants.
Subjects were trained in the driving simulator for about 10 minutes, or longer if required,
until they were able to make smooth turns in the urban environment.
Heart rate was collected throughout the experiment; reference heart rate was collected three
times for about 4 minutes (to serve as a baseline measurement): after the training, i.e.,
before the experiment actually started, and after the first and second journey. During these
rest periods, subjects were requested to sit in the simulator car and relax. During these rest
periods and all experimental conditions, subjects were asked not to speak, and to avoid
moving unnecessarily to avoid disturbances of the ECG signal. ECG was recorded
continuously during all conditions.
At the start of a condition, subjects were requested by an electronic female voice to start the
engine and drive off. When driving speed was over 5 m/s, an event code was automatically
generated by the driving simulator computer to mark the beginning of the condition in both
the heart rate recording file and the driving parameters recording file. The end of each
condition was a specific location in the ride, and when the subject arrived there, the same
electronic voice asked the subject to stop and park the car on the shoulder of the road, and
an event code was automatically generated to mark the end of the condition in all recording
files. Immediately after a subject had parked and come to a stop, he was asked to give the
total length of the traffic queues (in the WM conditions); no feedback on accuracy was
given. Subjects were then requested to fill out a self-report scale for mental effort (see
below). Then followed the instructions about the next condition, and when the subject was
ready, the next condition was started by the auditory instruction to start the engine and
drive off.
6.3.4 Data collection and analysis
After correction of heart rate, heart rate variability was calculated with CARSPAN (L.
Mulder, Van Dellen, Van der Meulen & Opheikens, 1988). The mid-frequency band
0.07-0.14 Hz (referred to as heart rate variability, HRV, from now on) was used as a
measure of cognitive effort. Heart rate and HRV have repeatedly been shown to be
sensitive to effort invested (e.g., Wilson, 1992; L. Mulder & G. Mulder, 1987), especially
over short periods of about 3-5 minutes (e.g., Aasman, G. Mulder & L. Mulder, 1987).
Heart rate can be considered a global measure of general arousal, whereas HRV can be
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considered a specific measure of cognitive mental effort (Wilson & Eggemeier, 1991), that
is, cognitive effort involved in manipulating and maintaining information in working
memory. Because of the event codes generated by the driving simulator, all heart rate data
could be ascribed to each condition in a precise manner.
Averaged heart rate of a condition was expressed as a percentage relative to the preceding
resting period (reference). HRV values for each condition were normalised by logarithmic
transformation and expressed relative to the preceding reference rest periods; the HRV
values are thus expressed as ln(task) - ln(rest). This normalisation procedure allows
analyses of variance on the transformed HRV values. When mental effort increases, heart
rate increases and heart rate variability decreases.
After completion of each condition, participants were asked to indicate their invested
mental effort for that ride on the Rating Scale Mental Effort (RSME) (Zijlstra, 1993). This
is a unidimensional scale of mental effort and runs from 0 to 150. It has been shown to be
sensitive to mental effort (Verweij & Veltman, 1996). The main reason for choosing this
scale was ease of administration and analysis.
Speed and lateral position were measured with a sample rate of 5 Hz. Averaged driving
speed and averaged standard deviation of lateral position (SDLP, a measure of swerving)
were calculated for each condition. The driving measures were averaged only across those
periods when subjects were actually moving, to exclude the confounding effect that waiting
at traffic lights etc. would have on averaged speed. Possible collisions, near-collisions and
deviations out of lane were noted.
The total length of traffic queues that the subject reported at the end of a condition was
recorded as correct or incorrect. The number of navigational errors was also recorded.
All measures, except navigational errors and WM performance, were analysed by means of
analysis of variance. Factors included traffic density, type of route guidance (map or ARG),
WM task and the interactions between these factors.
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Due to simulator sickness, one participant dropped out of the study. Due to apparatus
failure, driving performance data were incomplete for five participants and heart rate data
for four participants. Heart rate data of one subject were excluded because they contained
too many physiological artefacts (uncompensated extra-systoles) making it impossible to
ascribe HRV to mental effort investment. Data for heart rate and driving performance were
therefore analysed for 14 subjects. There were no main effects of order for the factor
“traffic density” for any of the variables, so this is not considered in the subsequent
analyses.
6.4.1 Workload measures
Multivariate analyses of variances were performed on heart rate and normalised HRV.
Driving with a map resulted in higher heart rates, indicating more effort. This effect of type
of route guidance (RG) on HR was significant (F(1,13)=21.92, p<.001). The WM task did
not increase heart rate significantly (F(1,13)=4.05, p<.067). The interaction between WM
and RG was also not significant (F(1,13)=.98, ns). HR was not significantly affected by
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traffic density (F(1,13)=1.51, ns), nor were any of the interactions with traffic density
significant. None of the effects on transformed HRV values were significant.
MAP conditions were rated as requiring more mental effort than ARG conditions
(F(1,13)=17.76, p<.002). The WM task also increased RSME (see Figure 6.1) significantly
(F(1,13)=33.89, p<.001). The subjective ratings also showed a significant interaction effect
between RG and WM (F(1,13)=7.23, p<.016): performing a WM increases effort more
when driving with a map. RSME showed no significant main effect for traffic density
(F(1,13)=.43, ns). None of the interactions with traffic density were significant, either.
6.4.2 Performance measures
Speed (see Figure 6.2) was significantly higher in conditions with ARG than in conditions
with MAP (F(1,13)=10.50, p<.007). There was no significant difference between
conditions with and without the WM task (F(1,13)=.00, ns), nor was the interaction
between RG and WM significant. Mean speed was significantly higher in low traffic
density than in high intensity (F(1,13)=5.55, p<.036), but there were no significant
interactions between traffic density and RG or WM.
The standard deviation of lateral position, SDLP, (see Figure 6.3) was significantly larger
(i.e., subjects swerved more) in MAP conditions, than in ARG conditions (F(1,13)=6.88,
p<.022). There was no significant effect of the WM task (F(1,13)=.21, ns). None of the
interactions were significant. SDLP showed no significant effect of traffic density
(F(1,13)=4.04, p<.067).
No collisions or near-collisions were noted, nor were deviations out of lane.
Working memory performance varied considerably between conditions. In MAP conditions,
the percentage of correct answers (see Table 6.2) was consistently lower than in ARG
conditions, with less than half of the subjects giving correct answers. Only 74% of the
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Figure 6.1 Average self-reported mental effort across the experimental conditions; the
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Figure 6.3 Average standard deviation lateral position across the experimental conditions
Table 6.2 Memory task performance: percentage of subjects correct
MAP ARG
quiet traffic 26 74
busy traffic 47 63
MAP: driving with a map; ARG: driving with auditory route guidance messages
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No subject made a navigational error (see Table 6.3) with route guidance (ARG) without
the WM task and only 5% of the subjects when ARG was combined with the WM task.
However, in the MAP conditions, this percentage increased to 42% in quiet traffic with the
WM task. Unexpectedly, more subjects lost their way in quiet than in busy traffic.
Table 6.3 Route errors: percentage of subjects taking a wrong turn
MAP ARG
no WM WM no WM WM
quiet traffic 26 24 0 5
busy traffic 16 16 0 5
MAP: driving with a map; ARG: driving with auditory route guidance messages
WM: working memory task
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It is generally assumed that operators in complex dynamic tasks deal with the task in a
flexible way to keep their task performance coherent. In order to protect the structure of
their task behaviour, operators ignore irrelevant information and search for relevant
information. The flexible allocation of effort between sub-tasks and task goals is probably a
major factor in keeping performance in complex dynamic tasks effective (Bainbridge,
1997). When task performance levels cannot be preserved, operators can invest more effort
in the task, or they may give up low-priority task goals. In general, operators will be biased
to maintain high-priority task goals (Hockey, 1997; Hockey, Wastell & Sauer, 1998).
The main task goal of car driving is to arrive safely at the planned destination (Michon,
1985). It can therefore be assumed that car drivers try to protect this task goal when they
are confronted with an increase in task demands. However, traffic research shows that
driving performance often, but not always, does deteriorate when task demands increase.
We have assumed that driving performance may suffer more when the additional task is
part of the driving task rather than when it serves external goals (such as tuning the radio
does), and this hypothesis was tested directly in the present driving simulator experiment.
In all conditions, it was stressed to the experimental subjects that they should drive as they
would normally do in similar circumstances. This allowed us to study car drivers’ strategies
in dealing with secondary tasks in a naturalistic way. No instructions were given that
stressed that they should drive safely as this might have resulted in more cautious behaviour
by our subjects than they would show in real life. However, it is sometimes assumed that
safe course-keeping is the primary goal in driving, and one might object that a driving
simulator environment does not encourage safe driving in the same way as driving on the
real road does, and that therefore subjects should have received explicit instructions to drive
safely. However, as was discussed previously in the introduction, the assumption that safe
course-keeping is the main goal is in fact violated in much previous research, performed on
the road, and in driving simulators. Drivers have been shown to swerve more, and even
deviate out of lane when driving with visually complex route guidance (RG) systems (e.g.,
Pohlman & Traenkle, 1994, Dingus et al., 1997). These findings was precisely the reason
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why the present study was undertaken, and instructions about safe driving might have
precluded obtaining results similar to those of other research.
Thus, it seems unjustified to assume that the main goal in driving is precise course-keeping,
that is, to keep lateral position as constant as possible. Minor deviations from a certain
criterion in lateral and longitudinal control are not necessarily detrimental to safe driving.
In fact, we wanted to test whether drivers indeed considered the navigation task in driving
to be more important than that of lateral control.
Driving simulators have been used before in research on route guidance systems, but we
know of only one validation study which studied RG systems and navigation performance
both in a driving simulator and on the real road (Bruckmayer, Becker, Brockman, Erkan,
Mertens, Mihm & Sontag, 1995). Their results showed that navigation performance in the
driving simulator was comparable to that on the road, suggesting that a driving simulator
can indeed be a valuable research tool in route finding performance.
Workload measures showed that the experimental manipulations were indeed successful in
increasing task demands. RSME increased from about 35 (“some effort”) when driving
with ARG, to about 60 (“rather much effort”) when map reading was combined with
performing the WM task. Heart rate showed a similar pattern: it increased when subjects
drove with a map and when the WM task was performed. Heart rate was highest in the
combined condition (MAP/WM). A surprising finding was that heart rate variability (HRV)
showed no significant effects of any of the manipulations. HRV was included in the
experiment for its specific sensitivity to cognitive mental effort (Wilson & Eggemeier,
1991), as HRV has repeatedly been shown to be sensitive to increases in mental effort, not
only in laboratory and applied settings (for a review, see Wilson & Eggemeier, 1991), but
also in driver behaviour studies (e.g., De Waard, Van Der Hulst & Brookhuis, 1999). Our
interpretation of the results is that subjects regarded the task demands as rather high, and
therefore used behavioural strategies reducing task demands and, hence, mental effort. We
will discuss this below, when we address each experimental manipulation separately.
6.5.1 The effects of type of route guidance
In accordance with our hypothesis, participants swerved considerably more when they
drove with a map than when they used auditory RG messages. In the present experiment,
we imposed no restrictions on the position of the map. The participants were allowed to
hold the map wherever they wished. Many subjects held the map on the steering wheel. It is
likely that any task which requires drivers to take their eyes off the road while driving will
increase SDLP, for the simple reason that visual information is needed for course keeping.
They did reduce their driving speed in MAP conditions to counteract the negative effect of
map reading, but not sufficiently to prevent an increase in swerving completely. In the
present study, map reading was part of the main task goal (arriving safely at the
destination), because they had no other way of knowing the route to drive. Subjects were
therefore confronted with two conflicting subgoals: course keeping and map reading. The
increase in SDLP, and the large amount of route errors in some conditions, show that our
subjects were not entirely able to resolve the conflict between the two task goals.
This confirms our hypothesis that drivers consider route finding an important subtask of
driving. It should however be pointed out that the increase in SDLP, although significant,
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amounted to only a few centimetres, and this does not indicate a significant threat to traffic
safety. Also, no deviations out of lane were noted.
It is noteworthy that subjects often checked their map when they were waiting for other traffic
at intersections. This points to a strategy that subjects may have used to deal with the
conflicting task goals of course keeping and route finding. Probably, subjects did not
memorise the complete route at the beginning of each condition as to which direction to turn
at which intersection. Instead, they probably cut the route into smaller chunks (first, turn left at
second crossing). At each intersection, when standing still, subjects updated their information
(now turn right at the following crossing). This strategy largely reduces working memory use,
and thereby the amount of cognitive effort that is needed for this task. This strategy may
explain why HRV showed no effect of map use. The significant change in averaged heart rate
and in self-reported effort in MAP conditions showed that subjects were more generally
aroused and investing more (general) effort when driving with a map than when following
auditory route instructions, suggesting that map use increased task demands significantly.
Not surprisingly, route errors were predominately made when subjects used a map for
navigation. An important, and counterintuitive, finding was that more route errors were
made in quiet traffic than in busy traffic. In both conditions in busy traffic, 16% of the
participants took a wrong turning; however, in quiet traffic, these percentages were 26 and
42 (MAP and MAP/WM, respectively). The fact that navigation performance was not
perfect with a map indicates that route finding was not an easy task to do. However, the fact
that on average only 16% route errors were made in busy traffic also shows that it was
within the capabilities of our subjects. It is probable that more navigational errors were
made in quiet traffic because driving speed was higher in quiet traffic. In busy traffic,
subjects therefore simply had more time to consult the map.
6.5.2 Performing a working memory task while driving
In contrast to our predictions, performing the working memory task while driving was not
associated with a decrease in HRV, which would have indicated more cognitive effort. Not
only is this in contrast to our own expectations, it is also in contrast to other similar traffic
research. For example, in the study by Brookhuis, De Vries & De Waard (1991), subjects
also had to perform a mental arithmetic task while driving. In that study, HRV was reduced
compared to driving without the MA task.
What might explain the lack of effect on cognitive effort (HRV) is the relatively poor
performance on the WM task. In the easiest condition, 74% of the subjects gave the correct
answer (ARG, quiet traffic), but this number dropped to 26% in the MAP condition in quiet
traffic. Together with the fact that HRV shows no cognitive effort on the memory task,
these performance data strongly suggest that the subjects did not give much attention to the
WM task. Especially in the MAP conditions, where only a minority of the subjects gave the
correct answer, subjects did not invest much effort into the WM task. This strongly
suggests that in more demanding conditions, subjects focused less on the subsidiary WM
task. Whether this also explains the differences between the study by Brookhuis, De Vries
& De Waard and our results is difficult to say, as Brookhuis, De Vries & De Waard
unfortunately did not report on the level of MA task performance.
61
6.5.3 The effects of traffic density
More than the other two experimental manipulations, increased traffic density represents an
increase in primary task demands. The subject therefore cannot neglect increased traffic
density in the same way that a subject can neglect a secondary task. The main effect of
traffic density was that the participants reduced their driving speed. It should be noted that
speed was only averaged for periods in which subjects were actually driving. Periods where
subjects were waiting were not used to calculate averaged speed. Speed in heavy traffic was
therefore not lower because subjects had to wait longer at traffic lights or to give priority to
more cars. However, there were probably more instances of stopping in heavy traffic
because there were more intersections where other cars would meet the subject. Therefore,
there will have been more instances of slowing to a stop, and accelerating after a stop,
thereby reducing averaged speed.
It is our impression that averaged speed in busy traffic was also lower because subjects
approached intersections at lower speeds. This can be interpreted as a strategy to decrease
primary task demands. This allows more time to attend to the more complex traffic
situation. It also allows more time to check the paper map, or listen to the memory task.
Also, subjects did wait longer at intersections and at traffic lights in busy traffic. Together
with a lower driving speed when driving, this probably explains why WM performance and
Navigational performance were better in busy traffic.
6.5.4 General conclusions
Self-reported effort (RSME) showed that, in some conditions, our subjects had to invest
rather much effort to deal with the task. This is also clear from the increase in heart rate in
more demanding conditions (MAP, WM task). This indicates not only that our subjects
were actively involved in the task, but also that the demands on the subjects were high.
Actually, our subjects were not able to perform all the (sub)tasks, as shown by the relatively
poor performance on the working memory and the navigational task, and by the increase in
swerving when subjects navigated with a map. This demonstrates that the combined task
demands were clearly beyond the capabilities or motivation of our subjects.
Hockey (1997) stated that operators can basically do two things when task demands
increase: invest more effort, or adopt less strict performance targets to protect the high-
priority task goal, at the expense of subsidiary activities. Our results support this view: it
was performance on the subsidiary tasks that suffered most from the high task demands.
Hockey (1997) calls this latent performance decrement. Our subjects indeed seemed to
regulate their own task demands, either by reducing driving speed or by taking a more
lenient performance criterion on less important tasks. The present data suggest something
more: different sources in increases in task demands may have differential effects on
behavioural strategies.
The working memory task is an artificial task without clear relevance to the main task goal
in driving. Performing the WM task means an increase in secondary task demands. When
traffic density increased or subjects had to read the map, subjects dealt with these further
increases in task demands by reducing their efforts in the artificial WM task. In other
words, subjects (partly) gave up secondary task performance when they can or will not
perform an additional task on top of the primary task.
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In contrast, an increase in traffic density implies an increase in primary task demands.
Subjects cannot neglect this in the same way as they can neglect performing a secondary
task. In our experiment, subjects reduced their driving speed to reduce the demands. This
means that they changed the way in which the main task was performed. As an additional
effect, reduced driving speed resulted in better WM task and navigational performance.
This can be interpreted as secondary effects of the main strategy to protect the main task.
Although map reading may be considered a task additional to the main driving task, route
finding is in fact an important subtask in an unfamiliar environment. As map reading
implies taking the eyes off the road, map reading hampers precise course keeping, and it
thus produced a conflict between the subgoals of route finding and course keeping in the
present study. Results show that subjects were unable to resolve this conflict. This was
evidenced both by the increase in swerving and the many route errors when subjects drove
with a map. The fact that subjects swerved more with a map may indicate that navigation
was indeed considered an important subtask, even at the expense of course keeping.
These date are evidence for the Hockey’s assumption (1997) that task operators will protect
high-priority task goals. Car drivers seem to protect their primary task from degradation
due to secondary task intrusion by remaining focused on the driving task, at the expense of
secondary task performance. The data also indicate that map reading may not be a
secondary task in the same way as an external (working memory) task is. Route finding is
an important subtask for drivers, and the data suggest that it may at conflict with course
keeping.
Lastly, it is important to note that “deteriorated” performance on a secondary task thus does
not mean that the operator’s performance is inadequate. Rather, the operator has enhanced the
efficiency of his task behaviour. It may allow more time or more mental capacity to perform
other (sub)tasks, which may be more relevant for the present context, or to perform better on
the primary task. It is important to realise that the performing operator determines the
relevance of a specific (sub)goal, not the observing researcher. Care should be taken that a
particular change in task behaviour is not interpreted as a deterioration in task performance.
Such a change probably serves a (sub)goal deemed important by the operator. The challenge
to the researcher lies in finding out which goal is served by such a change.
6.5.5 Practical implications
It thus appears that drivers can ignore some tasks, such as placing a mobile phone call, or
perhaps checking the rear-view mirrors in certain situations. Other additional tasks, most
notably route finding, are probably more important to drivers. The present experiment
implies that this should have major implications for the design of route guidance systems in
particular. More than of most other in-car equipment, the information a RG systems
presents is highly important to driver. Route finding is an essential task in driving in
unfamiliar environments, and car drivers will be highly motivated to check the RG system
even in difficult traffic situations, as for example near intersections. This places high


























Car drivers appear to reduce their driving speed in high task demand situations. Summala’s (1996,
1997) model of behavioural adaptation (MBA) also assumes that drivers increase speed in low task
demand situations, or attend to additional tasks more. The present study investigated the relation
between driving speed and task demands in simulated driving. Participants were observed under
three speed conditions, driving fast, driving as if taking a driving test, and following a fast-driving
car. The same route was driven twice under each of these speed conditions: once with and once
without the concurrent performance of an auditory short-term memory task. All other things being
equal, driving fast required more effort than driving more slowly, which was not compensated for
by better memory performance. This refutes one assumption of the MBA. When following a fast-
driving car, participants invested less effort than when driving fast. As auditory route guidance
messages were embedded within the memory task, participants were forced to attend the memory
task in all rides of the Fast and Accurate conditions, but not in the Car Following conditions. This
can also explain why the memory task had no effect on cognitive effort. It is concluded that car
drivers prioritise their task goals.
.,

It is generally assumed that operators in complex hierarchical tasks deal actively with task
demands. In order to compensate for high task demands, operators have been shown to use
a number of strategies (Bainbridge, 1974; Hockey, 1993, 1997). One strategy is to invest
more effort in the task. Another strategy is to adopt less demanding working strategies,
which involve fewer manipulations of information or less use of working memory (for
example, writing things down instead of trying to remember them; resorting to well
practised routines instead of working out the best solution), or adopt a more relaxed method
of working (working more slowly or less accurately). A third strategy is to skip subsidiary
tasks that are not essential for achieving the main task goal. The effect of this strategy is an
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increased focus on the main task, at the expense of subsidiary tasks (see also Hockey,
Wastell & Sauer, 1998). Thus, the compensatory control model of Hockey (1997) assumes
that overall task performance may decrease when less demanding strategies are used or
subsidiary tasks are skipped, but that the primary task goal is usually protected against
degradation.
An example of a complex dynamic task is car driving, and although traffic behaviour
research has not always explicitly focussed on adaptive strategies of car drivers, already in
the 1960s the driving task was described as a self-paced task (Taylor, 1962), where drivers
change their behaviour in response to secondary task demands. For example, Brown &
Poulton (1961) and Brown (1962) showed that performance on a secondary auditory task
decreased when demands of the primary driving task increased. Later studies confirmed
these results and found evidence for a number of strategies in dealing with high task
demands, most notably a change in driving behaviour and neglect of a subsidiary task. For
example, Harms (1991) found evidence for both these strategies: drivers decreased their
driving speed and were slower in responding to a mental arithmetic task in more demanding
traffic situations.
Other studies have also shown that car drivers adopt less demanding strategies by changing
their driving behaviour when task demands increase. It has been found that car drivers
reduced their driving speed when task demands increased (e.g., Cnossen, Meijman &
Rothengatter, 2000; Dingus et al., 1997; Pohlman & Traenkle, 1994), while Noy (1989)
showed that drivers increased their headway when performing an additional task, involving
monitoring a display. Car drivers also neglect subsidiary activities when task demands
increase. Various studies have for example found that participants tend to check their rear-
view mirror less with increased task demands, for example when driving with a visual route
guidance system or when performing additional memory tasks (Landsdown, 1997;
Fairclough, Ashby & Parkes, 1993; Brookhuis, De Vries & De Waard, 1991).
In all these studies, mirror checking was not an important subtask. Landsdown (1997)
performed his study in relatively low traffic densities and in such circumstances, drivers
may have had enough time to check on other traffic. Fairclough, Ashby & Parkes (1993)
draw attention to the adaptive character of their participants’ behaviour, noting that
different traffic environments and traffic densities resulted in different visual scanning
patterns. In the study by Brookhuis, De Vries & De Waard (1991), drivers were not allowed
to overtake or change lane, which largely reduced the need to check the mirrors. This
suggests that with increased demands, drivers chose to neglect actions that were not
essential in the given circumstances. De Waard (1991) indeed showed that in situations
where task demands were high and checking the mirrors was important (driving on a
combined entrance/exit section of a motorway), drivers did not decrease the frequency with
which they checked their mirrors. Instead, they decreased the total glance duration on
traffic irrelevant objects. Indeed, Crundall & Underwood (1998) have shown that
experienced drivers’ eye movements change across differing road types, adapting their
looking behaviour to the circumstances. Furthermore, Crundall, Underwood & Chapman
(1999) showed that hazardous events redirect attention away from extra-foveal regions of
the functional field of view toward the hazard at the point of fixation. These studies clearly
illustrate the adaptive component in visual scanning behaviour.
An important issue is what the possible mechanisms are behind the behavioural adaptations.
The, 1970s saw the breakthrough of motivational models (Summala, 1985) which assumed
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that driving is a self-paced task and that drivers select the amount of risk they are willing to
tolerate (Ranney, 1994). That is, these models assumed an active role for the driver in
dealing with task demands. Two approaches were highly influential: the risk homeostasis
theory (Wilde, 1982) and the zero-risk theory (Näätänen & Summala, 1974). The risk
homeostasis theory proposed that driving behaviour is aimed at maintaining a subjective
target risk level, i.e., drivers adjust their speed to keep subjective risk levels constant. An
implication of this theory is that drivers will not only for example drive slower to
compensate for high task demands, but will also react to safety-enhancing improvements by
driving faster or less cautiously to re-establish the target level of subjective risk. Main
criticisms included a confusion between aggregated and individual levels of analysis, lack
of internal mechanisms that account for the higher-order cognitive functions with which the
models deal (risk, beliefs), and exclusion of cognitive mechanisms (Michon, 1985). The
zero-risk model assumed that in the dynamic driving situation, drivers control safety
margins rather than risk; only when subjective risk or fear increases above a certain
threshold, will risk influence driving behaviour. Although the two models differ in the
precise way in which risk plays a role in driving, they have in common that if subjective
risk is considered too high, drivers will change their driving behaviour and will for example
slow down. Note that task demands do not lead to an adjustment of driving behaviour
directly but only indirectly through subjective risk.
The zero-risk model already used safety margins as the control variable, and these were
later also incorporated in the hierarchical model of behavioural adaptation by Summala
(1996, 1997). Behavioural adaptation, also called risk compensation, is the phenomenon
that drivers are inclined to react to changes in the traffic system, whether they be in the car,
in the road environment, in road or weather conditions, or in their own skills or states, in
accordance with their motives (Summala, 1997). More specifically, it may also refer to
behavioural changes specifically triggered by safety measures (such as airbags, antilock
brakes, or collision avoidance systems), which cancel out the intended positive safety
effects of the measures. Rather than control of subjective risk, it is control of available time
that is central to this model. Available time is reflected in time margins, the temporal
distance to an object, as in time-to-line crossing (TLC), time headway, etc. It is assumed
that time margins are the control variable for drivers. For example, for a similar TLC,
“decreasing road width or increasing curvature calls for slowing down (or more effort), and
wider or straighter road allows higher speeds or more time” (Summala, 1997, p. 44). Thus,
drivers try to keep available time constant, and driving speed serves an important role in
doing so. In this model, mental workload and shortage of available time (or short time
margins) are closely related (see also Hancock & Caird, 1993, for a similar position on
workload). In Summala’s words: “to maintain speed when the road standard (e.g., width)
decreases we have to put more effort into the task, or slow down” (1996, p. 112). Borrowed
from earlier risk models is “a tendency to go to the limit, which may be postulated as an
inherent motivational pressure to increase speed” (1996, p. 111). Thus, as in risk
compensation models, with increasing time available (for example when task demands are
low), drivers are assumed to increase speed or, alternatively, allocate more time to in-car
tasks, resulting in shorter psychological time margins.
The behavioural adaptation model by Summala (1996, 1997) is in accordance with the
general literature on task demands, in the sense that increased task demands may lead to
slower driving speeds. However, the compensatory control model of Hockey (1997) does
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not predict that when task demands are low, operators will increase their speed or accuracy
to keep workload constant. In the general literature on complex dynamic task performance,
it is assumed that fundamental to task performance is the protection of goal directed
behaviour, not keeping levels of effort or task demands constant. In Summala’s conception,
higher-level goals do play a role in modifying lower-level behaviour, but the main control
variable is available time or workload. This leads to different predictions for low task
demand situations: the behavioural adaptation model predicts an increase in driving speed,
or increased time spent on additional tasks to keep available time or workload constant,
whereas the compensatory control model has no specific predictions for low task demands.
A typical example of low task demands is reduced arousal state due to time on task. Truck
drivers have been shown to increase time headway when driving in convoy at night (Fuller,
1981) whereas Van Der Hulst, Meijman & Rothengatter (2000) found a positive relation
between levels of fatigue and time headway: fatigued drivers increased their time headway
more than drivers who did not report an increase in fatigue. Fuller (1981) interpreted the
increase in time headway as an increase in caution to compensate for reduced visibility
and/or for non-optimal arousal level. Van Der Hulst, Meijman & Rothengatter (2000)
suggest that drivers who are fatigued become less willing to invest effort into the task, and
therefore increase their safety margins. This argues against the assumption of the
behavioural adaptation model that workload (and thus effort) should remain constant,
although it may still be argued that because fatigue drivers’ reaction will be slower,
psychological time margins (i.e., time margins that include slower reaction times) may still
have remained constant. However, Egelund (1982) showed that after prolonged driving,
heart rate variability (more specifically, the 0.10 Hz component) increased, which he
interpreted as a measure of increased fatigue; however, the 0.10 Hz component is more
generally interpreted as a measure of mental effort (e.g., L. Mulder & G. Mulder, 1990),
and Egelund’s results thus showed that drivers invest less effort after prolonged driving.
This argues against the assumption of the behavioural adaptation model that drivers try to
keep workload levels constant.
However, not all researchers interpret reductions in driving speed as an adaptive response
to high task demands. Dingus et al. (1997) interpreted the fact that drivers reduced their
speed when looking at a visual route guidance display as an indication of driver
“inattention” to the driver task. Drivers slow down because they invest more effort in the
secondary task and less effort in maintaining speed, just as car drivers will swerve more
when they focus on an in-car device and not on the road. Many researchers stress the
importance of driver “inattention” in accidents. Drivers’ attention is diverted from the
driving task and focused on processing additional information or performing additional
tasks. It has been argued that driver inattention plays a role in about 30 to 50 per cent of
accidents, and that the introduction of in-car displays could increase this number (Verwey,
1993). Another fear is that of narrowing of attention. Alm & Nilsson (1995) warned that
high task demands may lead to narrowing of attention, which is unwanted in situations that
ask for a more global type of attention, for example, near intersections. However, results
from Crundall, Underwood & Chapman (1999) show that attention is actually directed at
hazardous events when they present themselves, away from extra-foveal regions of the
visual field.
There is thus some controversy regarding the effects of secondary tasks on driving
performance and the underlying mechanisms. The differences are, however, important. If
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changes in driving behaviour are caused by driver “inattention” (that is, no attention is paid
to the driving task), then these changes are unintended and unwanted. This can be
considered an inadequate response of the driver to the increased demand. On the other
hand, if driving behaviour is changed as an adaptive response to high task demands, the car
driver is actively restructuring the task to meet the task demands. The latter would be
predicted on the basis of the general literature and also by the behavioural adaptation model
by Summala (1996, 1997) concerning the effects of high task demands on task
performance. The last two models mainly differ in their predictions regarding low task
demand situations.
In an earlier study (Cnossen, Meijman & Rothengatter, 2000), the relation between task
demands and driving behaviour was investigated. Primary task demands were increased by
driving in high traffic density, and by using a paper map for navigation (arriving at the
destination is the main task goal in driving, which implies that map reading is a very
relevant subgoal). Secondary task demands were increased by presenting a working
memory task when participants were driving. Car drivers were found to reduce their driving
speed only when primary task demands increased, not when performing the memory task.
Increases in secondary task demands instead resulted in skipping the subsidiary task when
task demands increased beyond capability or motivation of the participants. Heart rate
variability (HRV) was used as a measure of mental effort, and the result of participants’
strategies was that HRV showed no increase in mental effort in this study. This suggests
that car drivers are indeed adjusting their behaviour to cope with high task demands.
However, due to the nature of the experimental design, a direct relation between task
demands, driving speed and mental effort could not be inferred.
The present experiment tried to clarify the relation between task demands, driving speed
and mental effort by having car drivers drive at different speeds and measuring their
invested effort. If car drivers reduce driving speed to reduce task demands, mental effort
should, all other things being equal, decrease with decreasing driving speed; otherwise, a
reduction of speed cannot have the effect of reducing task demands. In the experiment,
performed in the same urban environment as in the previous study, participants received
three different instructions concerning driving speed. In the Accurate condition, they were
instructed to drive as accurately as possible, as if taking a driving test. In the Fast condition,
participants were instructed to drive as fast as possible, as if they were late and in a hurry.
In the Car Following condition, participants had to follow a relatively fast driving car. This
last condition was included to have direct control of participants’ driving speed and to
ensure that driving speed was high. The speed instructions therefore resulted in one
condition in which participants drove relatively slow (Accurate) and two conditions in
which participants drove relatively fast (Fast and Car Following).
Each speed condition (Fast, Accurate and Car Following) involved two rides, which
differed in terms of secondary task demands. In all rides, travel news was presented to the
participants. The travel news reported 30 traffic jams on Dutch motorways. In one ride
under each speed condition, the participants had to the name the longest traffic queue at the
end of the ride; in the other ride under each speed condition, they were not required to
process the information. Consequently, six rides had to be completed, representing three
speed conditions and two levels of secondary task demand.
There were a number of different expectations. The compensatory control model predicts
that, all other things being equal, driving speed and effort levels are inversely related. Thus,
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the Accurate condition, where driving speed is lowest, should be associated with lower
effort levels than the other two speed conditions. Also, performing the memory task should
increase effort levels. A weaker prediction is that in high speed conditions, high task
demands may lead drivers to give up the memory task, resulting in worse memory task
performance in these conditions. These effects are also predicted by the behavioural
adaptation model but this model has an additional prediction: precisely because of lower
driving speed in the Accurate condition, and thus lower effort levels, performance on the
additional memory task should be better in that condition than in the other conditions,
because psychological time margins have increased due to lower driving speed.
Additionally, with available time or workload as the control variable, it predicts that effort
levels should be equal for all conditions.
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-
7.3.1 Participants
Twenty participants participated in the study, 10 male and 10 female. Except for 5
participants, all participants had taken part in earlier experiments using the same driving
simulator. Their age ranged from 24 to 39 (mean age 31.6). All participants had held a
driving licence for more than 3 years (mean was 12.2 years). Mean kilometres driven per
annum was 15,100. Participants were paid for their participation.
7.3.2 Experimental environment and conditions
The experiment was performed in a driving simulator (Van Wolffelaar & Van Winsum,
1995). The simulator car was a BMW 525 with original controls linked to the driving
simulator. A graphical workstation (Silicon Graphics Skywriter) generates the images,
which are projected on a panoramic screen with a 165-degree angle of vision horizontally
and a 45-degree angle of vision vertically. Using the network specification facility, we built
an urban environment with many intersections and buildings. There were main and
secondary roads, traffic signs and traffic lights. The road network consisted mostly of
straight roads but there were curved roads as well. During the experiment, other interactive
traffic drove on the road network.
Participants made six rides representing three speed conditions (Fast, Accurate, and Car
Following) and two secondary-task demand conditions. Half of the participants started in
the Fast condition, in which participants were requested to try to reach their destination as
quickly as possible, as if they were in a great hurry and already late. The other half of the
participants started in the Accurate condition, in which participants were requested to drive
as accurately as possible, as if they were taking a driving test. The participants were also
instructed to observe the speed limit of 50 km/h in this condition. Note that in the Accurate
condition, participants were not instructed to drive slowly, merely to drive accurately.
During these rides, participants received simple auditory route guidance (RG) messages (go
right, go left) presented by a digitised female voice. If participants had to go straight ahead
at an intersection, no RG message was presented. With the scenario specification facility of
the simulator, all participants were presented with RG information at the same locations in
the road network.
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For all participants, the last speed condition of the experiment was the Car Following
condition. In the Car Following condition, participants did not receive RG messages but
were instructed to follow a car driving in front. At the first intersection of a ride, a dark blue
car would arrive from the right. Participants were told that if they followed that car, they
would automatically reach their destination. Participants were notified that the lead car
would drive rather fast and that, for that reason, they had to be careful not to lose it in
traffic. The lead car aimed to drive 60 km/h, and would not yield to traffic at intersections,
of which the participants were unaware. This condition was always the last condition as it
involved relatively reckless driving by the car to be followed, and we did not want
participants to be tempted to copy this behaviour in the Fast condition.
All three speed conditions consisted of two rides. Task demands were varied by the
inclusion of a memory task in half the rides. During all rides, participants were presented
with one broadcast of travel news; the presentation of the 30 traffic jams lasted about 120
seconds in total. In either the first or second ride of a speed condition (balanced across
participants), participants were told beforehand to listen carefully to the travel news as they
would be asked to name the location and length of the longest traffic jam of the list (e.g.,
Amsterdam, 8 km) at the end of the ride. In the other conditions, travel news was presented
but participants were instructed to ignore this information. In all cases, the information
consisted of 30 traffic jams on 15 different existing Dutch motorways, varying in length
between 3 and 9 km. Some traffic jams had equal lengths. There could be more than one
traffic jam on the same location, but there were never more than three. Traffic jams on the
same location were never presented immediately after each other and never had equal
lengths. If a traffic jam had the same length as the previous longest traffic jam, participants
were instructed that they should remember the last traffic jam, replacing the previous
longest traffic jam. In each list, the longest traffic jam was replaced seven times by a traffic
jam of greater or equal length. The presentation of the traffic news was delayed when a RG
message was presented and resumed after the RG message had finished.
7.3.3 Procedure
Upon arrival, participants filled out a short questionnaire about their driving experience and
health. Participants made a test drive of about 10 minutes in the urban environment of the
experiment. Naive participants received extra training, until they were able to make smooth
turns in the urban environment. Instructions about the experimental conditions were given
in written form.
A short version of the memory task (60 seconds) was practised while participants were
stationary; then, while driving, a short (60 seconds) and long (120 seconds) version were
practised. Participants received feedback on their performance on the task. This was
followed by two practice rides of 120 seconds identical to the experimental rides. In one of
these rides, participants had to ignore the travel news. Participants were instructed to drive
as they would normally do, and received no feedback. After this, the experiment started
with either the Fast or Accurate condition (balanced across participants). The last condition
for all participants was the Car Following condition.
Reference measurements of heart rate were made during the 3 minutes prior to the last two
practice rides and prior to each speed condition (i.e., before Accurate, Fast and Car
Following). At the end of a reference measurement, a digitised female voice requested
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participants to start the engine and drive off. When the participant reached a specific
location in the route (about 10 seconds after starting to drive), the travel news started, and
an event code was automatically generated by the driving simulator computer to mark the
beginning of the condition in both the heart rate recording file and the driving parameters
recording file. The end of each condition was also a specific location in the ride, and when
the subject arrived there, the same electronic voice asked the subject to stop and park the
car on the shoulder of the road, and an event code was automatically generated to mark the
end of the condition in all recording files. Immediately after a subject had parked and come
to a stop, he or she was asked to give the total length of the traffic queues (in the memory
task conditions); no feedback on accuracy was given. Subjects were then requested to fill
out a self-report scale for mental effort (see below). Then followed the instructions about
the next condition, and when the subject was ready, the next condition was started by the
auditory instruction to start the engine and drive off.
7.3.4 Data collection and analysis
The driving performance measures were speed, standard deviation of lateral position
(SDLP, a measure of amount of car swerving), and standard deviation of steering wheel
angle (SD Steer, a measure of steering performance). All measures were sampled at 5 Hz.
Averaged driving speed, averaged SDLP and averaged SDLP were calculated for each ride.
These measures were averaged across those periods when participants were actually driving
to exclude the confounding effect that waiting at traffic lights etc would have on averaged
speed; the number of such periods could vary between participants and conditions.
Self-report (Rating Scale Mental Effort, RSME, Zijlstra, 1993; Verwey & Veltman, 1996),
heart rate (HR) and heart rate variability (HRV) were used as measures of mental effort.
Heart rate is a more general measure of arousal, whereas HRV is more specifically sensitive
to cognitive processes involved with information manipulation in working memory
(Aasman, G. Mulder & L. Mulder, 1987; Wilson & Eggemeier, 1991; Wiethof, 1997).
After completing each condition, participants were asked to indicate their invested mental
effort on the Rating Scale Mental Effort (RSME), a uni-dimensional scale of mental effort.
This scale runs from 0 to 150 and has been shown sensitive to changes in mental effort
(Zijlstra, 1993; Verwey & Veltman, 1996). If a ride included the memory task, participants
were first asked to name the length and location of the longest traffic jam before they were
asked to rate their effort. This procedure prevents unnecessary decay of the contents of
working memory.
Inter-beat intervals (IBI) were computed from the event file (heart rate in bpm can be
calculated as 60,000 / IBI) and corrected for physiological and measurement artefacts.
Heart rate variability in the selected frequency domain (HRV) was calculated with
CARSPAN (L. Mulder, Van Dellen, Van der Meulen & Opheikens, 1988). In agreement with
other research (e.g., Aasman, G. Mulder & L. Mulder, 1987; G. & L. Mulder, 1990;
Wiethof, 1997), we used the mid-frequency band 0.07-0.14 Hz as a measure of mental
effort. IBI of a condition was expressed as percentage relative to the preceding reference
period. HRV values for each condition were normalised by logarithmic transformation and
expressed relative to the preceding reference periods (the HRV values are thus expressed as
ln(task) - ln(rest)). For the transformed data, the law of initial values is no longer valid
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(Van Roon, 1998) and this log transformation therefore allows analyses of variance on the
HRV values. When mental effort increases, heart rate variability decreases.
All data were analysed with analyses of variance, except performance on the memory task.
Because responses on the memory task were dichotomous (either correct or incorrect), they
were analysed with McNemar tests for significance of changes. As the results for the
Accurate and Fast condition most clearly test the effect of driving speed on mental effort,
pair-wise comparisons were made testing for significant differences between these
conditions. Also, differences between the Fast and Car Following condition were tested.
There were no main effects of the order in which conditions were presented (Fast or
Accurate as first condition; the memory task in the first ride in a speed condition) and order
was therefore not considered in the statistical tests.
.%
Three naive participants, all female, did not complete the experiment because of simulator
sickness. Heart rate measurements were completely or partially lost for three participants
due to apparatus failure. Consequently, complete data were obtained for 14 participants,
and data will therefore be analysed for these 14 participants (7 males and 7 females) only.
None of the variables showed a significant effect of gender.
7.4.1 Driving performance
The speed instructions indeed resulted in different driving speeds (see Figure 7.1) across
speed conditions (Hotelling’s T=18.48; p<.000). Pair-wise analyses showed that mean
speed in the Fast condition was significantly higher than in the Accurate condition
(F(1,13)=15.35; p<.003), and speed in the Car Following condition was significantly
higher than in the Fast condition (F(1,13)=11.13; p<.006). There was no significant effect






















































Figure 7.3 Average Standard Deviation Steering Wheel Angle across the experimental
conditions
For averaged SDLP (see Figure 7.2), the main effect of speed instruction was significant
(Hotelling’s T=1.29; p<.009), but somewhat surprisingly, none of the pair-wise analyses
(Fast vs Accurate, Fast vs Following) showed statistically significant effects, probably due
to the relatively large standard deviations of SDLP.
The main effect of speed for averaged SD Steering wheel angle (see Figure 7.3) was also
significant (Hotelling’s T=2.73; p<.001). Pair-wise analyses showed that this was due to
the significant difference between the Fast and Accurate condition (F(1,13)=4.78; p<.049);
the difference between the Fast and Car Following condition was not significant
(F(1,13)=.72; ns). There was no significant effect of the memory task on SD Steer
(F(1,13)=1.91; ns).
7.4.2 Memory task
The percentages of participants that gave the correct location and length of the longest
traffic jam in the list for each speed condition were as followed: Accurate: 71; Fast: 86; Car
Following: 64. Thus, memory task performance was highest in the Fast condition and
lowest in the Car Following condition, but the differences between conditions were not
significant. McNemar’s test of significance of changes showed no significant differences
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between the Fast and Accurate conditions (p<.688), nor between the Fast and Car
Following conditions (p<.453)
7.4.3 Mental effort
Figure 7.4 shows the averaged percentage increase in heart rate (in fact, interbeat interval)
relative to baseline: the higher the change, the more effort was invested; 10% change means
that IBI decreased 10% (= increase in heart rate) compared to baseline. The multivariate
test showed a significant main effect of speed conditions (Hotelling’s T=1.91; p<.002).
Pair-wise comparisons showed that heart rate in the Fast condition was significantly higher
than in Accurate condition (F(1,13)=24.600; p<.001), and higher than in Car Following
condition (F(1,13)=6.270; p<.027). The effect of the memory task on heart rate was also
significant (F(1,13)=4.66; p<.050): when participants performed the memory task, their

















Figure 7.4 Average percentage change in interbeat interval between baseline and

















Figure 7.5 Average change in Heart Rate Variability between baseline and the conditions
(see text for more information); higher bars indicate more cognitive effort in
the experimental condition
The decrease in heart rate variability (HRV), indicating an increase in mental effort, was
highest for the Fast condition (see Figure 7.5, higher bars indicates more mental effort). The
main multivariate effect of speed condition on HRV approached significance (Hotelling’s
T=.59; p<.07). Pair-wise analyses showed that the difference in HRV between the Fast
condition and the Accurate condition approached significance (F(1,13)=3.886; p<.07),
while the difference between the Car Following condition and the Fast condition was
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significant (F(1,13)=5,387; p<.037). The memory task had no significant effect on HRV
(F=.404; ns).
7.4.4 Self-reported effort
Figure 7.6 shows the averaged scores on the Rating Scale Mental Effort; the multivariate
effect of speed condition was significant (Hotelling’s T=2.44; p<.001). Self-reported effort
was significantly higher in Fast than in Accurate conditions (F(1,13)=12.931; p<.003), but
there was no significant difference between Fast and Car Following conditions
(F(1,13)=.447; ns). The participants rated rides in which the memory task was performed as












Figure 7.6 Average self-reported mental effort across the experimental conditions; the
maximum value of the scale is 150.
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A main assumption of the behavioural adaptation model by Summala (1996, 1997) is that
drivers try to keep available time or workload constant. An important way of doing so is
adapting behaviour to the task demands: high task demands result in lower driving speed
and/or less attention to additional tasks while driving; low task demands lead to increased
driving speed, or more attention to additional tasks. The model does not provide specific
predictions regarding the priorities which drivers assign to specific additional tasks.
Hockey’s (1997) compensatory control model, however, predicts that drivers’ priority is
with the protection of the main task goal. In driving, the main task goal is to arrive safely at
the planned destination. This implies for example that the additional task of processing
route guidance information is more important to drivers that performing a working memory
task unrelated to the driving task. A previous experiment indeed confirmed this prediction
(Cnossen, Meijman & Rothengatter, 2000). Drivers were found to give primacy to the route
information more than to performing an auditory memory task. They were also found to
reduce their driving speed when route information was difficult to acquire or when traffic
density was high, but not when performing a memory task.
Car drivers have often been found to reduce their driving speed in situations of high
(primary) task demands. It has been assumed that this speed reduction serves to decrease
task demands, but this relation between driving speed and mental effort has not been tested
directly. The question that this driving simulator experiment tried to answer was therefore
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whether this speed reduction is indeed a strategy to reduce the task demands, perhaps to
protect the main task goal. Participants were given different speed instructions: driving
accurately, driving fast, or following a car driving fast. The prediction was that, all other
things being equal, task demands should be higher in Fast and Car Following conditions
than in the Accurate condition, due to higher driving speeds. Only if driving speed and task
demands are inversely related, can speed reductions be interpreted as a way to reduce
mental effort.
An additional objective of the study was to test the prediction of the behavioural adaptation
model that low task demands are associated with better performance on a secondary task.
Therefore, all speed conditions were driven with and without a memory task. From the
general literature came the prediction that the memory task, not being relevant for the
driving task, might be neglected in high task demand situations. The behavioural adaptation
model predicts that because workload should remain constant, low task demands of the
Accurate condition should be compensated for by better performance on the memory task.
Furthermore, with task demands as the control variable, mental effort should be the same
for all conditions.
The main reason for including the Accurate condition was to reduce driving speed of the
participants. The instructions to the participants were indeed successful in inducing lower
driving speeds in the Accurate condition than in the other conditions. However, SDLP did
not show that participants actually drove more accurately in the Accurate condition.
Obviously, an instruction to drive as accurately as possible should lead to more accurate
lateral control. However, the SD Steering Wheel Angle was lower in the Accurate
condition. This indicates that participants needed less steering wheel movements to achieve
the same level of lateral control. That is, drivers were steering more accurately in the
Accurate condition than in the other conditions, where more and/or larger steering
corrections were needed to maintain the same lateral position (cf., Donges, 1978).
The high level of task performance in the Fast condition is striking. The task of the
participants was a demanding one: not only did they have to drive fast, interact with other
traffic, and monitor the auditory information for RG messages, but at the same time, they
also had to process the travel news, remembering the location and length of the longest
traffic jam in the list, replacing it by longer jams as they came along. It is therefore quite
remarkable that despite the high driving speed, 86% of the participants were able to name
the correct location and length of the longest traffic jam at the end of the ride. This shows
that even when driving fast, car drivers can process large amounts of information and
perform additional tasks. In other words, even in these difficult situations, car drivers did
not seem to suffer from “driver overload”. However, this high level of performance had
costs associated with it. Compared to the Accurate condition, HR and RSME showed
significant increases in the Fast condition, while the differences in HRV approached
significance.
Obviously, this is in contrast with the prediction from the behavioural adaptation model that
mental effort should remain constant across conditions. Also, memory task performance
was not better in the Accurate condition than in the other conditions. That is, drivers did not
compensate for the lower task demand levels of the Accurate condition by paying more
attention to the memory task, as the behavioural adaptation model predicts. Thus, the
present study found no evidence for the notion that low task demands (in this study because
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of low driving speed) lead to an increase in secondary task performance, which seriously
questions the validity of that assumption.
The results for the Car Following condition were not as straightforward as the results for
the Fast and Accurate condition. Although driving speed in the Car Following condition
was significantly higher than in the Fast condition, and heart rate was also significantly
increased, participants did not report more mental effort in the Car Following condition.
HRV even showed that participants invested significantly less mental effort in the Car
Following than in the Fast condition. Post-hoc analyses showed no significant differences
in HRV between the Car Following and the Accurate conditions (F(1,13)=.255; ns),
although driving speeds in these conditions were markedly different. This is clearly in
contrast to the general prediction that higher driving speeds are associated with more
mental effort.
First, what might be the reason for the dissociation in the mental effort measures? The fact
that heart rate was increased in the Car Following condition compared to the Fast condition
indicates increased arousal, and perhaps increased anxiety about the task. The car to be
followed drove faster than participants in the Fast condition, and participants may have
been worried about losing it in traffic. Also, higher driving speeds might have induced
more frequent physical activities (steering, shifting gear, etc.), increasing physical activity
in the Car Following condition, which might have increased heart rate. HRV, on the other
hand, is not sensitive to changes in physical effort during driving (Egelund, 1982).
Generally speaking, HRV is specifically sensitive to cognitive effort, that is, manipulation
of information in working memory (e.g., see Aasman, G. Mulder & L. Mulder, 1987;
Wiethof, 1997). The data thus suggest that in the Car Following condition only little
cognitive effort was invested.
An unintended aspect of the task structure might clarify this unexpected result. Route
guidance (RG) messages were presented auditorily in the Fast and Accurate condition, but
not in the Car Following condition. Actually, RG messages were embedded within the
travel news. This made the auditory information more important for the participants than
intended. Participants had to monitor the travel news in all rides of the Fast and Accurate
conditions for RG messages, and not only when they had to perform the memory task. In
the Car Following condition, participants simply had to follow a car to know the way to
drive. The important difference between the Car Following and other conditions therefore
seems to be the easy access to RG information. Cues easily observable in the immediate
external environment took away the need for demanding cognitive processing, and thus
reduced the cognitive demands on the operator.
In contrast, in the Fast and Accurate conditions, the need to monitor the auditory
information was high. Actually, not only did the drivers have to remember and update the
traffic queues when appropriate, but they also had to detect whether a message was a travel
news message or a route guidance message. Furthermore, there was a need to synchronise
the auditory route guidance message with the visual cues in the environment. The actual
task for the participants therefore involved a significant amount of switching between
different sources of information. Task switching has a strong association with cognitive
effort and therefore with HRV. It is conceivable that this synchronisation of different types
of information is especially strained when driving fast, as in the Fast condition. This would
explain the difference between the Fast and Accurate condition. Unfortunately, HRV
cannot be computed reliably on a message-by-message basis to test this hypothesis directly,
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but this interpretation is supported by the Car Following condition, in which processing of
the auditory information was not required. Despite higher driving speed, HRV showed that
cognitive effort was significantly lower in the Car Following than in the Fast condition.
This interpretation would also explain the unexpected lack of effects of the memory task on
HRV. HRV was expected to show an increase due to cognitive effort when participants had
to remember the longest traffic jam. However, as the RG messages were embedded within
the travel news, participants had to process the travel news in all rides of the Accurate and
Fast conditions. Therefore, performing the memory task had no additional effects on HRV
in the Fast and Accurate condition. In this context, it is noteworthy that memory task
performance was lowest in the Car Following condition, indicating that participants indeed
paid less attention to the travel news than in the other speed conditions. However, these
data should be interpreted with some reservations, as the differences between speed
conditions in memory task performance were not significant. Also, the high performance in
the demanding Fast condition may indicate that the task is actually insensitive because of a
ceiling effect. On the other hand, the memory task performance measure was dichotomous,
and the number of participants may have been too small to be able to detect differences.
In car driving, the main task goal is to arrive at the planned destination. It is therefore
essential for car drivers to know the route to drive, and this implies that in unfamiliar
environments, route guidance information should not be missed. The present study showed
that when RG information is embedded in other information, much effort is invested to
extract that information. Especially in the conditions where participants were driving fast
(Fast and Car Following), mental effort (RSME, HR) was high. More importantly, this
effect on mental effort even existed in those conditions where travel news was presented
but participants could ignore the information. This should have implications for the design
of route guidance systems and other in-car information systems. Because driving is largely
a visual task, researchers have suggested (e.g., Schraagen, 1993; Wierwille, 1993) that RG
systems should not present their information visually, as this would further increase visual
task demands. Instead, information should be given auditorily.
However, the present study showed that presenting information auditorily can also increase
task demands substantially, especially when the auditory information is embedded within
other auditory information. The Fast and Car Following conditions showed substantial
interference, due to the primary task instruction (navigation messages) and secondary task
information (travel news) both being auditory. This is in agreement with the multiple
resource model by Wickens (1984, 1991), which assumes separate resources for two
different codes of information (verbal and spatial) and for two different stages of
information processing (perceptual/cognitive and response stages). This suggests that
important information should not be presented in the same modality. In a previous study
(Cnossen, Meijman & Rothengatter, 2000), however, a memory task was presented
auditorily while route information was presented visually as a paper map. The multiple
resources theory predicts that this should not interfere. However, substantial interference
was observed between the two information sources: memory task performance decreased
considerably when participants were driving with a map. Presenting information in
different modalities therefore does not seem to suffice to prevent interference. It was
concluded that the priority of the information was probably more important for interference
than the modality of the information presented: more important information receives more
attention. Drivers focus more on navigation information than on an artificial memory task,
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because route information is more central to the driving task. This is indeed a central tenet
in the general literature on complex dynamic tasks (Bainbridge, 1974; Hockey, 1993,
1997): tasks are prioritised with respect to the main task goal.
Unfortunately, the relation between task demands and driving speed could not be studied as
directly in the present experiment as was hoped, as a few factors were confounded. A
follow-up study rectifying this problem would therefore be of great interest. An interesting
research question would be whether modality of the information presented is the
determining factor in task interference or whether priority of information is more important.
In summary, as the lack of HRV effects in the Car Following condition showed, high
driving speed alone does not necessarily increase cognitive effort. Only when high driving
speed is associated with performing a cognitively demanding task, is cognitive effort
increased. From the results of the Accurate and Fast conditions, it appears that car drivers
may indeed reduce their driving speed to decrease task demands, and by doing so, decrease
the necessary mental effort. However, the present study found no evidence for the
assumption that low task demands increase secondary task performance. On the contrary,
task behaviour appears more strategic. Drivers prioritise their tasks with respect to the main
task goal, which is to arrive safely at the destination. Also, not all increases in task demands
are automatically compensated for by increases in mental effort, but effort investment is
strategic and motivational. It thus appears that the behavioural adaptation model could
benefit from including more general psychological mechanisms to explain driver behaviour.
The main issue in previous traffic behaviour research concerning subsidiary tasks was that
drivers might become overloaded or distracted by additional information. Our results show
that car drivers can achieve a high level of task performance when performing a number of
tasks concurrently, even in difficult driving situations. However, drivers will try to avoid
the high costs associated with this by either skipping less important subtasks, or by
adapting their driving behaviour. The main concern should therefore be with where these
adaptive responses are not possible, either because of high traffic densities, high speeds, or
















It is unclear how operators in complex dynamic tasks choose between two subtasks that are
important in achieving the main task goal. The main goal in driving is to arrive at the destination,
but collision avoidance is equally important. Complex route guidance (RG) messages, essential for
arriving at the destination, were presented to 26 participants in a driving simulator study. In the
experimental group, a traffic emergency developed (a car from the left did not yield at the
intersection) at the moment RG was presented; the same situation proceeded normally for the
control group. The emergency led to loss of goal intentions in the experimental group: With 3 route
directions, 42% lost their way, whereas all participants in the control group arrived at the
destination. Therefore, goals that protect bodily integrity seem superordinate to task goals.
/,
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At an abstract level, performing complex hierarchical dynamic tasks can be described as the
process where operators try to achieve a certain task goal which can only be accomplished by
satisfying a number of hierarchically organised subgoals. Operators have to plan actions and
determine which actions are necessary by comparing the present situation with the desired
(sub)goal state. In complex hierarchical tasks, operators are usually performing several
subtasks at the same time (Bainbridge, 1997), which individually may or may not be essential
for the main task goal. Each subtask has its own subgoal hierarchy to achieve the subtask goal.
As several subtasks may be performed at the same time, subtasks also have to be co-ordinated,
in particular if there are temporal restrictions on the subtask order. Furthermore, complex
hierarchical tasks are typically performed in a dynamic environment. Operators have to be
flexible and adapt their working strategies to changing circumstances. For example, after
reacting to an incident, operators must remember to finish the (sub)task they were doing
before the incident occurred. Therefore, operators have to keep track of their location in the
hierarchy of subgoals and monitor the progress of goal fulfilment.
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This temporal organisation of behaviour is mediated by the prefrontal cortex (Fuster, 1997;
Stuss, Shallice, Alexander & Picton, 1995). Fuster (1997) assigns three related cognitive
functions to the prefrontal cortex. The first is working memory, which retains information
necessary for oncoming actions. The second function is to select, prepare and anticipate for
further actions. The third function of the prefrontal cortex is inhibitory control, which serves to
protect the structure of behaviour from interfering influences, that is, to keep behaviour goal-
directed. Inhibitory control also prevents the simultaneous performance of actions that cannot
be performed together effectively. It can be assumed that tasks which involve prefrontal
functions are perceived as mentally demanding, and it is assumed that hierarchical goal
processing is implemented by the prefrontal cortex (Anderson, 1993).
However, task performance does not proceed only in a top-down manner. Control of goal-
directed actions can also occur based on cues from the environment. There are two types of
environmental action control identified (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994). The first is when an
operator repeatedly has the same goal in a particular state of the environment; that specific
situation will automatically trigger the actions associated with that goal. This means that the
actions will be performed automatically when the relevant stimuli are present, but only when
that goal is active (Bargh, 1992). As an example, a red traffic light will only trigger a brake
response with the foot during car driving, not when walking. Automatic behaviour does not
have to be unintentional: even when driving, the driver may ignore a red traffic light. The
other type of environmental control is the formation of so-called implementation intentions
(Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996). This means that the operator forms the intention to perform
a particular action when a certain anticipated future situation is encountered, for example:
“when the goal is to post a letter, and I see a mailbox, I will post this letter”. When that
situation is then encountered, the intended actions will be initiated automatically, without the
conscious control of the operator (Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997). Furthermore, there is no
conscious control involved in remembering the contents of one’s intentions (Goschke & Kuhl,
1993). This implies that once implementation intentions have been formed, their content is
remembered without conscious processing, and the initiation of the intended actions proceeds
automatically. In this way, the control of actions is effectively transferred to the environment.
Goals exist at different levels of behaviour. A distinction can be made between general goals,
task goals, and subgoals. General goals refer to higher-order, abstract goals, such as being a
nice person, being informed about world affairs, or becoming an Olympic champion. It is this
type of goals that social psychologists mostly, though not exclusively, refer to when they use
the term “goal” (Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996; Higgins & Kruglanski, 1996). These goals
determine the contents of the task goals. Task goals, also called action goals (Gollwitzer &
Bargh, 1996), are in fact intentions to complete a certain task in order to fulfil a higher-order
goal, for example take the train to Amsterdam (to visit a friend), read a newspaper (to become
informed), run the Amsterdam marathon (to check on physical form). Multiple task goals can
be active at the same time, though not all can be combined, as the examples show. Subgoals
are short-term goals that are set in order to achieve the task goal (check the train timetable, go
to railway station, buy a train ticket). Subgoals to fulfil a task goal are hierarchically organised
and are served on a last-in-first-out basis (Anderson, 1993)1.
Once a task goal has been set, that is, once operators have committed themselves to
completing a task, operators have to ward off distractions, perform the right action at the right
time, deal with difficulties, compensate for failures in task performance, and negotiate
conflicts between goals (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996). Effective pursuit of task goals is
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characterised by selecting information from the environment that is relevant for achieving the
presently active task goal, while ignoring irrelevant information. However, operators do not
passively wait for and react to changes in the environment. Experienced operators actively
search for information, or know where and when to expect it (Bainbridge, 1997). This search
for information is guided by the currently active task goal. As experience grows, operators
learn which information is relevant for the achievement of the current goal. Only when the
information is relevant for achieving the presently relevant task goal (Vicente & Wang, 1998;
Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996), will operators select and use that information to decide on
adjustments of their actions.
Operators in complex dynamic tasks have to be flexible when dealing with emergencies.
Although task goals in general have to be protected against disturbances, operators may need
to interrupt ongoing behaviour in case of significant information, even if that information is
unrelated to the presently active task goal. Neuropsychological evidence from animal studies
shows that dopaminergic neurons in the mesencephalon show a quick and short burst of
impulses after a behaviourally significant stimulus (Redgrave, Prescott & Gurney, 1999). This
“short-latency dopamine response” promotes the switching of limited-capacity attentional and
behavioural resources towards biologically significant stimuli. That is, it helps to interrupt
ongoing behaviour, and promote switching attention and behaviour toward the new
unexpected event of behavioural significance. However, this dopamine response has costs
associated with it: it hampers prefrontal functioning. As a result of the hyperdopaminergic
mechanism after stress, monkeys performed worse on a delayed-response working memory
test, but not on an immediate visual pattern discrimination task (Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic,
1998). Because the prefrontal cortex appears to be taken “off-line” the temporal organisation
of behaviour may be implicated.
Effective task behaviour can also be impaired by high task demands. With increased task
demands, it becomes more difficult to process all relevant information or perform all
necessary actions, as actions cannot always be combined (Allport, 1980). High-priority
information may therefore be missed, especially if it is not relevant for the currently active
task goal and appears at an unexpected time or location. In general, operators have been
shown to use at least three ways to deal with high task demands (Bainbridge, 1974; Hockey,
1993, 1997). One way is to put more effort into the task if task demands increase. Another
way is to change the working strategy. In complex tasks this usually is possible, because there
are often more methods for doing the same task (Bainbridge, 1974). For example, operators
may decrease the required level of speed or accuracy, or can utilise less demanding strategies.
These involve fewer calculations or manipulations of information, or fewer storage processes
of information. A third way of dealing with high task demands is to pay less attention to
subsidiary activities. Operators may choose to skip a task, if that secondary task is not
essential for achieving the main task goal (see also Hockey, Wastell & Sauer, 1998). The
alternative strategies may not result in the same level of task performance; however, operators
may not always aim at perfect task performance and may consider results acceptable if the
main task goal is achieved, even though subsidiary tasks or subgoals may have been
discarded. Achieving the main task goal is central in task performance because it was the key
reason why the task was undertaken in the first place. It is therefore assumed that operators
will protect high-priority task goals (Hockey, 1997; Hockey, Wastell & Sauer, 1998), even if
this protection is at the expense of some of the subsidiary tasks.
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In an every-day skill such as car driving, the assignment of priorities to subtasks has important
safety implications. Drivers should remain focused on the main driving task and not distracted
by performing subsidiary tasks irrelevant to the driving task, such as tuning the radio or
making a car telephone call. There has been considerable research on the potentially negative
effects of performing secondary tasks on driving performance. Although these changes in
driving performance have not always been interpreted as adaptive, the data show that, in
general, car drivers are resistant to distraction by such tasks. Drivers appear to adjust their
driving behaviour in high task demand situations, or alternatively, to give up secondary tasks
not relevant for performing the main driving task. For example, drivers reduced driving speed
when they had to use route guidance systems presenting complex route information on a
visual display (Dingus et al., 1997; Pohlman & Traenkle, 1994), or increased the following
distance from to the car immediately in front (Noy, 1989). Fairclough, Ashby & Parkes (1993)
found that drivers checked their mirrors less often when they drove with a paper map than
when simply receiving short route instructions on a display.
In a previous experiment in a driving simulator (Cnossen, Meijman & Rothengatter, 2000),
car drivers were presented a memory task auditorily driving, and given a paper map for
navigation. Primary task demands were manipulated by having participants drive in different
traffic densities. Route finding can be considered a relevant and high-priority subgoal when
driving in an unfamiliar environment. The memory task had no direct relevance for the driving
task, and can thus be considered a true secondary task. In general, two types of adaptation to
high task demands were found. If primary-task demands increased (busy traffic, driving with a
map), drivers changed their primary task performance by reducing their driving speed. If, on
the other hand, secondary task demands increased (performing the memory task), drivers
neglected the secondary task without changing their driving speed. However, in the most
demanding conditions (memory task and map reading), participants neglected the memory
task and reduced their driving speed as well. This was taken as evidence that car drivers try to
protect high-priority task goals at the expense of low-priority task goals.
Duncan (1990) also described driving behaviour in terms of goal-directed behaviour and
proposes a theory of how drivers select goals. He claims that actual driving behaviour, as most
other activities, always reflects a balance between competing goals, for example between
speed and safety. He suggests that in divided attention tasks, of which car driving is an
example, the efficiency of goal weighting is hampered compared to single-task performance.
This can lead to the selection of an inappropriate goal. He raises an interesting issue, by
drawing explicit attention to the fact that the goal of “driving safely” always has to compete
with other goals, implying that safe driving may not always win the competition.
Unfortunately, Duncan’s theory of goal weighting is too abstract to predict how goals are
actually selected, so it remains unclear when “driving safely” may lose the competition.
Duncan’s account appears to be in contrast to the compensatory control model proposed by
Hockey (1997; Hockey, Wastell & Sauer, 1998), where operators are assumed to always try to
protect the main task goal. Obviously, the contrast only exists if “driving safely” is actually a
high-priority goal in driving.
Research questions
Car drivers seem resistant to distractions by secondary tasks, but traffic behaviour studies have
stressed that performing secondary tasks may hamper traffic safety (Alm & Nilsson, 1995;
Verweij, 1993). It is therefore uncertain how much priority car drivers assign to “safe
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driving”. This question is especially relevant for traffic behaviour, where such choices will
have direct effects on traffic safety, especially if assuming that safe driving may have to
compete with other goals (Duncan, 1990). This is also an important question for the general
field of complex task performance, because it questions how operators assign priority to one
goal over another if two goals are in conflict with each other, but of equal importance for
achieving the main goal. The present experiment was therefore performed to study how car
drivers choose between two competing goals in driving.
The main task goal of driving can be broken down into two task goals: arriving at the intended
destination, and maintaining safety. In the present study, the main task goal in driving was
divided into these two parts. Arriving at the destination is the main task goal, because it is the
very reason why the task is undertaken in the first place. We assumed that the goal of
maintaining safety is not a subgoal of arriving at the destination (the result of an accident
being that the destination may never be reached) but a separate task goal, subordinate to the
general goal of maintaining bodily integrity. Therefore, main research question was when and
how these task goals compete.
This experiment was conducted in a driving simulator, where participants drove through an
urban environment. They received complex auditory route guidance (RG) information, for
example: turn right at the second crossing, then turn left at the next crossing, then turn right at
the third crossing. This was the only way in which participants were informed about the route
to drive. The main task goal of arriving at the destination could therefore only be achieved if
the subtask of processing the route information was fulfilled adequately. To measure the
importance of maintaining safety, the other main goal in driving, half of the participants (the
experimental group) were confronted with a critical traffic incident while the route guidance
message was presented. The other participants served as controls, and were not presented with
this critical traffic incident. The critical incident occurred at intersections, where a car from the
left did not stop to yield to the participant, even though the participant did have right-of-way.
At an abstract level, the route guidance messages determined the task goal currently most
relevant for the participants. The participants commit themselves to this task goal, so
following these instructions to arrive at the destination should be a high-priority subgoal. This
subgoal of following the route directions would be expected to be protected against
disturbances. The car from the left (“the virtual car”) not yielding unexpectedly is one such
disturbing event against which that subgoal has to be protected. However, warding off such an
emergency situation can be considered an important goal in itself. On the basis of a pilot
study, it was expected that participants would have difficulty dealing with both events
simultaneously, and that this would thus present a conflict between these two goals.
It was hypothesised that in some participants of the experimental group processing the route
information and reacting to the incident would present a conflict between competing goals. If
the priority of the participants were with the goal of avoiding accidents, the experimental
group would make more route errors than the control group and avoid near-collisions in those
conditions where participants were confronted with a critical traffic incident while the RG
information was presented. If, on the other hand, arriving at the destination were more
important, the experimental group would have more near-collisions whereas the number of
route errors would be the same for both groups in these conditions.
In some instances, the critical incident of a car from the left not yielding did not occur at the
intersection where the RG message was presented, but at a later intersection. Thus, it could be
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tested whether a critical traffic situation interferes with the formation or with the execution of
implementation intentions. When the RG messages are being presented, the driver is forming
implementation intentions to follow the specified route. A critical traffic incident could
interfere with this. Alternatively, the critical incident could interfere with the execution of the
formed intentions when it occurs later. As remembering the contents of one’s intentions does
not involve conscious control (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993), interference of the critical incident
with the execution of the intentions was not expected to occur.
The complexity of the RG messages was varied in the experiment. In half the conditions,
the RG message consisted of two directions (e.g., “at the second crossing turn right, then at
the first crossing turn left”); in the other half of conditions, the number of directions was
three. A pilot study had shown that three directions were rather difficult to remember. To
prevent a floor effect, conditions with two directions were also included in the experiment.
It was expected that RG messages containing three directions would be more difficult to
remember than those containing two, and that the number of route errors would therefore be
higher in conditions with RG messages containing three directions.
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8.3.1 Participants
Twelve female and fourteen male participants from the institute’s participants pool
completed the study (mean age was 32.8 yrs; mean kilometrage per annum 14,000). To
prevent simulator sickness only participants were selected who had completed previous
experiments in the driving simulator. Three participants who developed simulator sickness
were replaced by others. Participants were assigned to either the control or the experimental
group, controlling for sex, age, and driving experience. There were no significant
differences between females and males, nor between experimental and control group on any
of these variables.
8.3.2 Experimental environment and conditions
The experiment was performed in a driving simulator (Van Wolffelaar & Van Winsum,
1995). The simulator car was a BMW 525 with original controls linked to the driving
simulator. A graphical workstation (Silicon Graphics Skywriter) generates the images, which
are projected on a panoramic screen with a 165-degree angle of vision horizontally and a 45-
degree angle of vision vertically. Using the network specification facility, an urban
environment was built with many intersections and buildings. There were no main roads and
no traffic lights. The road network mostly consisted of straight roads but there were curved
roads as well. Distance between intersections was mostly 200 meters, although some
intersections were 400 or 600 meters apart. There was other interactive traffic driving in this
city. With the scenario specification facility of the simulator, all participants were presented
with the same route guidance (RG) information and with the same traffic situations at the
same locations.
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Figure 8.1 Illustration of traffic situation “during RG presentation” and “later”
The experiment consisted of two rides, which were divided into four conditions each. Each
condition started with a route guidance message presented auditorily to the participant and
ended when the participant arrived at the destination. In each condition, participants had to
cross 6 to 8 intersections. Average route length was about 1.5 km, and participants needed
approximately two minutes to complete one route.
It was essential that participants were highly motivated to listen to the RG information,
otherwise the critical traffic incident would not present a conflict between subgoals. To
increase the importance of the RG information, participants were told that if they lost their
way, short auditory directions (turn left/right) would direct them back to the location where
they had taken the wrong turn. It was emphasised to the subjects that this meant making a
detour, and that it was therefore advisable to listen to the route messages carefully. A detour
could take up to two minutes to drive, doubling the normal length of a condition
RG messages always started before an intersection where drivers had to drive straight ahead
(see Figure 8.1). Route guidance messages were presented by a digitised female voice and
consisted of two or three directions to follow. The RG messages were timed according to the
expected arrival time at the next intersection of the participant, assuming the participant’s
speed remained unchanged. This was calculated as: Expected Arrival Time = (Present
Distance to Intersection / Present Velocity). RG messages with 2 directions (“simple RG”)
started 5 seconds before expected arrival time, and RG with 3 directions (“complex RG”)
started 8 seconds before expected arrival time. This resulted in route guidance information
being presented while the participant entered the intersection, where a car from the left (“the
virtual car”) would arrive at approximately the same time as the participant. The scenario was
designed such that this virtual car was already visible to the participant when RG started. In
conditions without this virtual car from the left, the timing of the RG messages was the same
(5 or 8 seconds before expected arrival time). To standardise the experiment as much as
possible, RG information was only given on straight sections, to ensure that all participants
were always driving at approximately the same speed when they were presented with RG
information. At the intersection, where they would arrive with RG information being
presented, participants always had to drive straight ahead.
To be able to test a priori differences between the experimental and control group, the first
ride was the same for all participants. In the second ride, the traffic conditions during RG
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presentation were different for the two groups (see Table 8.1). In both rides, there were two
conditions with and two conditions without a car from the left during RG presentation. There
were never cars from right or from ahead at the intersections where RG was presented. The
car from the left was always visible to the participant because there were no buildings
obscuring the participant’s view at these intersections. The cars from the left planned to arrive
at the intersection at the same time as the participant in all conditions, although exact arrival
time depended on the actions of the participant and on the right-of-way rules that the car from
the left used. In the first ride (of 4 conditions), this car from the left observed the right-of-way
rules, yielding to the participant’s car. In the second ride, this car did not yield to participants
from the experimental group. As a test for habituation of the experimental group to the car
from the left, the last condition was the same for both groups: the car from the left would not
yield to either group.
In order to test whether an emergency situation interferes with the formation of intentions
and/or with the execution of intentions, two conditions in the second ride were altered slightly,
compared to similar conditions in the first ride. In these conditions, there was no car from the
left at the intersection when RG was being presented. Instead, there was a car from the left at
the first intersection after the RG information (see Figure 8.1). This car yielded normally to
the control group but not to the experimental group. This was the same traffic situation as
when that car would arrive at the intersection when RG was still being presented. The only
difference was the timing of the RG message: in the “car later” condition, RG had already
ended when the experimental group was confronted with a car from the left that did not give
way.
Table 8.1 Overview of behaviour of car from the left in the different
experimental groups
Condition RG Traffic Control group Experimental group
1 3 no car no car no car
2 2 car during RG car yields car yields
3 2 no car no car no car
4 3 car during RG car yields car yields
5 3 car later car yields car does not yield
6 2 car during RG car yields car does not yield
7 3 car during RG car yields car does not yield
8 2 car later car does not yield car does not yield
RG: number of route guidance directions presented
8.3.3 Procedure
The experiment was combined with a vigilance experiment, which was conducted prior, and
subsequent to the present study. Upon arrival in the laboratory, the participants first filled out
a health and driving experience questionnaire. They were trained for the vigilance experiment
for about 10 minutes and then performed the vigilance experiment, which was conducted on a
rural road with intersections and other traffic and which took about 30 minutes. The present
study started with a training of about 15 minutes. Participants were familiarised with driving
in the urban environment and with the experimental task of processing the route messages.
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During the training, traffic always observed the right-of-way rules. The experiment took about
30-45 minutes to complete, depending on driving speed and number of route errors.
Participants finished with another half-hour of the vigilance experiment (reported elsewhere,
Van der Hulst, Meijman, & Rothengatter, 1999).
8.3.4 Data collection
Route finding errors were recorded and divided into two categories: directional and counting
errors. A directional error means that a participant turns off at the correct intersection but takes
the wrong direction. A counting error occurs when a participant takes the correct direction but
at the wrong intersection. The occurrence of collisions or near-collisions with the car from the
left was also noted. The experimenter judged whether an incident was considered to be a near-
collision: A near-collision was the incident where a participant had to make an emergency
stop to avoid a collision.
Route errors were analysed with Chi-square tests. If the assumptions for the Chi-square test
were not met, Fisher’s exact probability test was used instead. This was either because n
was smaller than 20 or because expected frequencies were too small (n between 20 and 40,
and expected frequencies less than 5), as recommended in Siegel (1956), Fisher’s exact
probability test is a non-parametric test for discrete data; it does not compute a statistic but
the probability that two groups differ in the proportion with which they fall into two
categories (Siegel, 1956).
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First, data will be presented concerning the number of route errors that were made in the
experiment; this will be followed by the number of collisions and near-collisions in the
experiment.
8.4.1 Route errors
Due to the dynamic interactive character of traffic in the driving simulator, the traffic situation
was not completely under experimental control. The other traffic in the simulator is
autonomous, following generic rules, and it can only be controlled fully by the experimenter at
the expense of unnatural behaviour of that other traffic (e.g., unrealistic acceleration rates,
extreme speeds). It was decided to try to keep traffic behaviour of the other cars as natural as
possible. Factors such as driving speed, acceleration rate and other behaviours of a participant
in the experiment therefore influenced the particular traffic situation that the car from the left
encountered at the crossing and reacted to. Unfortunately, this at times resulted in the car
yielding to the participant when it should not have, and vice versa. Data on route errors will
therefore be presented in two ways. First, the differences between the experimental and
control group were analysed. In these analyses, a number of cases were coded as missing due
to unplanned behaviour of the other traffic. This implies that results are based on less than 26
subjects in these conditions. Next, data will be presented on the basis of the actual traffic
situation encountered by the participants, irrespective of group membership (experimental or
control), summed over the entire experiment. In this way, all experimental data can be used,
which has the additional benefit that statistical power is increased.
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Group differences
To test for a priori differences between the two groups in route finding performance, data
from the first ride will be compared, because the first part of the experiment was the same for
both groups. The two easiest conditions without any traffic during RG presentation (Condition
1 and 3) were compared. In these conditions, the car from left always behaved as planned. The
two groups showed similar route finding performance: in Condition 1, one participant in each
group took a wrong way; in Condition 3, one particpant from the control group, and no-one
from the experimental group, made a route error). With simple RG messages (2 directions;
condition 3), no route errors were made in either group. With complex RG messages (3
directions; condition 1), in each group, one driver took a wrong turning. To test for habituation
effects in the experimental group, route-finding performance in the last condition was
compared between the two groups. In the last condition (Condition 8), both groups were
confronted with a car from the left not yielding, which it should have. In this condition, no
participant in the experimental group made a route error. As there were also no route errors in
the control group, it is unlikely that this was due to a learning effect in the experimental group.
The question that this experiment tried to answer was whether the participants would give
priority to processing the RG information to reach the destination, or avoiding an accident.
Route finding performance and the occurrence of accidents were therefore compared for the
two groups in conditions 6 and 7. In these conditions, with 2 and 3 route directions
respectively, the car from the left gave way to the control group but not to the experimental
group. With simple RG messages (2 directions), no route errors were made in either group.
However, with complex RG (3 directions), the experimental group made considerably more
route errors than the control group (see Table 8.2): 42 percent of the participants in the
experimental group took a wrong turn. All participants who had received normal right-of-
way with complex RG drove the correct route. The difference between the groups was
significant (Fisher’s exact probability test, p< .03).
Table 8.2 Group differences in percentage of route errors in second ride
Condition RG Traffic Control group a Experimental group b
5 3 Car later 23 (n = 13) 33 (n = 12)
6 2 Car during RG 0 (n = 11) 0 (n = 11)
7 3 Car during RG 0 (n = 11) 42 (n = 12)
8 2 Car later 0 (n = 12) 0 (n = 12)
RG: number of route guidance directions presented
a Car from the left yields to control group, except in condition 8
b
 
Car from the left does not yield to experimental group
A further research question referred to the timing of the critical traffic situation. Would the
critical traffic situation interfere with the formation of implementation intentions or the
execution of the intention? To answer this question, conditions 5 and 7 were compared (see
Table 8.2). Both conditions involved a complex RG message (3 directions), and a critical
incident for the experimental group. In condition 7, this car did not yield during RG
presentation, whereas in condition 5, the car from the left did not yield at the first
intersection after RG had ended (“later”). The experimental group lost their way more in
condition 7 (“during RG”) than in condition 5 (“later”): 42% vs. 33%. However, in the
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“later” condition, 23% of the control group also lost their way. The difference between the
control group and the experimental group in this condition is not significant (Fisher’s exact
probability test, p<.426).
Route errors as a function of actual traffic situation encountered
Next, all 8 experimental conditions were analysed together, irrespective of group membership
of participants, and route finding performance was analysed depending on the actual traffic
situation during RG presentation. Table 8.3 shows these data. Note that the total number of
traffic situations was 208 (8 conditions x 26 participants; the total number of occurrences of 2
RG directions is 104, as is the number of 3 RG directions: 104 + 104 = 208; see bottom row).
The total number of route errors in the experiment was 25 (21 with RG=3, and 4 with RG=2).
Table 8.3 Number of route errors as a function of the actual traffic
condition encountered, summed over entire experiment
RG = 2 RG = 3
Traffic condition Errors n % Errors n %
No car 1 29 3 3 30 10
Later, car from the left yields 0 2 0 3 14 21
Later, car from the left does not yield 0 24 0 4 12 33
During RG, car from the left yields 2 33 6 2 26 8
During RG, car from the left does not yield 1 16 6 9 22 41
Total 4 104 4 21 104 20
RG: number of route guidance directions presented
Taken together over all traffic situations, the data again show that 2 directions were
remembered better than 3 directions, irrespective of the traffic situation. Following 2
directions, 4% of the participants lost their way; following 3 directions, 20% of the
participants lost their way. This difference between 2 and 3 RG directions was significant (Χ2
(1, n=208)=11.64, p<.01). The most important finding is that the highest number of route
errors occurred when the car from the left did not give way “during RG” (RG=3): 41% of the
participants lost their way. More participants lost their way when they did not receive right-of-
way than when they did during RG presentation (8% versus 41%) (Χ2 (1, n=48)=5.68, p<.01).
Note again the large number of route errors in the “later, does not yield” conditions with
RG=3: 33% of the participants made a route error. The conditions “later, car yields” and
“later, car does not yield” resulted in similar number of route errors (21% and 33%,
respectively).
Summed over the entire experiment, for all route errors, the type of route errors made were
analysed: directional or counting errors (see Table 8.4). Summed over RG=2 and RG=3,
counting errors seemed more prominent than directional errors: there were 8 directional and
14 counting errors in the experiment (three route errors could not be classified as either a
directional or a counting error, e.g., when a participant should turn right but drives past the
correct intersection, and cannot go right at the next intersection because that intersection is
a T-junction: it is unknown whether this driver made a counting error or a direction error;
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one subject took a wrong turn after he had followed all directions correctly, which was
noted as a route error because it showed he did not remember the entire route).
Participants equally lost their way at the first, second and third turning: 9, 9, and 7 route
errors respectively. However, to fully understand the nature of errors, the data have to be
corrected for the fact that participants who make a route error in a previous turn cannot
make a route error later. Therefore, data have to be expressed as percentages of the number
of participants who actually arrive at the second or third turning. In the entire experiment,
there were 208 first turnings (26 participants x 8 conditions). Nine participants made a route
error here, which is 4%. Thus, 199 (208 - 9) participants arrived at the second turning, of
whom 9 made a route error, which is 5%. In the RG=3 condition, there were 90 participants
(104 - 9 - 5) left to arrive at the third turning (there is no third turning with RG=2). Seven
of them made a route error, which is 8%. Thus corrected, the data show that the third
direction is remembered relatively worse than the first two directions of a RG message.
Table 8.4 Number and type of route error as a function of number of route
guidance messages
Route error type
Counting Direction Other Total
RG = 2 First turning 1 3 0 4
Second turning 0 0 0 0
Total for RG = 2 1 3 0 4
RG = 3 First turning 5 0 0 5
Second turning 5 4 0 9
Third turning 3 1 3 7
Total for RG = 3 13 5 3 21
Total for all RG conditions 14 8 3 25
RG is number of route guidance directions presented
“Counting” refers to going the correct direction at the incorrect intersection
“Direction” refers to going the incorrect direction at the correct intersection
“Other” is an error that could not be classified as either a counting or a direction error
“First turning”, “Second turning”, and “Third turning” refer to where in the route the route
error was made
8.4.2 Collisions and near-collisions
In the entire experiment, there were eight (near-)collisions with the car from the left that did
not give way (see Table 8.5). One near-accident happened with a complex RG message at a
“later” intersection: this participant reached the destination without errors. Three near-
accidents happened when complex RG was being presented: these participants lost their
route later. With simple RG, three near-collisions happened, where the participants nearly
collided with the car from the left that did not give way at the “later” intersection. These
participants did not lose their way. The only participant who made a route error with 2
directions had a real collision later in a condition, with a car that did not yield.
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Table 8.5 Number of Near-Collisions and Route Errors
(Near-)collisions Route errors (n) Route errors (%)
RG = 2 Later 3 0 0
During RG 2 1 50
Total for RG = 2 5 1 20
RG = 3 Later 1 0 0
During RG 3 3 100
Total for RG = 3 4 3 75
RG = Route Guidance directions; “Later” and “During RG”: see Figure 8.1
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The present study tried to answer the question how operators in complex dynamic tasks
choose between conflicting subgoals when both are equally important for achieving the top
goal of the task. Car driving was used as an example of such a task, because it is a
hierarchical task where the top goal can be divided into two equally important subgoals:
arriving at the planned destination, and avoiding accidents. Also, choices made by car
drivers have direct consequences for traffic safety, as collision avoidance has been assumed
to compete with other subgoals (Duncan, 1990).
Car drivers were presented with route guidance (RG) messages while a critical traffic incident
happened. It had been expected that this would present a conflict between the two subgoals of
driving to the destination and arriving there without accidents. Because the critical incident
happened at the same time as the route guidance messages were given, the two subgoals could
be separated and it could thus be tested which subgoal received more priority from car drivers.
To be able to test whether the emergency situation interfered with intention formation or with
intention execution, the timing of the emergency was manipulated: not only were participants
confronted with an emergency situation during RG presentation, but also later in the ride.
A first finding was that processing 2 RG directions (simple RG) did not induce much of a
conflict between subgoals. In the entire experiment, only 4 route errors occurred when
participants were following simple RG. It can be concluded that processing two route
directions was well within the capabilities of the participants, and could be combined with
negotiating an intersection and avoiding a collision. Processing three directions proved more
difficult: of all route errors made in the entire experiment, 84% occurred with 3 directions.
Actually, it seemed only just within the capabilities of participants to process three directions.
After complex RG, irrespective of the traffic situation at the time of presentation, 20% of the
participants lost their way. This indicates that the conflict between the two subgoals mostly
occurs in conditions with 3 directions. The rest of this discussion will therefore focus on those
conditions.
Notable in the results for conditions with 3 directions are the large differences between similar
conditions. Whereas in condition 5 (“later”) 23% of participants of the control group made a
route error, only 8% (2 of 26) of the participants made a route error in condition 1 (“no car”).
This is somewhat surprising, as the conditions are very similar: in both conditions, no traffic
was present at the intersection when the direction information was presented. There does not
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appear to be a clear explanation for this difference. This was one of the reasons for summing
all experimental data over the traffic scenarios encountered by the participants.
When summed over the entire experiment, the results were straightforward: when forced to
choose, participants gave more priority to accident avoidance than to route finding. Summed
over the entire experiment, 8% of the participants made a route error when the car from the
left behaved normally. This stands in sharp contrast with the situations where the car from the
left did not observe right-of-way rules. When confronted with a critical traffic incident when
three directions were being presented, 41% of the participants (see Table 8.3) did not
remember the route correctly and took a wrong turn. These subjects gave priority to handling
the traffic situation, and avoided an accident successfully, but at the expense of processing the
route information. Furthermore, participants who were involved in a near-collision, did not
arrive at their destination (see Table 8.5). The conclusion is therefore warranted that the
participants’ main priority was collision avoidance rather than remembering the route.
Unfortunately, the large number of route errors in condition 5 for the control group (an
emergency situation later in the ride) made it impossible to test the effects of the timing of the
RG messages. In this condition, the number of route errors was so high in the control group
that the larger number of route errors in the experimental group was not significantly different.
There is no real explanation for this high number of route errors, as nothing extraordinary
happened to the control group in this condition. Therefore, it remains unclear whether the
handling of an emergency situation only interferes with the formation of intentions, or also
with the execution of previously formed intentions.
However, the relatively high incidence of route errors at the second and third direction (Table
8.4) suggest that dealing with the car from the left not yielding unexpectedly interfered with
the encoding of the RG messages (although this obviously does not rule out the possibility that
such an emergency situation could not interfere with the execution of previously memorised
messages). Remember that the RG messages started around 8 seconds before the participant
reached the intersection. Depending on the speed driven by the participants, they were either
listening to the second or third direction when they arrived at the intersection where the
critical incident happened. Supposedly, the first direction had already been committed to
memory when the critical traffic incident happened. The fact that most route errors occurred
with the last two directions shows that the incident had no effect on the execution of the
already memorised direction, but strongly interfered with the encoding of the incoming
messages.
Driving is largely a visual task, leading many researchers to suggest (Schraagen, 1993;
Wierwille, 1993) that route guidance systems should present their information auditorily.
However, the present study indicates that auditory (RG messages) and visual (car from the
left) information can interfere, and that the contents of auditory messages may be lost
completely when dealing with distracting visual information. There is reason to believe that
not only emergency situations may result in loss of (auditory) information. Operators in
complex tasks have been shown to select information only if it is relevant for the presently
active goal (Vicente & Wang, 1998). When a driver is involved in another subtask
(overtaking, talking to a passenger, or planning the evening meal), RG messages may not be
effectively processed by the driver, as they are not relevant for the presently active task goal.
This suggests that an effective auditory RG system should be supplemented with a visual
backup system. If an auditory RG message is missed by the driver when engaged in other
subtasks than route finding, the visual RG system will still show the direction to turn when the
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driver enters an intersection, at which time the driver’s subgoal of route finding has become
active.
These results clearly demonstrate how easily the formation of intentions (to remember the
route) can be overruled by an unexpected emergency. This seems in contrast to claims by
Goschke & Kuhl (1993) that remembering the contents of one’s intentions proceeds without
conscious control. However, the route guidance messages in this study were rather complex,
and more importantly, did not allow control to be transferred to the environment. Driving the
correct route not only involved remembering the instructions, but also required counting the
intersections until the appropriate intersection was reached. This implies continuous use of
working memory. The fact that the majority of the route errors in this experiment was due to
counting errors indicates that counting of the intersections is indeed error-prone. A route
guidance message which would include distinct landmarks, such as “turn left at the traffic
lights,” would probably have been more effective in transferring control to the environment;
the traffic lights would have been the cue to turn left. There is evidence that drivers indeed use
landmarks in navigation (Alm, 1990). It is doubtful, however, that the interference that
occurred during the emergency incident with the encoding of the RG message would not have
occurred if the RG messages had used such landmarks. RG messages that would use
landmarks are still rather complex (turn left at the gas station, right near the church, then left at
the traffic lights), and would need substantial processing.
It is precisely this kind of processing that seems heavily disrupted during the occurrence of
biologically significant emergencies. Noise stress impairs prefrontal cognitive functioning to
allow more habitual responses through a hyperdopaminergic mechanism that comes into play
in stress (Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic, 1998). The so-called short-latency dopamine response is
in general observed after the unexpected presentation of a behaviourally significant stimulus
(Redgrave, Prescott & Gurney, 1999). This suggest that in episodes of acute (mild) stress, the
organism stops ongoing behaviour, orients itself to the new stimulus and performs habitual
behavioural patterns that have proved to be helpful in stress situations, without losing time
deliberating over what actions would be the most appropriate in the present situation.
Although these effects have been observed in animals, the present study suggests that the
same mechanism may come into play in humans when their bodily integrity is under threat.
The car from left that does not yield can been seen as an unexpected event of behavioural
significance: Not reacting to such an emergency situation can result in an accident. Because of
this event, the RG messages are not further processed, and attention is switched to the
unexpected new stimulus. With the prefrontal cortex off-line, there is room for the more
habitual or stereotyped behaviour of collision avoidance, a behaviour with high survival value.
Interpreted in this way, collision avoidance is not mediated by the prefrontal cortex; the
prefrontal cortex would “calculate” the value of collision avoidance in comparison to other
task goals, that is, would weight the values of the respective goals (Duncan, 1990). Rather,
collision avoidance is habitual behaviour regulated by lower brain regions. Collision
avoidance is an essential part of driver education emphasising safe driving in general.
However, because drivers have learned to focus on safety, collision avoidance is not only a
high-priority goal, it is also part of the higher-order goal of protecting bodily integrity.
Collision avoidance is not an “ordinary” task goal or subgoal that has to compete with other
task goals. By training, it has indeed become a habitual response or “supergoal” to emergency
conditions. Collision avoidance is very likely to dominate over lower-order task goals as it is










The main research question in this thesis referred to goal management in drivers, especially
in situations of high task demands. Previous studies showed that drivers often deal actively
with task demands, for example by reducing driving speed in high-demand situations.
However, the strategies drivers use in dealing with task demands had not been studied in a
systematic way. These strategies were therefore the object of study in the present thesis. On
the basis of a review of the literature, a number of assumptions and hypotheses were
formulated.
The central premise of this thesis was that task behaviour is essentially goal directed, that
is, aimed at fulfilling a certain task goal. On the basis of research on task demands in
complex dynamic tasks, it was assumed that strategies in dealing with high demands serve
to protect the main task goal, which may be at the expense of subsidiary-task goals. The
driving task is a multi-task activity and two or more task goals can therefore be active
simultaneously. The driving task is often regarded as a task where task behaviour takes
place at hierarchically different levels. At the lowest level, operational behaviours take
place such as steering, braking, and speed control; the intermediate level accommodates
tactical behaviour, which includes overtaking, merging, negotiating intersections; at the
“strategic” and highest level in the driving task, decisions are made regarding means of
transportation and route to drive.
It was hypothesised that drivers’ strategies in high task demands would be aimed at
protecting higher-order task goals, which might (but need not) result in neglecting lower-
order task goals. As the main goals in driving are to arrive at the destination and to do so
without accidents, it was furthermore hypothesised that these two goals would dominate
over all other task goals in driving. It was additionally hypothesised that internal task goals,
i.e., task goals that are inherent to the driving task, are given more priority than external
task goals, such as talking to a passenger or performing a memory task as these tasks are
unrelated to the driving task.
In light of the central role that goals play in this thesis, the nature of goals themselves was
also studied. Goals to which one has committed oneself are called intentions. The literature
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on goals and intentions is equivocal regarding their nature: some authors believe that once
intentions have been formed, they are remembered and executed automatically, but others
argue that intentions may be forgotten and that they may not be executed at the intended
time or place. On the basis of empirical evidence, it was hypothesised that intentions are
subject to disruption and can be forgotten similar to other declarative information. This
question was examined in the last experiment (Chapter 8).
In summary then, the main hypotheses were:
1. Drivers give more priority to tasks that serve higher-order goals than tasks that serve
lower-order goals in the driving task.
2. Drivers give more priority to tasks that serve goals that are part of the driving task than
external tasks.
3. Drivers’ main priorities in driving are to arrive at the destination and to prevent
accidents.
4. Collision avoidance is more important than knowing the route to drive.
5. Intentions are of a declarative nature, and are subject to interruption and decay.
This chapter will first summarise the main results of the three experiments described in the
previous chapters. It will then describe some theoretical implications of these results, and





9.2.1 Experiment 1: Conflicting goals at same level
Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that drivers assign higher priority to subtasks that are
directly associated with the driving task rather than to other subtasks, even if these subtasks
are at the same hierarchical level of the driving task. More specifically, it examined
whether map reading is considered more important than performing a memory task. The
memory task consisted of adding up the lengths of traffic queues presented auditorily, and
was therefore not relevant for the driving task. It was generally assumed in this thesis that
the main goals in driving are arriving at the destination and avoiding accidents. Finding the
route to drive is therefore a task goal that serves one of the highest goals in driving, and it
was hypothesised that it would receive more priority than the memory task, in high task
demands situations. Conditions were driven in high and low traffic densities, the idea being
that the increased task demands of driving in high traffic density cannot be neglected by the
driver in the same way as a memory task can be. It was hypothesised that drivers might
increase their effort, or change their driving behaviour, for example by driving more slowly
in heavy traffic.
The results showed that drivers were indeed prioritising their task goals in a consistent
manner. Memory task performance was worst in the map reading condition where driving
speed was highest, indicating that in that condition, drivers gave more priority to reading
the map than to performing the memory task. The memory task was performed best when
demands from the route finding task were low. This clearly supports the hypotheses
regarding task priorities. Interestingly, drivers only reduced their driving speed when
driving with a map and in high traffic density, but not as a result of performing the memory
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task. Lowering driving speed can be interpreted as a way of reducing task demands.
Apparently, drivers did not value the memory task sufficiently important to reduce driving
speed; rather, they neglected performing the memory task more in difficult conditions, as
predicted.
The speed reduction in high traffic density suggests that drivers preferred to reduce the task
demands rather than increase their mental effort. The effort data indeed showed that the
different traffic density levels were associated with similar levels of mental effort. The
speed reduction in the map conditions, however, did not result in less effort invested,
probably because drivers still needed to perform the difficult task of reading the map while
driving. It was tentatively concluded that increases in demands of the primary (driving) task
are dealt with by behavioural adaptations in the driving task, whereas increases in
secondary task demands are met by neglecting the secondary task if demands increase
beyond where drivers can or want to deal actively with the demands.
9.2.2 Experiment 2: Driving speed and mental effort
It is often found in research on driver behaviour that driving speed is reduced in high task
demands (see also Experiment 1), and it is assumed to be a strategy to reduce actual task
demands. Experiment 2 investigated the relation between driving speed and mental effort
directly: is a higher driving speed indeed associated with an increase in mental effort
invested, all other things being equal? Drivers were driving in different speed conditions.
They were asked to drive as fast as they could, as if they were in a hurry; to drive as
accurately as possible, as if taking a driving test; and finally, to follow a fast-driving car,
which also resulted in a high driving speed. All these speed conditions were driven with
and without a memory task: auditory traffic information was presented throughout a
condition, after which drivers should name the length and location of the longest traffic
queue in that list. It was hypothesised that drivers would neglect the memory task when
driving fast.
All other things being equal, driving fast indeed required more effort than driving more
slowly, as measured by heart rate and by self-reported mental effort. Heart rate variability
also showed more effort in the Fast condition than in the Accurate condition, but this
difference did not reach statistical significance. The difference in HRV between Fast and
Car Following conditions on the other hand was significant, even though in both conditions
driving speed was relatively high. Contrary to expectations, memory task performance was
not dependent on driving speed. Memory task performance was not better in the Accurate
condition than in the other conditions of higher driving speed. Actually, it was best in the
Fast condition, and worst in the Car Following condition, although differences between
speed conditions did not reach statistical significance.
It was concluded that these unexpected results were the result of an unintended aspect of
the experimental conditions. The route guidance messages in the Fast and Accurate
condition were embedded within the memory task. Drivers therefore only knew the route to
drive if they paid attention to the memory task. In these conditions, scanning the traffic
information for route information was therefore necessary irrespective of whether drivers
needed to process the traffic information as part of the memory task. In contrast, in the Car
Following conditions, the fast-driving car showed the route to drive and there was no need
for drivers to pay attention to the traffic information to know the route. This interpretation
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was supported by the fact that memory task performance was worst in the Car Following
condition; it also explains why the memory task had no additional effect on HRV in the
Accurate and Fast conditions. Drivers again appeared very strategic in their effort
investment: only when information is highly relevant for one of the main goals in driving
(knowing the route to drive) was it processed in high task demand situations.
9.2.3 Experiment 3: Goal management during an emergency
As in Experiment 1, the research question of Experiment 3 dealt with the assignment of
priorities to conflicting goals at the same behavioural task level, but in Experiment 3, the
research question concerned choices between two tasks that both serve the highest goals in
driving: arriving at the destination, and avoiding accidents. Drivers received complex route
guidance messages just prior to an intersection. In some instances, drivers were confronted
with an emergency traffic situation when they entered that intersection: a car from the left
arrived at the crossing but, violating Dutch traffic regulations, did not give priority to the
participant. This created a conflict between the two tasks of dealing with the traffic
situation and trying to remember the route guidance message. When thus forced to choose,
drivers were assumed to give collision avoidance more priority than processing the route
guidance messages. This would show up as more navigational errors after a traffic
emergency than after a normal traffic situation during the presentation of the route guidance
message.
As the general subject of this thesis regarded the way goals are managed by drivers, a
further research question concerned the nature of goals and intentions. Because of
contradicting theories on goals and intentions, it was therefore tested whether intentions,
i.e., goals to which one has committed oneself, are indeed vulnerable to decay, as other
declarative information, or not. In some conditions, therefore, the emergency traffic
situation occurred later in a condition when the driver was assumed to have already
committed the route to memory (the “later emergency” condition). If intentions are
declarative structures, then the emergency should also interfere with driving the route,
resulting in more navigational errors when the emergency occurred later in the condition.
Unfortunately, this last research question on the nature of intentions could not be answered
satisfactorily by the results obtained, as for unknown reasons, the number of navigational
errors were equally high for experimental participants and controls who received normal
priority. In other highly similar conditions without a traffic emergency, navigational errors
were substantially fewer. Obviously, the occurrence of a navigational error is a
dichotomous variable. These results of the “later emergency” condition may simply be a
matter of chance, but nonetheless, they make it difficult to examine the nature of intentions.
The results concerning dealing with the goal conflict were straightforward: when forced to
choose, all drivers dealt with the traffic situation rather than processing the route guidance
messages. In all emergency situations where three route directions were given, 41% of the
participants were not able to remember the route directions successfully and lost their way;
three participants were not able to avoid a collision, and also lost their way. This last
finding indicates that they did not regard the processing of the route information as their
main priority, either.
It was concluded that when put to the test, drivers’ main priority is with collision
avoidance, rather than processing information that is relevant for one of the highest goals in
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driving, arriving at the destination. It was concluded that collision avoidance serves the
higher-order goal of survival of the organism, but it is also a well-trained aspect of the
driving task, as many procedures in driving are only taught for reason of traffic safety.
9.2.4 Summary of findings
The previous chapters discussed three experiments in which the dynamic goal setting of car
drivers was examined. In all experiments drivers were presented with high task demands.
While driving, they had to add up and remember the total length of traffic queues presented
auditorily, while in some conditions, paper maps were necessary to know the route to drive
(Experiment 1); they had to establish the location and length of the longest of twenty traffic
queues, while driving fast through a complex urban environment (Experiment 2); or they
had to remember complex auditory route guidance messages while dealing with an
emergency traffic situation (Experiment 3).
An important finding in these experiments was the high level of performance that drivers
exhibited in many of these demanding situations. For example, in Experiment 2, drivers
were driving with high speeds through a complex urban environment with many
intersections to negotiate and other traffic to deal with, yet, at the end of such a ride, a large
majority of the participants was able to report the location and length of the longest traffic
queue out of a long list of other traffic jams. This high level of performance did, however,
not come easily as it was associated with high levels of effort expenditure. Interestingly
though, in a highly similar condition where participants followed a fast-driving car, lower
levels of performance on this memory task were found. In that condition, traffic queues
were remembered more poorly, which appeared to be caused by lack of effort investment. It
was concluded that a subtle difference between these conditions resulted in these large
differences: the traffic queue in formation also included the route guidance messages and
drivers therefore had to pay more attention to this auditory information than when
following a car showing the route to drive.
Taken together, these results indicate that task performance levels may vary largely because
of different levels of mental effort invested in the task. Especially the results from
Experiment 2 show that strategic decisions about effort investment determine task
performance, rather than inability or incompetence of participants. Effort investment
mainly depended on the underlying task structure. Investment of effort is thus not only
highly motivational but strategic as well, in the sense that high-priority goals are preserved.
The first two hypotheses on goal management (see page 96) were therefore supported by
the data. Measures of performance levels and measures of mental effort both indicated that
drivers give priority to tasks that serve higher-order task goals rather than to tasks that serve
lower-order task goals. This was also true for tasks that were performed at the same
behavioural level in the hierarchy in the driving task. Also, tasks that serve goals inherent to
the driving task received more priority than tasks not directly relevant for the driving task
as performed in these experiments. Results from Experiment 3 clearly supported the third
and fourth hypotheses on the main goals of drivers: drivers’ main priority appears to be the
prevention of accidents.
The last hypothesis regarding the nature of goals and intentions could not be answered
directly, but the large number of route errors after a traffic emergency indicates that at least
the formation of intentions is prone to interference. This supports the notion that intentions
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to perform certain actions are declarative. As already stated in Chapter 4, Crowder (1996)
suggested that intentions are in general only better remembered than other declarative




This thesis started with a description of the driving task as a task where behaviour takes
place at different behavioural levels. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the concept of a task
hierarchy assumes top-down control. For example, when the decision had been made to
overtake, which is a decision at the tactical level, the driver has to speed up, check mirrors
and steer into the other lane, which are actions at the operational level. Because driving is
performed in a dynamic environment, bottom-up control is also important. For example, icy
roads may lead a driver to increase time headway to the car in front.
An important theoretical framework trying to link both these modes of control is the
hierarchical model of behavioural adaptation (Summala, 1996, 1997). This model provides
detailed mechanisms of how low-level driving behaviour takes place. An important concept
in the model is that of time margins, which denote the temporal distance of the driver to an
object. For example, time-to-line-crossing (TLC) is the time to cross either of the lane
boundaries if present course and speed remain unchanged. The model assumes that these
time margins are the control variables for drivers. When a time margin decreases under a
certain threshold, drivers will take actions to prevent the time margin to decreases any
further. Alternatively, when time margins are large, for example on an empty motorway,
drivers may allocate more time to additional tasks, or increase their driving speed. Driving
speed is an important factor, and drivers can often accommodate changes in time margin by
changing their speed. When time margins decrease, for example when road width
decreases, drivers may either slow down, or invest more effort. Van Winsum (1996) also
uses safety margins as a central concept in his adaptive behaviour model, and presents
evidence that factors that affect operational performance result in adaptation at the tactical
level, such that constant safety margins are maintained. Drivers with poorer operational
performance were found to drive with larger safety margins. For example, drivers who were
less skilled in perception-response coupling adopted longer time headways.
A major assumption regarding higher-order influences in the model of behavioural
adaptation is that drivers have an inherent motivational pressure “to go to the limit”, which
is reflected in the tendency to increase driving speed. This tendency to increase speed
originates from the main goal in driving: mobility. Higher driving speed “enlarges the area
we can reach in reasonable time” (Summala, 1996, p. 109). However, Experiment 2 showed
that drivers do not always “go to the limit”, but may contend themselves with task
performance at lower effort costs, depending on the task structure. It is also proposed that
temporary higher-order motives may change time margins. For example, being in a hurry
might decrease time margins, which leads to an increase in effort.
Whereas these models provide detailed mechanisms that may underlie the tactical
adaptations to changes at the operational level, higher-order influences on tactical or
operational behaviour are only roughly outlined. This led Van Winsum (1996) to conclude
that a major research question would be the study of how effort is allocated under forced-
paced conditions (where tactical adaptations may not be possible) and the effects of this on
101
operational behaviour. The present thesis can be seen as an attempt to answer at least part
of that question.
Interestingly, Summala suggests that time margins, i.e., available time, reflect workload,
following Hancock & Caird’s (1993) model of workload in which workload is assumed to
increase as available time for action decreases. Thus, it is assumed that drivers adapt their
behaviour to changes in workload. The present thesis indeed provided evidence that
important strategic decisions concern the allocation of effort. Both the amount of effort that
drivers are willing to invest in their task behaviour, and the distribution of effort across
(sub)tasks were found to depend on driver strategies in task performance.
The general literature on performance of dynamic complex tasks provided some general
strategies in task performance that were helpful in explaining driver behaviour. Most
notably, the premises that task behaviour is goal-directed and that operators in such tasks
will always try to protect the main task goal were useful in describing and explaining driver
behaviour. Derived from these premises was the assumption that tasks serving higher-order
task goals, to arrive at the destination and to avoid accidents, are given more priority than
tasks that serve lower-order task goals. These assumption were supported throughout this
thesis.
Although workload or available time may be an important control variable in low-level
driving behaviour, the present thesis suggests that task strategies of effort allocation
determine actual task performance to a large extent. In order to understand driver
behaviour, it is vitally important to understand the strategies of drivers. The present thesis
indicates that for this, the goal that is being achieved by a (sub)task is more important than
the task itself. That is, the location in the goal hierarchy of a task goal determines its
relevance more than the location of that task in the task hierarchy. Control during driving
can thus be thought of in terms of relative priorities of task goals. On the basis of their
relative relevance in achieving more important task goals, task goals can be traded off
against each other. Thus, lower-level behaviour does not necessarily have low priority. For
example, collision avoidance can be described as behaviour at the lowest operational level,
but in actual fact, collision avoidance is so important that it can override goals at the highest
level of the driving task. This was observed in Experiment 3, where collision avoidance
interfered quite strongly with the processing and remembering of route guidance messages.
Although task goals may exert their control on driving behaviour in a top-down fashion,
bottom-up processes also play a major role in the driving task. Actual driving behaviour is
usually in response to the external traffic situation, and goals have to be continually adapted
to the prevailing circumstances. That is, task goals will mostly be created dynamically as a
response to certain situational factors. Also, attention to subtasks is allocated dynamically
in interaction with the environment. Thus, at a theoretical level, higher-level goals
determine underlying subgoals, but at the same time, lower-order information may set high-
priority task goals instantly. That is, the driver may set general plans, but the environment
provides the cues that determine which specific actions are actually taken. This is what





One of the reasons for conducting the experiments was to answer the question whether the
increase in information that drivers have to process (more traffic on the roads, information
systems both outside and inside the car, such as route guidance systems, and the
introduction of other devices into the car, such as car phones, faxes, televisions) raises the
risk of traffic accidents. The main risk of presenting additional information to drivers while
driving is distraction from the driving task. The present thesis indicates that drivers may
indeed be distracted from the driving task, but it also indicates that the relevance of the
information presented may give a clue as to what degree drivers are likely to become
distracted: more important information will be given more attention than less important
information.
In general, drivers assign priority to information that serves higher-order goals, most
notably those of navigation and collision avoidance. This suggests that especially the design
of route guidance systems may be critical for traffic safety. The present thesis showed that
presentation of visual or auditory information alone is associated with problems: visual
information will force drivers to take their eyes off the road, which may even lead to out-of-
lane deviations, while the auditory information may not be processed adequately in urgent
traffic situations.
Actually, there is another reason why drivers may not process information adequately from
an information system: if the information is presented without the appropriate task goal
active. For example, when a driver is involved in some subtask unrelated to navigating
(e.g., overtaking), the information presented by a route guidance system may not be picked
up by the driver. Operators only select information if it is relevant for the presently active
goal (Vicente & Wang, 1998). Therefore, the information may be neglected if it is not
relevant for the presently active task goal. This suggests that an effective RG system should
combine auditory and visual messages. If an auditory RG message is missed by the driver
when engaged in other subtasks than route finding, the visual RG system will still show the
direction to turn when the driver enters an intersection, at which time the driver’s subgoal
of route finding has become active. Because intersections present complex traffic situations,
the visual information should be presented in a straightforward format. Drivers will be
highly motivated to know the direction to turn and complex displays will increase the
number of glances to the display, which is unwanted prior to intersections.
Car phones present another source of potential distraction from the driving task. At present,
accident risk of using mobile phones while driving is unknown, mainly because systematic
crash data collection that would help characterise cellular-telephone-related crashes is
lacking (Goodman, Tijerina, Bents & Wierwille, 1999). In their comprehensive study on
this, Goodman et al. (1999) tentatively draw the conclusion that conversation appears to be
the principal factor associated with crashes, rather than dialling, hanging up or reaching for
the phone. Results from the present thesis may suggest that a modifying factor in driver
distraction is the priority of the phone conversation. Whereas drivers making personal calls
may delay the conversation if the traffic situation asks much of their attention, drivers
making business calls may allocate more of their attention to the conversation because of its
high importance. It would be interesting to test this hypothesis on individual differences in
goal priorities empirically. It is plausible that different drivers may have different goal
priorities, and this should be reflected in the level of distraction of additional information
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systems from the driving task. For example, traffic information may be more important for
professional drivers so they can plan an alternative route than for the commuter who cannot
avoid the traffic jam.
A serious point of concern for traffic safety is that adaptation of behaviour is not always
possible. For example business travellers and truck drivers may have strict time schedules
constraining their opportunities for adaptation. This can be expected to have detrimental
effects on traffic safety. However, it should also be noted that the professional driver is
often a highly experienced driver. In comparison with other, less-experienced drivers, they
have probably developed better perceptual-motor driving skills, are better at using
peripheral vision in lateral control, and they can probably use more and different cues and
can thus anticipate better on future traffic situations. Furthermore, drivers who habitually
use car phones, faxes, complex route guidance systems and the like when driving are likely
to develop skills that enable them to integrate these behaviours better with the driving task.
However, it is still not known to which extent drivers can actually learn to use such systems
without hampering traffic safety.
It has previously been recommended that an information system or a driver support system
present information consistent with the driver’s goals and the present dynamic traffic
situation (Michon, 1993). However, it is difficult to make on-line estimates of the driver’s
goals. Many goals are set dynamically in interaction with the environment, and the system
should therefore consider the dynamic traffic circumstances as a source of new goals.
However, classifying dynamic traffic situations is not equivalent to classifying road type or
other static traffic objects. It involves considering the dynamic properties of the
environment and its projection into the future, in light of the present goals of the driver. For
example, drivers’ approach of an intersection and their looking behaviour will depend on
the direction drivers will take: when turning right, other traffic participants have to be
observed than when driving straight ahead, or when turning left. Knowing the present goals
and intentions of drivers is essential for a support system to provide meaningful warnings
(e.g., a warning about a pedestrian crossing the street is only useful if the driver is heading
in that direction).
Also, assessing drivers present goals is not easy. Any computer system trying to support the
user by inferring the intentions and goals of the user is presently far from perfect2. Even in
very restricted, non-dynamic domains such as programming in LISP, state-of-the-art tutor
computer systems are not always correct in knowing the goals or intentions of the user
(Anderson, 2000). This suggests that present attempts to design driver support systems that
are really helpful at present seem at best premature. Even a state-of-the-art support system
cannot know the actual traffic situation or the intentions of the driver on a moment-to-
moment basis, and it can therefore not be prevented that information is presented to drivers
that is not congruent with the present intentions, goals or tasks. This may result in
distraction of the driver, more likely in annoyance of the driver, but almost certainly in
neglect of the information by the driver. In none of these cases will the system have its
intended effect.
                                                          
2




The present thesis pointed to the strategic character of effort investment in driving
behaviour. It was assumed throughout this thesis that when forced to choose, for example
because task demands are very high, drivers would concentrate on processing the most
important information or performing the most important (sub)task, even if this is at the
expense of other information or tasks. The importance of the present approach lies in its
emphasis on the goals that a task tries to achieve, rather than on tasks themselves. To
explain why some (sub)tasks are protected during high task demands while others are not,
the data support the view that the priority and relevance of the goal that a task tries to fulfil
determine the probability that a certain task is performed in high task demands. Route
guidance systems, presenting high-priority information, may therefore be a large source of
driver distraction if their design is unduly complicated. However, rather than navigation,
collision avoidance appears to have the highest priority in drivers, and it may be assumed
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In dit proefschrift wordt geprobeerd een aantal praktische vragen te beantwoorden die
ontstaan zijn nu automobilisten steeds meer informatie moeten verwerken tijdens het
autorijden. Allereerst neemt het aantal auto’s nog steeds toe, en daarmee ook de drukte op
de weg, waardoor automobilisten dus steeds vaker op steeds meer auto’s moeten letten.
Daarnaast krijgt een automobilist steeds meer informatie aangeboden, zowel buiten de auto
(informatieborden met bijvoorbeeld file-informatie) als in de auto (denk aan bijvoorbeeld
de autotelefoon, routegeleidingssystemen, fax, televisie). Een vraag die daarbij opdoemt is
of deze toename aan informatie de verkeersveiligheid niet in gevaar brengt. Tenslotte
kunnen mensen maar een beperkte hoeveelheid informatie gelijktijdig verwerken, en
bovendien zouden automobilisten zich kunnen laten afleiden door irrelevante informatie.
Nu is deze vraag natuurlijk al eerder gesteld en er is dan ook wel onderzoek naar gedaan.
De belangrijkste resultaten zijn dat het verwerken van extra informatie inderdaad kan leiden
tot meer mentale inspanning van automobilisten, maar ook blijken automobilisten hun
gedrag aan te passen aan de toegenomen mentale werkdruk. Ze gaan bijvoorbeeld
langzamer rijden of ze nemen meer afstand tot hun voorligger. Door deze
gedragsaanpassingen verlagen automobilisten in feite de werkdruk en geven ze zichzelf
meer tijd om op verkeerssituaties te reageren. Echter, deze gedragsaanpassingen zijn nog
nooit echt goed onderzocht. In hoeverre passen automobilisten hun gedrag systematisch






Om deze vragen te beantwoorden, hebben we eerst eens gekeken wat er zoal in de
wetenschappelijke literatuur bekend is over autorijden en taakverrichting. In dit proefschrift
worden deze theoretische achtergronden behandeld in de eerste 5 hoofdstukken.
Autorijden is een hiërarchische taak
In Hoofdstuk 1 wordt in het kort de problematiek van de hoge werkdruk voor
automobilisten geschetst. Ook wordt in het kort alvast aangegeven welke theoretische
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benadering dit proefschrift zal hebben. Om het gedrag van mensen te begrijpen die een taak
uitvoeren, is het van belang te beseffen dat mensen niet zomaar een taak uitvoeren: meestal
willen mensen met die taak een zeker doel proberen te bereiken. Met andere woorden:
taakgedrag is doelgericht. Voor autorijden geldt dat mensen in de auto stappen om ergens
naar toe te gaan, en daarbij geen ongelukken willen maken. Dat zijn de twee belangrijkste
doelen van het autorijden.
Dit zijn echter niet de enige twee doelen bij het autorijden, er zijn meer doelen en
subdoelen “actief”. Dit wordt in Hoofdstuk 2 behandeld. In dit hoofdstuk staat de
theoretische achtergrond van “autorijden als taak” centraal: wat voor soort taak is het, wat
is erover bekend, en wat nog niet? Autorijden wordt meestal beschreven als een
hiërarchische taak waar gedrag zich op verschillende niveaus afspeelt. Op het bovenste
niveau, het zogenaamde strategische niveau, worden keuzes gemaakt over de middel van
vervoer (met de auto of met de trein?), over de route (door de polders of via de
Afsluitdijk?), en volgens sommige onderzoekers wordt hier ook bepaald hoe hard er
ongeveer gereden gaat worden (maar ik denk niet dat echt zo is). Op het niveau daaronder,
het zogenaamde tactische niveau, vinden de manoeuvres plaats: inhalen, kruispunten
oversteken, afslaan, invoegen, enzovoort. Op het onderste niveau, het zogenaamde
operationele niveau, vinden de werkelijke acties plaats: bediening van de pedalen, het stuur,
de versnellingspook en dergelijke. Een theoretisch interessante vraag is hoe de controle
tussen deze verschillende niveaus plaatsvindt, dat wil zeggen, hoe bepalen automobilisten
waar ze de meeste aandacht aan zullen besteden?
Verschillende activiteiten tegelijkertijd
Autorijden zou je ook kunnen beschrijven als een taak waarbij de automobilist
verschillende activiteiten tegelijkertijd uitvoert. Bij het naderen van een kruispunt
bijvoorbeeld, moet een automobilist een aantal dingen in behoorlijk korte tijd doen: kijken
of er nog meer verkeer het kruispunt nadert, knipperlicht aandoen, snelheid verminderen,
misschien remmen, in de spiegels kijken, in de juiste baan gaan staan, terugschakelen,
enzovoort. Eigenlijk is het coördineren van al deze subtaken alweer een taak op zich. En dat
dit allemaal niet makkelijk is blijkt wel uit de eerste rijlessen: het kost heel wat oefening
om zoveel dingen bijna tegelijkertijd goed te doen. En wat het ook al niet makkelijker
maakt, is dat de wereld rondom de auto niet stil staat: autorijden gebeurt in een dynamische
omgeving waar gevaarlijke situaties snel en onverwacht kunnen ontstaan. Automobilisten
moeten daarom niet alleen goed kunnen autorijden, maar bovenal flexibel zijn, en hun
gedrag kunnen aanpassen aan (snel wisselende) omstandigheden. Hoe mensen zulke
complexe vaardigheden als autorijden kunnen leren wordt beschreven in Hoofdstuk 3.
Hoe leren mensen complexe taken?
Hoofdstuk 3 is, net als Hoofdstuk 4, geen gemakkelijk hoofdstuk. Hoe leren mensen
complexe, dynamische taken, zoals autorijden? Complexe dynamische taken worden
gekenmerkt door het feit dat er meestal meerdere subtaken tegelijkertijd gedaan worden.
Wie zo’n taak uitvoert, moet dus goed weten wat eerst gedaan moet worden, voor iets
anders gedaan kan worden, onthouden wat er nog gedaan moet worden, bijhouden wat al
gedaan is, goed plannen, en weten welke subtaken heel belangrijk zijn. Tegelijkertijd moet
zo iemand snel en adequaat kunnen reageren op mogelijke verstoringen en mogelijk zelfs
gevaarlijke situaties. Kortom, zulke mensen moeten zowel taak- en doelgericht werken als
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flexibel reageren op nieuwe omstandigheden. Daarom moeten ze op elk moment steeds
goed weten waar ze mee bezig zijn (die heet situatiebesef en is vooral bij vliegtuigpiloten
onderzocht).
Om zulke taken goed uit te kunnen voeren, is veel kennis en kunde nodig. Om uit te leggen
hoe iemand die kennis en kunde verwerft, is het nodig onderscheid te maken tussen
declaratieve en procedurele kennis. Declaratieve kennis is kennis over feiten, weten wat
(wat is de hoofdstad van Friesland?), en procedurele kennis is eigenlijk kunde: weten hoe
(hoe loop je een trap op?). Over declaratieve kennis kun je met iemand praten, maar
procedurele kennis kun je niet zomaar uitleggen (pas als je je voorstelt hoe je een trap op
loopt, weet je welk been zich wanneer strekt): procedurele kennis is niet rapporteerbaar
(iedereen die wel eens schaatsles heeft gegeven weet dat een beginnende schaatser vaak
heel eenvoudige vragen heeft over hoe iets moet waar de ervaren schaatsers niet altijd
meteen een antwoord op heeft—bijvoorbeeld “en als ik dat doe, waar is mijn linkerbeen
dan?”).
Een beginner krijgt meestal eerst instructies over een taak (bijvoorbeeld: om te schakelen
moet je eerst het gas loslaten, de koppeling indrukken, de versnellingspook bewegen naar
de goede versnelling, de koppeling langzaam op laten komen, etcetera). Deze instructies
worden eerst declaratief onthouden, dat willen zeggen, als feiten. Een beginner die moet
schakelen, loopt in gedachten de instructies af (nu de koppeling indrukken) en voert ze
vervolgens uit. Dit zal in het begin niet altijd goed gaan, maar als het goed gaat, wordt dat
onthouden als voorbeeld. Wanneer zich een volgende soortgelijke gelegenheid voordoet,
zullen beginners zich herinneren dat ze zoiets al eens eerder hebben gedaan, en zullen ze
dat voorbeeld van hoe het goed ging weer uit het geheugen opdiepen en uitvoeren. Al
doende zullen steeds meer goede voorbeelden opgeslagen worden, en uitgevoerd worden.
Declaratieve gegevens uit het geheugen ophalen kost trouwens inspanning (in dit
proefschrift noem ik dit meestal cognitieve inspanning; cognitie heeft met kennis, geheugen
en informatieverwerking te maken).
Langzamerhand (in Hoofdstuk 3 staat hoe dat precies gaat) zal het niet meer nodig zijn
steeds specifieke voorbeelden uit het geheugen te halen, maar zullen specifieke
omstandigheden steeds automatischer gekoppeld worden aan de bijbehorende acties: het
gedrag wordt steeds verder geautomatiseerd. Feitelijk worden de declaratieve instructies
omgezet in procedurele regels (zogenaamde productieregels), die bestaan uit een ALS- en
een DAN-deel, bijvoorbeeld ALS ik wil schakelen, DAN moet ik eerst het gas loslaten. Deze
productieregels zelf zijn dus niet rapporteerbaar. Als een specifieke situatie zich voordoet,
gaat het ophalen van de bijbehorende productieregels uit het geheugen veel sneller en met
minder fouten dan het ophalen van declaratieve kennis, dus het uitvoeren van de taak gaat
dus steeds wat sneller en beter. En met minder inspanning, want het ophalen van
procedurele kennis kost geen inspanning. Omdat het kiezen van productieregels steeds
sneller gaat en mensen geen echt besef van deze regels hebben, lijkt het alsof iemands
reacties op de omgeving steeds automatischer verlopen. Je zou bijna kunnen zeggen dat
(prikkels in) de omgeving voor een deel het gedrag van iemand bepalen. In hoeverre dit
werkelijk zo is, is niet zo helemaal duidelijk; wel is duidelijk dat zelfs “automatisch”
gedrag alleen wordt vertoond als het betreffende doel actief is (alleen als je in de auto rijdt,
zal het rode stoplicht leiden tot het intrappen van het rempedaal, niet als je als passagier
naast de bestuurder zit).
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Taken uitvoeren tijdens hoge werkdruk
Zoals al eerder gezegd moeten mensen die complexe, dynamische taken (vliegen,
autorijden, luchtverkeersleider) uitvoeren, doelgericht werken, maar toch flexibel omgaan
met nieuwe omstandigheden. Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft wat mensen in het algemeen doen als
ze zulke taken uitvoeren, en hoe ze omgaan met hoge mentale werkdruk. Zoals eerder al
gezegd, bestaan zulke taken meestal uit meerdere kleinere taken (subtaken). Omdat
taakgedrag doelgericht is, worden al deze subtaken niet zomaar uitgevoerd, maar om
daarmee een bepaald (sub)doel te bereiken. Als de werkdruk hoog is, dus als mensen veel
in korte tijd moeten doen, moeten ze afwegen welke (sub)taken ze willen gaan doen, of
eigenlijk, moeten ze afwegen welke (sub)doelen ze belangrijk vinden. Dit noem ik
doelmanagement: het bepalen van welke doelen voorrang krijgen boven andere doelen.
Uit de literatuur blijkt dat mensen op verschillende manier omgaan met hoge werkdruk.
Een belangrijke strategie van mensen is om meer inspanning in de taak te steken. Door
beter je best doen blijft de prestatie ondanks de hogere werkdruk toch op ongeveer
hetzelfde niveau. Een andere strategie is de manier te veranderen waarop de taak wordt
uitgevoerd. In bijna alle complexe dynamische taken zijn er meerdere wegen die naar Rome
leiden, en bij hoge werkdruk kiezen mensen er soms voor om op een minder inspannende
manier de taak uit te voeren. Een beroemd voorbeeld uit de jaren zeventig zijn de
luchtverkeersleiders in Parijs. Als het aantal vliegtuigen dat ze moeten binnenleiden te
groot wordt, gaan ze niet meer voor elk vliegtuig de beste en kortste route uitzoeken, maar
krijgen alle vliegtuigen een standaardroute toegewezen en worden ze op verschillende
hoogten in een wachtrij gezet. Dit kost elk vliegtuig wel meer tijd maar de veiligheid komt
zo niet in het geding. Een derde strategie is om minder aandacht te besteden aan zaken die
minder belangrijk zijn. Alle aandacht wordt gericht op de belangrijkste informatie. In zijn
meest extreme vorm leidt dit tot het volledig negeren van minder belangrijke (sub)taken.
Wie het druk heeft neemt bijvoorbeeld de telefoon niet meer op, wie op een drukke weg
rijdt, let niet meer op de reclameborden, enzovoort.
Al deze strategieën hebben één ding gemeen: altijd wordt geprobeerd om de belangrijkste
taakdoelen te beschermen. Voor de luchtverkeersleider zijn dat bijvoorbeeld het landen van
de vliegtuigen en de veiligheid. Dat is niet zo gek want het bereiken van het hoogste
taakdoel was oorspronkelijk natuurlijk ook de reden waarom überhaupt aan de taak werd
begonnen. In ieder geval betekent dit dat mensen in tijden van hoge werkdruk zich
concentreren op de belangrijkste taken en informatie en zich niet laten afleiden door
irrelevante informatie.
Automobilisten en hoge werkdruk
Hoofdstuk 5 geeft een literatuuroverzicht van onderzoek dat gedaan is naar automobilisten
en hoge werkdruk. Het blijkt dat wat in het algemeen voor complexe dynamische taken
geldt, ook voor autorijden geldt: als automobilisten het drukker krijgen, spannen ze zich
soms meer in, gaan ze soms langzamer rijden of houden meer afstand, en laten ze
onbelangrijke taken soms schieten. Welke taak belangrijk of onbelangrijk is, hangt erg van
de context af. Als voorbeeld wordt spiegelen genoemd. Uit onderzoek blijkt dat als
automobilisten het druk hebben, ze minder vaak in de spiegels gaan kijken. Echter, dat doen
ze alleen als het ook niet zo belangrijk is om in de spiegels te kijken. Als het wel belangrijk
is, bijvoorbeeld als ze willen gaan uitvoegen op een snelweg, dan blijven ze ondanks de
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hoge werkdruk wel in de spiegels kijken. Aan de andere kant blijkt dat automobilisten soms
wel slechter gaan rijden: ze gaan bijvoorbeeld meer slingeren als ze met een
routegeleidingssysteem moeten rijden dat op een ingewikkelde manier de te rijden route
laat zien. Wellicht komt dit omdat zulke informatie voor een automobilist eigenlijk heel






De rest van het proefschrift bestaat vooral uit een beschrijving van drie experimenten die in
de rijsimulator zijn gedaan. In deze experimenten werd geprobeerd een antwoord te vinden
op een aantal verschillende vragen. In alle experimenten ging het in feite om de vraag
welke doelen voor een automobilist eigenlijk het belangrijkst zijn. Voor twee van deze
experimenten werd een deel van de stad Stuttgart en een aangrenzend kleiner stadje als het
ware nagebouwd in de rijsimulator. De gebouwen werden niet nagebouwd maar wel
werden de straten exact nagemaakt, en de stoplichten. Voor het derde experiment heb ik
zelf een stad gebouwd, maar dan een zonder stoplichten en zonder voorrangswegen. In de
rijsimulator reden ook altijd andere auto’s rond. Met een speciale programmeertaal kon ik
zelf deze auto’s programmeren: waar ze moesten komen, waar ze heen gingen, hoe hard ze
reden, etcetera. Alle proefpersonen krijgen zo te maken met dezelfde omstandigheden, wat
in vergelijking met een experiment op de echte weg natuurlijk een enorm voordeel is. In de
eerste twee experimenten werd ook hartslag gemeten om te bepalen of proefpersonen zich
ook inspanden.
Experiment 1: wat is belangrijk?
In het eerste experiment (besproken in Hoofdstuk 6) wordt onderzocht of interne doelen,
dat zijn doelen die van belang zijn voor het autorijden, belangrijker zijn dan externe doelen,
doelen die niets met autorijden te maken hebben. Een belangrijk doel in het autorijden is
het zoeken van de goede route. Je rijdt tenslotte auto om ergens te komen. Proefpersonen
maakten acht verschillende ritten, en in de ene helft daarvan reden ze met een kaart waarop
de route was aangegeven, in de andere helft van de ritten reden ze met een auditief
routegeleidingssysteem dat simpelweg zei welke kant de proefpersoon op moest
(“linksaf!”). Ook kregen proefpersonen filemeldingen te horen, en moesten ze na afloop
van een rit vertellen hoeveel kilometer file er in totaal stond (de geheugentaak). In sommige
ritten kregen ze geen verkeersinformatie. Verder werd de helft van de ritten in druk verkeer
gereden en de andere helft in rustig verkeer. De verwachting was dat als proefpersonen het
erg druk hadden, ze eerder de verkeersinformatie zouden negeren dan de kaart, omdat de
informatie op de kaart voor hen belangrijker was dan de verkeersinformatie (in de
genoemde files zouden ze toch niet terecht kunnen komen).
De hartslag liet zien dat proefpersonen zich in druk verkeer, met een kaart, en met de
verkeersinformatie goed inspanden; het experiment was dus in zijn opzet geslaagd. Verder
bleek dat als proefpersonen naar de verkeersinformatie moesten luisteren, ze niet langzamer
gingen rijden, maar dat deden ze wel in druk verkeer, en als ze kaart moesten lezen. De
prestatie op de geheugentaak was slechter in druk verkeer, en nog slechter als ook nog kaart
moest worden gelezen. Dit wijst erop dat automobilisten inderdaad meer belang hechten
aan route-informatie dan aan het optellen van files. Tenslotte waren die files niet zo van
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belang voor de proefpersonen, maar de kaart wel. Kortom, interne doelen zijn belangrijker
dan externe doelen.
Experiment 2: relatie tussen snelheid en inspanning
Proefpersonen bleken dus langzamer te gaan rijden als ze het druk hebben, en dit werd
geïnterpreteerd als een strategie om de werkdruk te verlagen. In het volgende experiment
(besproken in Hoofdstuk 7) werd onderzocht of langzamer rijden eigenlijk echt wel de
werkdruk verlaagd. Tenslotte was dat nog nooit echt onderzocht. Ook is er een theorie die
beweert dat als de werkdruk heel laag is, automobilisten vaak harder gaan rijden om toch
net zo veel inspanning te leveren, of meer aandacht gaan geven aan andere zaken. Dit wordt
risicocompensatie genoemd, en wordt vaak gebruikt als verklaring waarom sommige
veiligheidsmaatregelen niet werken (met winterbanden gaat men harder rijden, met ABS
later remmen). In dit experiment moesten proefpersonen met drie verschillende snelheden
gaan rijden. Dit zei ik natuurlijk niet zo: wat ze moesten doen was 1) rijden alsof ze
rijexamen deden (zodat ze langzamer zouden rijden), 2) rijden alsof ze haast hadden, en 3)
een donkerblauwe auto volgen (die 70 km/u wilde rijden, in de stad!). In alle ritten kregen
proefpersonen ook nog verkeersinformatie te horen; deze keer moesten ze in de helft van de
ritten na afloop vertellen waar de langste file stond, en hoe lang die was (bijvoorbeeld: voor
Heerenveen, 7 km); in de andere helft van de ritten kregen ze de files wel te horen maar
hoefden ze er niet naar de luisteren.
De resultaten waren eigenlijk erg verrassend. In de rijexamenritten was de snelheid het
laagst en in de achtervolging het hoogst. Maar uit de hartslagvariabiliteit (daarmee meet je
de hoeveelheid cognitieve inspanning) bleek dat in de achtervolging niet de meeste
cognitieve inspanning werd geleverd! Bovendien had het onthouden van de files daar ook
geen effect op. Bij nadere beschouwing bleek er in de opzet van het experiment een
addertje onder het gras te zitten. In de eerste ritten (rijexamen en met haast) moesten de
proefpersonen natuurlijk ook weten waar ze naartoe moesten: daarom kregen ze weer een
stem te horen die “linksaf” of “rechtsaf” zei. Maar dat betekende dat ze eigenlijk steeds
naar de verkeersinformatie moesten luisteren om te luisteren welke kant ze op moesten, dus
ongeacht of ze na afloop moesten vertellen waar de langste file stond. En in de
achtervolgingsritten kregen ze geen route-informatie dus hoefden ze helemaal niet meer
naar de files te luisteren. Waarschijnlijk hadden ze het veel te druk om te proberen om de
auto niet kwijt te raken. Na de rit met haast werd het vaakst de goede file genoemd, en na
de achtervolging het minst. Dit bevestigt het vermoeden dat er tijdens de achtervolging niet
echt goed naar de files werd geluisterd.
Wat betekent dit allemaal? Dit betekent allereerst dat rijsnelheid en cognitieve inspanning
geen directe relatie hebben: in de ritten met de hoogste snelheid was de cognitieve
inspanning immers het laagst. Verder lijkt de theorie over risicocompensatie niet op te
gaan: waar het langzaamst werd gereden, was de prestatie op de filetaak niet het best, dus
veel extra aandacht werd ondanks de lage snelheid niet besteed aan de files. Automobilisten
blijken dus eigenlijk nog strategischer te zijn dan gedacht: als informatie niet belangrijk is
voor het belangrijkste doel bij het autorijden, veilig op de plaats van bestemming komen,
dan wordt die informatie ook niet verwerkt als daar eigenlijk geen tijd voor is.
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Experiment 3: de weg vinden of ongelukken voorkomen?
Eigenlijk zijn twee doelen het belangrijkst bij het besturen van een auto: op de plaats van
bestemming komen, en ongelukken voorkomen. We hebben al steeds gezien dat route-
informatie voor automobilisten heel belangrijk is, maar wat doen automobilisten als ze
moeten kiezen tussen deze informatie verwerken, en het voorkomen van een ongeluk? Dit
werd onderzocht in het laatste experiment (Hoofdstuk 8).
Proefpersonen maakten één lange rit, en onderweg kregen ze routeaanwijzingen te horen. In
de helft van de gevallen waren dit twee aanwijzingen (zo meteen bij de derde straat
rechtsaf, daarna bij de tweede straat linksaf), en in de andere helft drie aanwijzingen.
Proefpersonen werd verteld dat ze goed op deze aanwijzingen moesten letten, want als ze
de route vergaten en daarna fout reden, zouden ze met korte routeaanwijzingen weer
teruggestuurd worden naar waar ze eerder de aanwijzingen hadden gekregen, en zouden ze
dus veel langer bezig zijn. De aanwijzingen begonnen altijd 5 (bij 2 aanwijzingen) of 8
seconden (bij 3 aanwijzingen) voordat de proefpersoon op een kruispunt zou aankomen (in
een rijsimulator kan de computer natuurlijk uitrekenen wanneer een proefpersoon op de
kruising zal zijn bij ongewijzigde snelheid). Dit zorgde ervoor dat de routeaanwijzingen
nog bezig waren als de proefpersoon op het kruispunt aankwam. In de helft van de gevallen
was er helemaal geen auto op dit kruispunt, in de andere gevallen kwam er een auto van
links. Deze auto van links moest gewoon voorrang geven aan de proefpersoon. De groep
proefpersonen was gesplitst in twee groepen. Bij de ene groep gaf die auto van links ook
keurig voorrang, maar bij de andere groep reed de auto van links in de helft van de gevallen
door zonder voorrang aan de proefpersoon te geven. Deze proefpersonen moesten dan echt
actie ondernemen om een botsing te voorkomen. De verwachting was dat sommige
proefpersonen problemen zouden kunnen hebben met het combineren van deze twee taken:
een ongeluk voorkomen en tegelijkertijd de routeaanwijzingen onthouden. Deze
proefpersonen stonden in zo’n geval dus voor een dilemma: waar zouden ze de meeste
aandacht aan geven?
Als proefpersonen twee routeaanwijzingen kregen, reden ze eigenlijk nooit fout. Maar drie
routeaanwijzingen waren duidelijk moeilijker te onthouden en daar ging het wel eens mis.
Niet als de auto van links gewoon voorrang gaf: berekend over het hele experiment, reed
8% van de proefpersonen fout. Maar als er door de proefpersoon ingegrepen moest worden
om een botsing met de auto van links te voorkomen, reed maar liefst 41% fout. Er was maar
een proefpersoon die echt een botsing kreeg maar deze reed later ook fout, dus hoewel haar
prioriteiten niet bij het verkeer leken te liggen, wilde dat niet zeggen dat ze de
routeaanwijzingen belangrijker vond.
Al met al zijn dit belangrijke gegevens, want het blijkt dus dat automobilisten aan het
voorkomen van een ongeluk meer belang hechten dan aan route-informatie. Omdat route-
informatie voor automobilisten zo belangrijk is, mag aangenomen worden dat er weinig
andere informatie is waar automobilisten zich wel door laten afleiden als zich gevaarlijke





Het laatste hoofdstuk bestaat uit een samenvatting van de resultaten van de experimenten.
Al met al kan gezegd worden dat proefpersonen soms wonderbaarlijk goede prestaties
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weten te leveren: bijvoorbeeld als ze heel hard rijden (in Experiment 2) kunnen ze nog goed
luisteren naar de verkeersinformatie, hoewel dit wel veel inspanning vergde. Toch zijn er
veel verschillen in prestaties, en de belangrijkste reden daarvoor is dat proefpersonen, en
automobilisten in het algemeen, heel strategisch omgaan met hoge werkdruk. Ze maken een
duidelijk onderscheid tussen belangrijke en minder belangrijke informatie en taken. Het
belangrijkst bleken inderdaad de beide hoofddoelen van autorijden te zijn: op de plaats van
bestemming komen, en geen ongelukken krijgen. Maar het belangrijkste bleek het
voorkomen van ongelukken.
Dat laatste is theoretisch gezien van groot belang omdat het voorkomen van ongelukken
een taak op een laag niveau in de taakhiërarchie van het autorijden is. Uit dit proefschrift
blijkt dat de plaats in de doelhiërarchie belangrijker is dan de plaats in de taakhiërarchie:
het voorkomen van een ongeluk is een belangrijker doel dan het onthouden van een route.
Een van de belangrijkste practische consequenties van dit onderzoek is dat hoge eisen
moeten worden gesteld aan het ontwerp van routegeleidingssystemen. Route-informatie is
immers heel belangrijk voor automobilisten en zij zullen er veel voor over hebben om die
informatie ook te krijgen. Deze informatie is vooral nodig vlak voor kruispunten en dat zijn
moeilijke verkeerssituaties waar op veel dingen gelet moet worden. Juist daarom moet de
route-informatie zo helder en duidelijk mogelijk worden aangeboden, dus niet met digitale
kaartjes maar gewoon met een heldere stem, eventueel aangevuld met eenvoudige pijlen op
een eenvoudig schermpje op het dashboard. Het staat natuurlijk minder indrukwekkend dan
een hele digitale kaart op je dashboard maar het is wel veel veiliger.
De belangrijkste vraag in dit proefschrift was de mate waarin automobilisten zich laten
afleiden door informatie. Dit blijkt dus vooral afhankelijk te zijn van het belang van de
informatie. Autotelefoons vormen natuurlijk een belangrijke bron van afleiding. Op grond
van deze experimenten zou je kunnen veronderstellen dat het belang van het gesprek
invloed heeft op de mate waarin zo’n gesprek afleidt. Voor zakelijke bellers die belangrijke
zaken regelen zal het moeilijker zijn het gesprek te negeren dan voor mensen die even naar
huis bellen om te zeggen dat ze wat later komen. Zo zal verkeersinformatie voor zakelijke
rijders die hun route nog kunnen veranderen, belangrijker zijn dan voor de forens die
gewoon elke dag in dezelfde file staat.
Verder is het van belang dat rijgedrag alleen aangepast kan worden (bijvoorbeeld
langzamer gaan rijden) als er niet te veel eisen worden gesteld aan de automobilisten.
Handelsreizigers, bus- en vrachtwagenchauffeurs hebben vaak tijden waaraan ze zich
moeten houden en in dat geval is er weinig ruimte voor gedragsaanpassingen die de hoge
werkdruk zou kunnen wegnemen, en dat zou de verkeersveiligheid wel degelijk in gevaar
kunnen brengen. Aan de andere kant zijn beroepschauffeurs natuurlijk wel heel ervaren
chauffeurs. Mogelijk, maar dit is nog niet goed onderzocht, kunnen zij veel meer dingen




Hoewel het schrijven van een proefschrift een eenzame aangelegenheid is (die overigens
met goede achtergrondmuziek te veraangenamen valt), is een proefschrift niet het product
van alleen de promovendus. In dit laatste stukje proefschrift wil ik daarom een aantal
mensen bedanken voor hun hulp bij het totstandkomen van dit proefschrift. Allereerst moet
ik mijn beide promotoren bedanken voor hun begeleiding. Theo en Talib, voor mij waren
jullie, inhoudelijk en persoonlijk, de perfecte begeleiders. En als haar promotoren bij een
kille dag in augustus al het raam uit kijken, en constateren dat het alweer bijna schaatsweer
is, heeft de promovendus geen klagen over het inlevingsvermogen bij haar promotoren.
Talib, ik wil je bedanken voor je hulp bij mijn onderzoek en het schrijven van dit
proefschrift. Je kennis van het vakgebied was zeer welkom, en je kritische houding ten
aanzien van mijn onderzoek (“en als je dat dan weet, wat schiet je daar dan mee op?”) heeft
zeker bijgedragen tot een beter proefschrift. Voor zover mogelijk, was jij nog kritischer op
het ontwerp van de experimenten en de inhoud van mijn proefschrift dan ik zelf al was, en
ik was er blij om.
Theo, ook jou wil ik bedanken voor je grote inbreng in dit proefschrift. Je hebt een groot
stempel gedrukt op de inhoud en richting van dit proefschrift, en iedereen die jou kent zal
jouw invloed op dit proefschrift zeker herkennen. Zonder jou was dit proefschrift blijven
steken bij (wellicht interessante) theoretische bespiegelingen over mentale belasting. Het
inzicht dat fundamentele theorieën en de praktijk zo met elkaar verweven zijn, is niet voor
iedereen gemeengoed. Ik ben dan ook blij dat je halverwege dit project mijn promotor
wilde worden.
Uiteraard ben ik ook de heren van de leescommissie, Prof. dr. J. Theeuwes, Prof. dr. A.
Hale en Prof. dr. R.A. Roe erkentelijk voor het kritisch doorlezen en beoordelen van het
uiteindelijke proefschrift (en natuurlijk voor de goedkeuring ervan).
Natuurlijk zijn er veel VSC-collega’s die ik wil bedanken voor hun hulp. Allereerst wil ik
Karel bedanken. Karel, vooral in het begin was je nauw betrokken bij mijn onderzoek.
Hoewel terugkijken op het verleden niet altijd tot zinvolle perspectieven op de toekomst
leidt, moet toch gememoreerd worden dat dit onderzoek al voor aanvang zijn geldschieter
en opdrachtgever kwijt was en dat het een reorganisatie en een verhuizing heeft moeten
doorstaan. Karel, je hebt altijd je uiterste best gedaan om desondanks de juiste werk-
omstandigheden te waarborgen, en maar weinig managers zullen zo pal voor hun personeel
staan als jij; en ik waardeer je erom.
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Verder was dit proefschrift er nooit geweest zonder de hulp van Wim van Winsum en Peter
van Wolffelaar. Wim, bedankt voor met name je hulp bij de scenario’s. Ik zal nooit
vergeten hoe jij een werkelijk “zeer complex” scenario zo even binnen een uurtje schreef en
testte, waar een ander daar twee dagen over had gedaan. Peter, het was een genoegen met je
te werken. Je kalme en vriendelijke manier van werken, en je realisme in moeilijkere tijden
maken je tot een fijne collega. Ook Peter Albronda wil ik bedanken omdat hij altijd klaar
stond om plotselinge problemen te verhelpen.
Ynze van Houten wil ik bedanken voor het minutieus simuleren van het wegennet van
Stuttgart en omgeving, waar ik maar liefst drie experimenten heb gedaan. Dick de Waard
en Frank Steyvers wil ik o.a. bedanken voor het helpen bij het experimenteren, net als Aleid
Erbrink, die ook heeft geholpen bij het maken van de scenario’s. Joyce van Dorssen wil ik
bedanken voor het printen en versturen van de artikelen. Verder wil ik met name nog Koen
Kok, Marika Hoedemaeker, Harry Bakker, Anneke Menting, en Edith van der Heiden en
andere collega’s bedanken voor hun bijdrage aan een fijne werksfeer. Rineke Richters wil
ik daarnaast nog extra bedanken omdat ze mijn paranimf wilde zijn.
Ook wil ik twee mensen bedanken wier expertise ik zoveel mogelijk heb benut. Allereerst
Niels Taatgen die vanaf het begin tot het einde steeds bereid was mee te denken met mijn
onderzoek (zelfs al voordat ik nog maar aangenomen was…). Ook bedankt voor het kritisch
doorlezen van de belangrijkste delen van hoofdstuk 4. Ook Ben Mulder wil ik bedanken:
vanaf de eerste, toen nog vreemde en onverklaarbare hartslagresultaten ben je mijn
vraagbaak geweest wat betreft het meten en analyseren van de fysiologische data. Ik
waardeer het erg dat je altijd weer tijd voor me hebt uitgetrokken.
En natuurlijk wil ik Monique van der Hulst bedanken: Monique, je was mijn perfecte
collega-aio, en zonder jou was het allemaal veel minder leuk geweest. Natuurlijk hebben
we vele zinvolle inhoudelijke discussies gehad, maar bovenal hebben we elkaar veel en
vaak van het werk gehouden, en daar heb ik geen seconde spijt van. Ik ben blij dat we zulke
goede vriendinnen zijn geworden.
Verder wil ik niet al mijn vrienden hier persoonlijk bedanken, want met dit proefschrift
hebben zij vrij weinig van doen gehad. Toch wil ik graag opmerken dat ik blij ben dat jullie
er voor me zijn, in goede en minder goede tijden. Het feit, dat je dit proefschrift in handen
hebt, mag je beschouwen als het bewijs dat ik je aanwezigheid in mijn vriendenkring zeer
op prijs stel.
En als laatste, en niet in het minst, wil ik graag (mijn ware) Jacob bedanken voor zijn steun,
en zijn afleiding tijdens de afgelopen jaren. Jacob, zonder jou was het proefschrift ook wel
afgekomen, en misschien zelfs wel sneller. Nooit heb ik geweten dat er zoveel school-
vakanties waren, en zulke lange ook. Maar lieve Jacob, zonder jou was de hoogste heuvel
die ik ooit op de fiets met bagage beklommen had, nog steeds 320 meter geweest, en dat
terwijl het hoog boven in de echte bergen zo mooi is. En hoewel ik het klimmen steeds
minder beschouw als een noodzakelijk kwaad, had ik vooral de snelle afdalingen niet
willen missen. Dus hoe lang het ook heeft geduurd voor dit proefschrift af was: uiteindelijk
is voor mij het plezier dat wij de afgelopen jaren samen hebben gehad, uit en thuis, veel
belangrijker geweest.
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